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The Paris Agreement sets out the goal of limiting the increase in global average temperature to 
within 2°C. Incentive mechanisms and low-carbon policies, such as emission trading schemes 
(ETS), feed-in tariffs, carbon taxation, renewable obligation and emission performance 
standards, are key instruments for achieving greenhouse gas emissions reduction. The cap-and-
trade ETS is one of the most popular policy instruments in controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions. The carbon price quoted from the ETS allowances price is usually considered by 
investors as the economic value of carbon emissions in formulating a long-term investment 
decision. However, the allowances price is currently quite low across jurisdictions. Thus, in 
order to incentivise large-scale and long-term low-carbon investment, a clear and strong carbon 
pricing signal is essential.  
There are divergent but increasingly prevalent views that additional policies may affect carbon 
prices, as the emission reduction effect of parallel policies would reduce the demand for 
allowances in the ETS, thus lower carbon prices could hamper the ETS’s capacity to promote 
low-carbon technologies over the medium and long term. This PhD study investigates how 
parallel energy and climate policies might affect carbon pricing in ETS and illustrates 
stakeholders’ views on this impact. The study defines the ‘cross-over effect’ of parallel energy 
and climate policies.  
A two-stage survey, including a closed-form questionnaire followed by open interviews, was 
conducted to elicit views and expectations of stakeholders on one of the carbon markets in 
China, the Guangdong ETS pilot, with an emphasis on perspectives on how the ETS may 
interact with other existing or proposed low-carbon and clean energy policies. Our survey 
results show that academic stakeholders, more than stakeholders from other sectors, viewed 
the policy interactions as a significant issue for developing a carbon market in China, and there 
was a positive correlation between recognition of such policy interactions and the time spent 
on energy saving and emission reduction policies. Relatively few respondents identified 
correctly the fact that both increasing renewable targets and imposing a carbon tax in addition 
to an existing ETS would be expected to depress prices in the ETS. Apart from government 
respondents, all other key stakeholders generally lacked confidence in China’s carbon markets, 
due to their lack of knowledge and information about the market and their concerns regarding 
uncertainties and failures in government policy and regulation. 
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Subsequently, an empirical study was conducted to probe the underlying rationality of pricing 
behaviour and the effect of policy interaction with low-carbon policy in seven ETS pilots in 
China using ordinary least square and event-based regression. The empirical results show that, 
first, crude oil and domestic liquid natural gas are positively linked to the allowance price in 
the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong pilots, while coal price lacks explanatory power. Second, 
extreme weather is positively correlated with Shenzhen carbon prices. Third, in contrast to 
existing studies, a positive correlation is found between renewable energy supply and carbon 
prices in the Tianjin carbon market, and low-carbon policy that intends to promote renewable 
energy would increase carbon prices in the Guangdong pilot. Finally, ETS regulatory events, 
such as the announcement on surrender date (adjustment) and offset limitation, will increase 
price variations in the Shenzhen and Tianjin pilots respectively. Overall, the empirical results 
currently indicate that ETS pilots in China are segmented, but not as rational as previous studies 
suggest.  
Finally, the potential benefits of linking emissions markets across countries and regions are 
well recognised. In theory, a global market provides more flexibility for parties to achieve 
reductions in emissions at the lowest marginal cost across all covered sectors. Therefore, 
quantifying the impact of emission trading market linkage would generate essential references 
for the forming of a global market. Driven by the above motivation, the GTAP-Energy (GTAP-
E) model was employed to assess the impact of carbon market linkage. Our results indicate 
that, although the abatement costs increase in the Chinese carbon market after the linkage, the 
strong and robust carbon price could give investors a correct signal on the value of carbon 
emission. Furthermore, a linkage between the Chinese carbon market and the international 
markets leads to a significantly smaller GDP reduction in China, 0.04% compared to the non-
linkage scenario (0.88%). In addition, allowing multilateral trading of emissions among these 
countries shifts the burden of the reduction away from oil products in the relatively carbon-
efficient economies towards coal in the less carbon-efficient regions. This induces a substantial 
reduction of the marginal abatement costs in the above economies. 
In summary, this PhD research investigates stakeholders’ views on the Chinese carbon market 
as well as interactions between energy and climate change policies; it also discovers the price 
drivers for carbon prices in China’s pilot ETSs and assesses the impact of including Chinese 
ETSs in a global emission trading system. Moving forward, as the results suggest that the 
Chinese pilot ETSs may not be rational and most market participants are not fully aware of the 
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function of the carbon market since they merely fulfil the need for government. The next step 





Table of contents 
 
Declarations ........................................................................................................................................... II 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. III 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. IV 
Table of contents ................................................................................................................................. VII 
List of Tables & Figures ....................................................................................................................... X 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 12 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1.2 Research motivations and research questions ............................................................. 14 
1.1.3 Research findings and contributions ............................................................................ 17 
1.1.4 Structure of the thesis................................................................................................... 19 
1.2 Literature review ................................................................................................................... 20 
1.2.1 International climate change policy framework ........................................................... 20 
1.2.2 Climate change policy development in China ............................................................... 26 
1.2.2.1 Energy saving and emission reduction in China ............................................................ 27 
1.2.2.2 Emission trading schemes in China ............................................................................... 29 
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 36 
Stakeholder views on the carbon market and interactions between low-carbon policies in China: 
Lessons from the Guangdong ETS .................................................................................................... 36 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 36 
2.2 Literature review ......................................................................................................................... 40 
2.3 Methodology and demographic information ....................................................................... 44 
2.3.1 Internet-based questionnaire design ............................................................................ 45 
2.3.2 Semi-structured telecom interview design ................................................................... 46 
2.3.3 Demographic information of respondents ................................................................... 46 
2.3.4 Univariate regression analysis ...................................................................................... 47 
2.4 Results and discussion .......................................................................................................... 48 
2.4.1 Perspectives on emissions reduction and the carbon market in China ........................ 48 
2.4.2 Perceptions of interactions between incentives .......................................................... 56 
2.4.3 Challenges for Chinese carbon markets ........................................................................ 62 
2.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 64 
VIII 
 
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................................................. 67 
An empirical study of carbon price determinants and the impact of other low-carbon policies on 
Chinese pilot ETSs .............................................................................................................................. 67 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 67 
3.2 Literature review ................................................................................................................... 70 
3.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 75 
3.3.1 Dataset .......................................................................................................................... 75 
3.3.1.1 Carbon prices ................................................................................................................ 75 
3.3.1.2 Explanatory variables .................................................................................................... 76 
3.3.2 Empirical method .......................................................................................................... 78 
3.3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares ................................................................................................. 78 
3.3.2.2 Event-based study ......................................................................................................... 79 
3.4 Results and findings .............................................................................................................. 80 
3.4.1 Empirical results ............................................................................................................ 80 
3.4.2 Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 82 
3.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 86 
Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................................................. 88 
Impact of emission trading market linkage on the carbon price .................................................... 88 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 88 
4.2 Literature review ................................................................................................................... 89 
4.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 92 
4.3.1 General features of the CGE Model .............................................................................. 92 
4.3.2 Model equilibrium......................................................................................................... 94 
4.4 Model description ................................................................................................................. 95 
4.4.1 Regions .......................................................................................................................... 95 
4.4.2 Sectors ........................................................................................................................... 96 
4.4.3 Scenarios ....................................................................................................................... 97 
4.5 Results and findings .............................................................................................................. 99 
4.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 101 
Chapter 5 ........................................................................................................................................... 104 
Conclusion and policy recommendations ....................................................................................... 104 
5.1 Summary of findings ........................................................................................................... 105 
5.2 Policy implications .............................................................................................................. 107 
5.3 Limitations and scope for future work................................................................................ 109 
IX 
 
5.3.1 Comprehensive review on stakeholder views on carbon market ................................ 109 
5.3.2 Quantitative assessment of policy interactions ........................................................... 109 
5.3.3 Validating energy-oriented CGE models .................................................................... 110 
5.3.4 Bottom-up approach for ETS linking .......................................................................... 111 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 114 
Appendices ......................................................................................................................................... 133 
Appendix A: Questionnaire results ............................................................................................. 133 
Appendix B: Regression results ................................................................................................... 139 
Appendix C: Policy events data ................................................................................................... 141 
Appendix D: Cross-correlation of all variables .......................................................................... 145 





List of Tables & Figures 
Table 1-1 Range of energy and climate policies that reduce GHGs ............................................. 22 
Table 1-2 Energy-saving and emission reduction targets in the 11th, 12th and 13th Five-Year 
Plans ...................................................................................................................................... 27 
Table 1-3 Main national climate change policies in China ........................................................... 28 
Table 1-4 Overview of ETS pilots in China.................................................................................. 30 
Figure 2-1 Map of seven pilot ETSs in China............................................................................... 38 
Figure 2-2 Existing main national and Guangdong province climate change policies ................. 39 
Figure 2-3 Shift of abatement curve driven by parallel low-carbon policies ................................ 43 
Figure 2-4 Demographic information of respondents ................................................................... 46 
Figure 2-5 Perceived prediction of deep cuts in GHG intensity in China ..................................... 48 
Table 2-1 Output of univariate regression model Expect-Gov ..................................................... 49 
Figure 2-6 The most cost-effective policy instrument to reduce GHG emissions in China ......... 49 
Figure 2-7 Stakeholders’ assessment of progress of Chinese pilot ETS ....................................... 50 
Table 2-2 output of univariate regression model Assess-Acad ..................................................... 51 
Figure 2-8 Cross-analysis of stakeholder perspectives and assessment on Chinese carbon market
 .............................................................................................................................................. 51 
Table 2-3 Output of univariate regression model Prospect-Assess ............................................... 52 
Figure 2-9 Perceived expectation of average carbon price in Guangdong pilot ETS ................... 52 
Table 2-4 Output of univariate regression model Price-Acad ....................................................... 53 
Figure 2-10 Price and volume in Guangdong pilot ETS ............................................................... 55 
Figure 2-11 Main reasons for the collapse of the carbon price in the EU ETS............................. 57 
Figure 2-12 Stakeholder-expected market responses to ambitious renewable obligation and 
carbon tax policies ................................................................................................................ 58 
Figure 2-13 Respondent attitudes to statement of policy interactions .......................................... 58 
Table 2-5 Output of univariate regression model Attit-Acad ....................................................... 59 
Figure 2-14 Cross-analysis of stakeholders’ attitude towards possible conflicts between multiple 
incentives and time spent on energy-saving and emission reduction policies. ..................... 61 
XI 
 
Table 2-6 output of univariate regression model Attit-Time ........................................................ 61 
Table 2-7 Ranking of potential challenges with regard to MRV system ...................................... 63 
Table 2-8 Ranking potential challenges with regard to implementation ...................................... 63 
Figure 3-1 Timeline of ETS development in China ...................................................................... 68 
Figure 3-2 EUA price collapses 2006 - 2007 ................................................................................ 69 
Table 3-1 Overview of carbon prices raw data ............................................................................. 76 
Table 3-2 Dataset summary .......................................................................................................... 78 
Table 3-3 Summary of impacts on carbon prices from explanatory factors ................................. 81 
Figure 3-3 China primary energy consumption by fuel type 2010-2016 ...................................... 82 
Figure 4-1 Circular flow of goods and services in the model ....................................................... 93 
Figure 4-2 Illustration of Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) ........................................................ 95 
Table 4-1 Regions covered in the model....................................................................................... 96 
Table 4-2 Sectors covered in the model ........................................................................................ 96 
Table 4-3 Scenarios in the model .................................................................................................. 97 
Table 4-4 Marginal costs of achieving the reduction target ........................................................ 100 
Table 4-5 Emission reduction under different scenarios ............................................................. 100 






1.1 Introduction  
Over the past few decades, a number of extreme climate events, such as Hurricane Katrina in 
the US in 2003, unusually heavy rain in the UK in 2013 and devastating sandstorms in Northern 
China, have forced us to face climate change caused by global warming, one of the major 
threats to human development. If global warming cannot be contained, a lot of islands and 
cities will be in danger of disappearing from the world map (IPCC, 2014).  
Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, almost every country in the world (184 Parties have ratified 
the Convention) agreed to keep global temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 
degrees Celsius (°C) (United Nations, 2015). The report by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) assessed that the 1.5°C would be almost certainly reached within 20 
years without major cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. The impact and costs of 1.5°C of global 
warming will be far greater than expected (IPCC, 2018).  
Cutting greenhouse gases (GHGs) is widely recognised as the most direct way to curb global 
warming. According to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), in order to limit the increase of average global temperature below 2℃ by 
stabilising GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a certain level (approximately 450 ppm 
CO2 equivalent), binding quantitative targets of reducing GHGs were set in the Kyoto Protocol 
(1998) for 37 industrialised countries and the European Union.  
To achieve the emission reduction goal, various market-based instruments have been 
developed in the last two decades, including emission trading schemes (ETS), renewable 
obligations, carbon taxation and feed-in tariffs (FITs). Among all the market-based 
instruments, there is no doubt that the ETS plays an important role in optimising the overall 
cost for reducing GHGs. Specifically, an ETS with a ‘cap-and-trade’ principle implies that a 
certain amount of emissions allowances can be issued during a trading period. The allowances 
are distributed by market regulators for free or for auction based on historical emission data of 
listed enterprises. Afterwards, if the emission abatement cost is lower than the market price of 
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the emission allowance in the ETS, enterprises tend to sell the extra allowance by deploying 
emission abatement measures. Conversely, if the abatement cost is higher, enterprises will 
purchase allowances in the ETS to avoid additional costs (MacKenzie, 2009).  
Since the launch of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005, the emission trading 
mechanism has become a popular instrument to facilitate carbon dioxide mitigation globally 
(The World Bank, 2014). As of 2016, ETSs were operating across four continents in 35 
countries, 13 states or provinces, and seven cities, covering 40 per cent of global GDP, and 
additional systems were under development (The World Bank, 2016). The most prominent 
emerging market schemes are China’s pilot ETSs, which, taken together, makes them the 
second largest carbon market in the world with more than 1,000 MtCO2e (The World Bank, 
2014).  
By putting a price on the carbon emissions pollution associated with business activity, climate 
impact caused by companies’ operations can be taken into account and therefore incentives for 
reducing emissions can be put into place. Pricing carbon also responds to stakeholder and 
investor calls for climate action and ETS allowance price is often used as a proxy for the cost 
of carbon emission pricing. Therefore, a correct emission price signal in the ETS is essential 
for stimulating long-term, large-scale investment in emission reduction as enterprises will trade 
off between emission abatement and allowance purchase. However, currently there is a 
mismatch between the visible carbon price and the actual cost of carbon abatement in ETSs. 
In theory, multiple incentives for mitigating GHGs should have the combined force to achieve 
emission reduction targets. However, experiences in the EU ETS and previous literature show 
that the traded carbon allowance prices are usually affected by other parallel carbon reduction 
incentives that could reduce the actual demand for carbon allowances.  
Furthermore, although China is currently piloting ETS designs at the provincial level and a 
trading market at the national level was formed at the end of 2017, China has indicated that it 
would consider participating in an international carbon market. Given the scale of China’s 
economy and energy system, its energy trends and climate policies will have a significant 
impact on global climate change mitigation. Additionally, the linkage may reduce the impact 
from interactions of parallel incentives for carbon reduction.  
Therefore, identifying what impact climate policy interactions, as well as a linked global carbon 
market, have on carbon price is vital for ETS design and reform, especially for the emerging 
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carbon market in China, as the results could provide policymakers with a reference for 
formulating an ideal carbon market system, avoiding the detours experienced by other ETSs. 
Thus, this PhD research attempts to employ mixed research methods to solve the underlying 
problems that will be specified in the next subsection. 
1.1.2 Research motivations and research questions 
The EU ETS launched in 2005 is the largest emission trading system in the world covering 
almost half of the EU’s carbon emissions, with 11,000 installations. The EU ETS was designed 
to achieve the EU’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol of reducing GHGs by 20% by 2020 
based on 1990 levels (European Commission, 2015). In 2008, the EU introduced a binding 
renewable energy target stating that 20% of its energy consumption must be from renewable 
sources by the end of 2020; the original intention of the supplemental policy was to help 
motivate carbon emission reduction. Theoretically, renewable obligations and the ETS would 
promote each other directly, adoption of renewable energy would contribute to carbon emission 
reduction while carbon abatement instruments would stimulate renewable energy (Fischer and 
Preonas, 2010). 
In the first two phases of the EU ETS from 2005 to 2012, EU allowances (EUAs) were allocated 
rather than auctioned. Due to the over-allocation of EUAs and the economic depression after 
the financial crisis, most covered entities enjoyed a surplus of allowances and were thus not 
highly motivated to reduce their emissions (Cadez and Czerny, 2010). In other words, the 
system was not functional yet (Fan et al., 2013). 
Although economic recession (IETA, 2014) and allowance allocation rules (Schleich et al., 
2009) were generally recognised as the principal causes, the interactions between the emission 
trading market and parallel energy and low-carbon policies also contributed to the weakening 
impact on the ETS, which have not been widely investigated.   
In the case of the EU ETS, David Hone (Hone, 2013b), climate change advisor for Shell, 
concludes that other low-carbon policies (e.g. renewable obligations) have distorted emissions 
mitigation economics across the EU, and the recession has further exacerbated the situation. 
Policy interactions are increasingly considered important barriers to introducing a new ETS as 
it would operate in parallel with pre-existing regulations and interact with each other directly 




Currently most studies with respect to interactions between climate change policies focus on 
Europe in scope; few have focused on China to discover the potential risk of carbon market 
failure caused by co-existing and competitive low-carbon incentives.  
As the largest emitter in the world (Liu et al., 2013b), China is applying diverse climate change 
policies including energy conservation, renewable energy development as well as launching 
pilot ETSs in seven cities (Zheng, 2013). There are only a few studies on ETSs in China, mainly 
focusing on describing the market features and characteristics (Cheng and Zhang, 2011, Zhang 
et al., 2014a), as well as the market design and relevant legal and regulation issues (Zeng, 2010, 
Wei and Tian, 2013), or modelling the economic performance and impact of emission trading 
in China (Liu and Dai, 2004) (Zhou et al., 2013). Recognising the significance of the potential 
impact of parallel policies and the emerging carbon market in China, as well as the limits of 
existing simulation-based assessment methods of policy interaction, it is important to 
understand future trends. The trends would be determined by the perception of key stakeholders 
such as policy makers and market participants. 
From a bottom-up perspective, an ETS is a public climate change market-based policy 
influenced by multiple sector stakeholders; the government is the policy maker that regulates 
and supervises the implementation of the carbon market, while industry enterprises are the 
market participants that reduce emissions and maximise the economic benefits at the same 
time. Moreover, public participation of academia and NGOs should always be included 
throughout the whole policy-making process including designing, implementing and 
monitoring (Yang et al., 2010). 
Therefore, stakeholder views on carbon markets are critical because policy construction can be 
influenced directly from, or improved by, government determination, participant confidence 
and enthusiasm, as well as public cognition and acceptance.  
Motivated by the above, the first two research questions centring on the interactions between 
ETS and other low-carbon policies are as below: 
 Research question I: what are stakeholders' views on emission reduction, 
implementation of ETS and interactions between ETSs and other climate change and 
low-carbon policies in China? 
This study is interested in stakeholder views on a range of issues related to Chinese 
energy-saving and emission reduction policies, including evaluation of low-carbon 
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incentives, perspectives on Chinese pilot ETSs and understanding of the interactions 
between carbon markets and other climate change and low-carbon policies. 
Specifically, the study is interested in stakeholders’ views on the potential conflict 
between ETSs and other energy and climate change policies, and how they assess the 
policy interactions’ impact on price in China’s carbon markets.  
 Research question II: what are the price drivers and the impact of parallel energy 
and low-carbon policies on carbon prices in China? 
Seven pilot ETSs in China have successively been in operation since 2013; this study 
intends to empirically investigate the underlying rationality of pricing behaviour in 
those carbon markets and the effect of policy interaction with low-carbon policy in the 
China’s seven ETS pilots. 
On the other hand, the potential benefits of linking emission trading markets across countries 
and regions are well recognised. A global market provides more flexibility for parties to 
achieve emissions reductions at the lowest marginal cost across all covered sectors. Some hope 
that this global expansion of carbon markets will revive their fortunes, helping to raise 
investments in low-carbon and climate change mitigation technologies. Although China is 
currently piloting ETS designs at the provincial level, a trading market at the national level had 
just commenced construction at the end of 2017. Additionally, China has indicated that it would 
consider participating in an international carbon market. Given the scale of China’s economy 
and energy system, its energy trends and climate policies will have a significant impact on 
global climate change mitigation.  
As a single global carbon market is an unlikely outcome in the near future following the Paris 
Agreement, it is more likely that any international trading system will grow out of a network 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements authorised and entered into voluntarily by participating 
parties. Therefore, a third research question is raised as below: 
 Research question III: what is the impact of linking ETSs across countries and 
regions on carbon prices? 
This study evaluates the impact of linking ETSs in China with other ETSs, and the 






1.1.3 Research findings and contributions 
To answer the first research question, a two-stage survey including a closed-form questionnaire 
followed by open interviews was conducted to elicit views and expectations of stakeholders on 
carbon markets in China (Guangdong pilot), with an emphasis on stakeholder perspectives of 
how the ETS may interact with other existing or proposed low-carbon and clean energy 
policies.  
The survey shows that academic stakeholders, rather than stakeholders from other sectors, 
viewed the policy interactions as a significant obstacle for developing a carbon market in 
China, and there is a positive correlation between the recognition of such policy interactions 
and the time spent on energy-saving and emission reduction policies. Whereas both increasing 
renewable targets and imposing a carbon tax in addition to an existing ETS would be expected 
to depress prices in the ETS, relatively few respondents identified this correctly. Apart from 
government respondents, all other key stakeholders generally lacked confidence in China’s 
carbon markets, due to their lack of knowledge and information about the market and their 
concerns regarding uncertainties and failures in government policy and regulation. 
Contributions from the first study within this PhD project are as follows: first, although 
previous studies suggest parallel low-carbon policies would influence allowance prices in the 
ETS and send industry wrong signals (Richstein et al., 2015, Syri and Cross, 2013, Fischer and 
Preonas, 2010, Bohringer and Rosendahl, 2010, Pethig and Wittlich, 2009), there has been little 
work on potential policy interaction in China and on related stakeholder beliefs.  This is the 
first survey with a focus on the interaction of low-carbon and energy policies in China, thereby 
filling the literature gap. Second, learning lessons from existing pilot emission trading systems 
are crucial in designing a cost-effective national ETS in China. This study will open the 
discussion and provide policymakers with a better understanding of some of the built-in biases 
and perceptions of key actors. The investigation of stakeholders’ views on the Chinese carbon 
market and their perceptions of policy interaction would benefit the future design, construction, 
operation and improvement of emission reduction incentives and instruments. 
Subsequently, an empirical study was conducted to address the second question by probing the 
underlying rationality of pricing behaviour and the effect of policy interaction with low-carbon 
policy in the seven Chinese ETS pilots during 2014-2016 using an ordinary least square (OLS) 
and event-based regression model. Compared to existing studies focusing on the price drivers 
of the Chinese ETS pilots (Lin and Jia, 2019, Fan et al., 2013, Zhao et al., 2017), this study 
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will complement the introduction of further renewable energy and extreme weather as 
explanatory variables, and take a step beyond by demonstrating the effect on allowance prices 
of policy interactions between renewable energy policy and ETSs.  
The empirical results show that, first, crude oil and domestic liquid natural gas are positively 
linked to the allowance price in the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong pilots, while the price 
of coal lacks explanatory power. Second, extreme weather is positively correlated with 
Shenzhen carbon prices. Third, in contrast to existing studies (Tu and Mo, 2017, Koch et al., 
2014), a positive correlation is demonstrated between renewable energy supply and carbon 
prices in the Tianjin carbon market, and low-carbon policy for promoting renewables raises 
carbon prices in the Guangdong pilot Finally, ETS regulatory events, such as the announcement 
on surrender date (adjustment) and offset limitation influences price changes in the Shenzhen 
and Tianjin pilots respectively. Overall, the empirical results indicate current ETS pilots in 
China are segmented and irrational.  
The second study contributes the following: first of all, it fills and extends the current empirical 
analysis of pricing behaviour in Chinese ETSs by further incorporating renewable energy 
factors and extreme weather as additional explanatory variables. This is the first attempt by 
empirical analysis in assessing the impact of parallel low-carbon policy on allowance prices in 
China. Second, China’s ambitious emission reduction target (60-65% carbon-intensity 
reduction from 2005 levels by 2030) could only be achieved under a functional and efficient 
policy framework; therefore, understanding the interactions between incentives will benefit the 
development and improvement of climate change policy, maximise the efficiency of the carbon 
trading market, effectively promote carbon abatement with a clear carbon price signal, and 
provide insight into the dynamic relationship between renewable promotion policy and carbon 
price series.   
Furthermore, to assess the impact of linking carbon markets around the world, the GTAP-E 
model is employed to simulate the linkage. Our results indicate that, although the abatement 
costs increase in the Chinese carbon market after the linkage, a strong and robust carbon price 
could give investors the right price signal on the value of carbon emissions. Additionally, a 
link between the Chinese and the international carbon markets leads to a significantly alleviated 
GDP decline in China, resulting in 0.04% reduction in GDP compared to the non-linkage 
scenario of 0.88% reduction in GDP. In addition, allowing multilateral trading of emissions 
among these countries shifts the burden of the reduction away from oil producers in the 
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relatively carbon-efficient economies towards coal in the less carbon-efficient regions. This 
induces a substantial reduction of the marginal abatement costs in the above economies. 
The third study contributes the following: first, using a top-down approach, this research 
verifies and replenishes the carbon market linkage analysis based on previous studies. With a 
modified and extended computable general equilibrium model, it verifies the validity of 
applying a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in assessing climate change policy. 
Second, the study generates essential references for confirming the potential benefits and 
energy consumption tendency brought by forming an international emission trading market. A 
growing number of countries are integrating cap-and-trade schemes into their national climate 
policies, but there are currently only a few links between trading schemes. Because of the 
diversity in numerous features of existing and emerging schemes, it is appropriate to ask a 
variety of questions, including whether the schemes can be linked and what impact such a 
linkage would bring to the relevant parties. The results show that linking results in a 
convergence of allowance prices and linking promises a wider range of abatement costs in the 
market by expanding the range of available mitigation options. The results could provide 
valuable references for policymakers in formulating an efficient policy framework of carbon 
market linkage.  
1.1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 states the motivations for the study and the 
research questions following from the motivations. This chapter also presents a comprehensive 
review of the literature within the research context. Chapter 2 investigates stakeholder views 
on interactions between parallel climate and low-carbon policies using a two-stage survey, 
followed by an empirical study to discover the rationality of pricing behaviour and the effect 
of policy interaction on the Chinese carbon market in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 assesses the 
quantitative impact of global carbon market linkage. Conclusions, policy implications and 







1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1  International climate change policy framework 
The first step in tackling global warming and climate change is the United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992. The Convention came into force in 1994 aiming to prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system (United Nations, 1992). At the end of 1997, the Kyoto 
Protocol was structured on the principles of the Convention, but due to the complex ratification 
process, the Protocol did not come into force until 2005. Binding emission reduction targets 
were set for 37 industrialised countries and the European Union, as these developed countries 
are largely responsible for the current high levels of GHGs in the atmosphere. These targets 
add up to an average five per cent reduction in emissions based on 1990 levels over the first 
commitment period 2008 to 2012. After the first five-year period, the second commitment 
period from 2013 to 2020 was launched in Doha.  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, three flexible and cost-efficient means have been offered in addition 
to those national measures for countries to meet their own targets: International Emissions 
Trading, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). CDM allows 
countries under the Protocol to implement an emission reduction project in developing 
countries and to earn tradable certified emission reduction credits (CERs) that equate to one 
tonne of CO2. JI allows countries under the Protocol to earn tradable emission reduction units 
(ERUs) by deploying emission reduction projects in other countries under the Protocol. The 
International Emissions Trading mechanism provides the platform for countries under the 
Protocol to trade spare emissions permits with other countries. Therefore, a new commodity 
was created in this platform; as carbon dioxide is the principal GHG, thus carbon is now tracked 
and traded like any other commodity in the emission trading market, or simply called the carbon 
market, and carbon pricing has become an important component of climate policies (UNFCCC, 
1998).   
As another key step for limiting average increases in global temperature, the Paris Agreement 
was reached in 2015 and came into force at the end of 2016. The Agreement aims to strengthen 
the global response to climate change by keeping global temperature rises this century to well 
below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase even further to 1.5°C. The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to put 
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forward their best efforts through ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) and to 
strengthen these efforts in the years ahead (United Nations, 2015). 
The above is a brief introduction to the development of the international climate change 
convention framework. Addressing climate change is a difficult and complex task because 
fossil fuel use runs throughout our economies and societies. No single policy can solve the 
issue, thus a carefully thought-through policy package including climate change or low-carbon 
policies and energy policies would be an optimal solution.  
There is a distinction between climate change policies and energy policies. Climate change or 
low-carbon policies have the primary goal of reducing emissions while energy security and 
affordability are the main objectives of energy policies with emission reductions as one of a 
number of their benefits. Climate change policies include carbon pricing, regulation of GHGs, 
subsidies for decarbonisation activities and supporting policies for low-carbon technologies 
such as carbon capture and storage. Energy policies that reduce emissions include energy 
performance standard, renewable energy support, energy taxes and subsidies. (Hood, 2013). 
Table 1-1 outlines a wide range of key policies that reduce GHGs.  
The transition to a decarbonised economy will require all investments to be on a low-carbon 
footing, thus requiring policy instruments which reach throughout the economy, influencing 
all production and consumption decisions. By putting a price on emissions to reflect the societal 
costs of climate change, carbon pricing plays a vital role in achieving the targets. The main 
policy option of carbon pricing is an emission trading system, which limits the emissions that 
can be emitted during a certain period. This system gives a direct price incentive for producers 
to shift towards clean investments and operations.  
Since the emergence of the EU ETS, the world has witnessed a rapid growth in GHG trading 
markets. The Swiss ETS was introduced in 2008 and now covers 55 companies from 25 
categories of activities. It is expected that the Swiss ETS will join the EU ETS in the near 
future. Following in the footsteps of Europe, the US, Canada and Japan have also launched 
market-based GHGs reduction programs in various forms. In the US, the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) began operating in 2009 and covers carbon dioxide emissions from 
power plants in nine northeast and Mid-Atlantic States. In Canada, in 2007 the province of 
Alberta set up a GHG reduction program under its Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER). 
However, since the SGER expired in September 2014, the current GHGs reduction program in 
Alberta is in the process of renewal. The largest cap-and-trade system is that of California, 
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which in 2014 linked up to the smaller cap-and-trade system in the province of Quebec. In 
addition, Japan has also established various sub-national systems since 2010, including ETSs 
in Tokyo, Kyoto and Saitama (The World Bank, 2014, The World Bank, 2016). 
Table 1-1 Range of energy and climate policies that reduce GHGs 
Policy type Policy option 
Market-based instruments Emission trading system 
Carbon taxation 






Requirements for operating certification 
Land use planning, zoning 
Technology support policies Feed-in tariffs 
Green certificates/renewable portfolio standard 
Public and private R&D funding 
Public investment in underpinning infrastructure for new technologies 
Policies to remove financial barriers to acquiring green technologies 
Information and voluntary 
approaches 
Education and training 
Product certification and labelling 
Award schemes 
Rating and labelling programmes 
(Source: Hood, 2013) 
Three major research trends have broadened the scope of climate policy development as of the 
last decade. First, the study of the adoption and integration of climate policy development; in 
these studies, command-and-control regulations and market-based instruments have been 
compared in terms of efficiency, commitment, credibility, flexibility, implementation and 
international cooperation (Hepburn, 2006, Tang et al., 2019, Ren et al., 2018, Haoqi et al., 
2017, González-Eguino, 2011) .  
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In recent years, a dominant view has emerged among researchers that market-based instruments 
have taken centre-stage in the debate on climate change policy (L.Sonneborn, 2004, Chameides 
and Oppenheimer, 2007, Turner and Daily, 2008, Patrinos and Bradley, 2009, Stavins, 2001, 
Wang and Chen, 2015). Tietenberg (2006) concluded that mitigation costs can be reduced by 
40%–95% by deploying market-based instruments. In addition to the rapid development of 
ETSs around the world, different types of environmental tax reforms have been introduced in 
Sweden, Norway and Germany (Patuelli et al., 2005). In addition, a regional effect has been 
observed in China (Haoqi et al., 2017), as command-and-control environmental regulation 
plays a positive role in eco-efficiency improvement whilst market-based regulation has no 
significant impact on the western region of China, in contrast to the eastern region (Ren et al., 
2018). 
The mainstream market-based instruments for emission reduction are carbon tax and emissions 
trading. There is a wealth of literature on cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of 
economic efficiency which started with Weitzman (1974), Weitzman (1978), which state that 
the choice of ETS or carbon tax measures is dependent on the relative slope of the marginal 
abatement cost and benefit curve of emission reduction.1 Many studies (Pizer, 1999, W.H.Parry 
and III, 1999, Pizer, 2002, Stranlund and Ben-Haim, 2008) have verified and extended 
Weitzman’s studies in both simulation and empirical analysis by taking unstructured 
uncertainties into account and these have confirmed that the rule still holds. Nevertheless, 
Shinkum and Sugeta (2016) further investigated Weitzman’s rule, and it seems the rule does 
not always hold when entry costs of firms and asymmetric information exist.   
Despite the pros and cons of emission trading systems and carbon taxation, the early literature 
favoured taxation policies based on a common perception of flat abatement benefits curves 
(Schlesinger, 2006, Alton et al., 2014, Pezzey and Jotzo, 2012). However, as more factors were 
brought into consideration, the advantages of emission trading systems became increasingly 
prominent (Chameides and Oppenheimer, 2007, Yang and Oppenheimer, 2007, Quirion, 2010, 
Wang et al., 2016, Xu et al., 2016, Barragán-Beaud et al., 2018, Liu et al., 2018). Finally, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, controlling the cumulative quantity of GHG emissions may 
be superior on efficiency grounds when marginal abatement costs are uncertain (Keohane, 
                                                          
1 If the absolute value of the slope of the marginal benefit curve is less than the absolute value of the slope of the 
marginal abatement cost curve, then price control policies (such as a carbon tax) will be more efficient than 
quantity control policies (such as cap and trade or ETS). Otherwise, the quantity control policies will be more 
efficient and the difference in efficiency will increase with the increase in the difference between the two slopes. 
24 
 
2009). Through a case study of the US, Keohane (2009) argued that emission trading offers a 
great deal of flexibility in allocating the value of emissions, enhancing its political feasibility.  
Therefore, reducing emissions for curbing climate change requires policymakers to find cost-
efficient means to meet the obligations. The literature shows that marginal abatement cost 
curves have frequently been used in this context to illustrate optimal selections of climate 
change policies. Based on previously published research, this PhD study intends to discover 
interactions between climate change policies caused by distortion of the marginal abatement 
cost curve. A dedicated literature review on climate change policy interactions is presented in 
Chapter 2.   
The second stream that opens up is the study of the economics of adaptation to climate change, 
which includes issues such as costs and benefits of adaptation and the identification of 
synergies between global climate actions and development objectives.  
Climate change policy presents many opportunities as well as challenges (Liobikienė and 
Butkus, 2018). The widespread concerned is that climate change policy imposes a significant 
cost on the economy (Bretschger, 2017). Individual countries are reluctant to adopt the 
necessary policy measures because they fear negative consequences for their domestic 
economy (Dietz et al., 2016, Aglietta and Espagne, 2016, Orlov and Aaheim, 2017, Dafermos 
et al., 2018). Nevertheless, Bretschger (2017) identified a sharp contrast between short-term 
and long-term policy effects, suggesting that pollution abatement has a positive growth effect 
in the long run. With a case integrated assessment model-based study of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Leimbach et al. (2018) found that Sub-Saharan Africa could participate in ambitious climate 
policy at roughly net zero cost while generating revenues from the export of biomass. A UN 
report also suggested that a ‘green and low-carbon economy would support growth, especially 
if one measures wealth as stocks of useful assets, inclusive of natural assets, but not narrowly 
as flows of produced output’ (UNEP, 2011).  
As one of the most prominent climate change mitigation actions, it is widely recognised that a 
properly functioning ETS can provide for price discovery and allow for cost-effective solutions 
for achieving greenhouse gas reductions (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008, Ellerman et al., 2010, 
Martin et al., 2015, Bel and Joseph, 2015). The overall goal of an ETS is to minimise the cost 
of meeting a set emission target or an emission cap (Laing et al., 2013). In 2015, the UK 
Parliament House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Select Committee (ECC Select 
Committee) recommended that a future international climate framework to facilitate ETS 
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linkage would be the most cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Kachi, 
2015). 
However, the sharp and persistent price decline in the EU ETS has triggered intense debates 
about the decisive allowance price drivers (European Commission, 2012, Clò et al., 2013, Koch 
et al., 2014). Such depressed allowance prices are not likely to provide sufficient incentives for 
low-carbon technological investments which reduce GHGs (Nordhaus, 2011) and may increase 
the risk of carbon lock-in (Clò et al., 2013).2 
Although climate change policies have evolved significantly since the early 1990s, a 
comprehensive assessment of global patterns of national climate change policies over the last 
27 years and across 171 countries found out that carbon pricing is still one of the policies that 
are least addressed and yet to be uncovered (Schmidt and Fleig, 2018). It is necessary to explore 
the price behaviours of ETSs to justify the effectiveness of market-based carbon pricing 
instruments. A dedicated literature review on the price drivers of ETSs is presented in Chapter 
3.   
The third major trend in the literature is about the international context that ETS could provide. 
Research in this area has been particularly fruitful in the last few years as ETS linkage is 
considered a viable catalyst for enhancing the role of a cap-and-trade system.   
There are two possible approaches to linking ETSs and other carbon pricing systems: a global 
top-down approach through the UNFCCC framework, or a bottom-up approach through 
bilateral and multilateral agreements between jurisdictions. ‘Top-down’ is determined by a 
centralised multilateral decision-making process under the UNFCCC framework, while 
‘bottom-up’ is a sub-national or individual decentralised decision-making procedure (Zapfel 
and Vainio, 2002, Tuerk et al., 2009, Green et al., 2014). 
Linking two or more ETSs appears to offer a win-win outcome. It signals a common effort to 
address climate change while allowing for more flexible arrangements to address the political 
and economic specificities of each jurisdiction (Marschinski et al., 2012, Green et al., 2014, 
Burtraw et al., 2013). Furthermore, linked markets are likely to be more liquid, since the more 
active the market participants, the weaker the price setting capability of each one individually 
                                                          
2 Carbon lock-in refers to ‘Industrial economies have been locked into fossil fuel-based energy systems through 
a process of technological and institutional co-evolution driven by path-dependent increasing returns to scale. It 
is asserted that this condition, termed carbon lock-in, creates persistent market and policy failures that can 
inhibit the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies despite their apparent environmental and economic 
advantages’ UNRUH, G. C. 2000. Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 28, 817-830.. 
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(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). In addition, the potential for carbon leakage emerging may be 
relieved when competing industries in the linked system face a similar price for compliance 
(Kachi et al., 2015). Most importantly, merging two or more systems expands the number of 
mitigation options, thereby facilitating reductions at the least possible cost overall (Flachsland 
et al., 2009, IETA, 2016, Qi and Weng, 2016). The broader the base for a given carbon price, 
the more efficiently it operates, and the lower the overall cost of reducing emissions for the 
economies within its scope (IETA, 2016).  
However, the impact of a global trading system may not always be positive for all parties. 
Babiker et al. (2001) and Flachsland et al. (2009) argue that market distortions or trade effects 
can affect the competitiveness of the industry and the economic advantages for the participating 
countries, while Tomás et al. (2010) showed that a loss in industry competitiveness may not 
result from the enforcement of the emission trading system, but from other restrictions. 
Meanwhile, the experiences and lessons of international climate negotiations suggest that 
reaching a global top-down international carbon market is extraordinarily difficult due to the 
heterogeneity in the design and type of emerging carbon markets (Carbon Trust, 2009, Ranson 
and Stavins, 2016, Jackson et al., 2018).  
Existing papers focus on the evaluation of linking ETSs among a small scope of regions, mainly 
the EU or US. As the effects of linkage mainly rely on the relative emission mitigation cost 
across regions (Qi and Weng, 2016), the difference in research region scope would result in 
different evaluation conclusions. Furthermore, many studies have discussed either the 
institutional compatibility or the feasibility of ETS linkage (Ellis and Tirpak, 2006, Tuerk et 
al., 2009, Jotzo and Betz, 2009, Borghesi et al., 2016), but this PhD study puts more focus on 
the economic impact of ETS linkage. Therefore, a multi-regional computable general 
equilibrium model will be employed to capture the impact on emission reductions, abatement 
costs as well as economic growth from ETS linkage among a wider scope of regions. A 
dedicated literature review on computable general equilibrium modelling for ETS policy 
assessment is provided in Chapter 4.  
1.2.2 Climate change policy development in China 
Chinese carbon markets are the main context of this PhD research, therefore it is important to 
follow the current state and trend of the Chinese carbon market. Since China’s market reform 
in the 1970s, its economic growth has been remarkable in that its GDP has increased more than 
80-fold. Given the requirements of hyper growth in economic development, this has led to an 
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enormous increase in energy consumption. In 2010, China’s energy consumption exceeded the 
United State for the first time, and became the world’s largest energy consumer with the 
equivalent of 2.43 billion tonnes of oil consumed (Lee and Zhang, 2012). Meanwhile, huge 
energy consumption in China, especially fossil fuel consumption, meant that China’s 
contribution to the world’s GHGs and global warming was greater than ever. As the world’s 
leading energy consumer, 80% of the world’s increase in carbon emissions was from China in 
2011 (Liu et al., 2013b). Therefore, highly efficient and large-scale reduction is the most 
pressing economic priority for the Chinese government. 
1.2.2.1 Energy saving and emission reduction in China 
In the Copenhagen climate negotiations in 2009, the Chinese government committed to a 
reduction in national carbon emissions intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP) of up to 
40%-45% by 2020 based on the 2005 level. Under the 12th Five-Year Plan (12th FYP) from 
2011 to 2015, energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) was reduced by 16% and 
carbon intensity by 17% below 2010 levels by the end of 2015. In the most recent (13th) FYP, 
with an average GDP growth expectation of above 6.5%, the carbon intensity reduction target 
by the end of 2020 has increased to 18%. Table 1-2 shows the changes in energy-saving and 
emission reduction targets in the 11th, 12th and 13th FYPs; it is obvious that the general trend is 
a decrease in carbon intensity and energy intensity.  
Table 1-2 Energy-saving and emission reduction targets in the 11th, 12th and 13th Five-Year 
Plans 















Average GDP growth 7.5% 11.2% 7% 7.8% >6.5% 
Carbon intensity: 
Reduction in carbon emissions per 
unit of GDP 
- - 17% 20% 18% 
Energy intensity percentage 20% 19.1% 16% 18.2% 15% 
(Sources: NDRC, 2016a, Hu, 2016) 
Meanwhile, a series of upcoming incentive schemes, including ETS pilot programs in seven 
cities, have been included in the FYP. As a matter of fact, China started to develop a low-
carbon economy in the last century following the publication of the first White Paper regarding 
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sustainable development in 1994. Table 1-3 shows the dominant national climate change 
policies in China (Wu et al., 2012).   
Table 1-3 Main national climate change policies in China 
Year Official documents Key policies 
1998 People’s Public of China Energy Saving 
Law 
Energy conservation and efficiency; 
Develop low-carbon and renewable technologies. 
   
2005 Renewable Energy Law National renewable energy targets; 
Mandatory connection and purchase policy; 
National FITs system; 
Cost-sharing and funding for renewable energy. 
   
2006 Eleventh Five-Year Plan Setting GHG emissions reduction target; 
Improving energy efficiency. 
   
2007 National Action Plan on Climate 
Change 
Slow down GHG emission; 
Promote renewable energy. 
   
2011 Twelfth Five-Year Plan Binding GHG emissions reduction target;  
Pilot ETS project; 
Promote renewable energy. 
2016 Thirteenth Five-Year Plan Binding GHG emissions reduction target; 
Building medium to long-term emission reduction 
programme; 
Optimising industry and energy mix. 
(Source:  National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC])                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Until recently, ‘command-and-control’ policy intervention with direct regulatory control 
played the leading role in curbing climate change while market-based mechanisms had limited 
application. However, as a widely recognised essential policy tool, market-based mechanisms 
can help China meet its energy and carbon intensity targets as well as improving energy 
efficiency (Han et al., 2012).  
As one of the most effective financial incentive mechanisms for renewable energy, feed-in 
tariffs (FITs) ensure renewable energy generators can cover their costs and earn an appropriate 
profit by setting a price for grid companies to pay for on-grid electricity generated by specific 
technologies (Schuman and Lin, 2012). 
The NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) introduced FITs for wind power 
in 2009, which are 0.51, 0.54, 0.58 and 0.61 CNY per KWh for four different regions in China 
from 2009 to the present, according to different wind resources in each region. Two years later, 
in 2011, the solar PV FIT was introduced at 1.15 and 1.00 CNY per KWh for solar PV projects 
approved and completed at different times (Zeng et al., 2013). 
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According to the report by the Global Energy Network Institute (GENI) and the World 
Resource Institute on renewable energy in China, hydropower, wind, solar and biomass power 
will be the main sources of renewable energy in China. China is the world’s largest hydropower 
generator with 229 GW installed capacity, and its target in the 12th FYP was set at 290 GW in 
2015. In the 13th FYP, China’s goal is increasing total installed hydropower capacity to 380 
GW by 2020, of which 40 GW is pumped hydro. Wind power development is also very rapid 
in China with 75 GW installed capacity in 2012 and 100 GW achieved in 2015. As for solar 
PV, the target in the 13th FYP is 105 GW by 2020, and the targeted cost reduction is 50% by 
2020 compared to 2015 levels. Although biomass contributes the least to Chinese renewable 
energy, it is expected that 15GW of cumulative biomass and waste electricity generation 
capacity will be reached by 2020. 
1.2.2.2 Emission trading schemes in China 
The Chinese government pays great attention to the development of a future carbon market. 
The Five-Year Plan is the most important national document released by the Chinese Central 
Government. With increasing energy demand and consumption, as well as growing GHG 
emissions, the energy policy in the Five-Year Plan changed significantly from expanding 
energy production to improving energy efficiency; reducing carbon emissions and promoting 
renewable energy for sustainable development was highlighted in the most recent plan (Yuan 
and Zuo, 2011). 
In fact, China has already conducted a series of experimental projects to test the feasibility of 
emission trading systems in China. For instance, in 2002, China’s State Council set out the 10th 
FYP for Preventing and Controlling Acid Rain and SO2 emissions in the two control zones, 
which suggested the implementation of a pilot project for an SO2 emissions trading scheme in 
the two control zones. There were different types of pilot programmes according to different 
motivations, such as compensation between new and old emitting sources, or within the same 
enterprise, and emission trading between enterprises. However, none of these trading cases 
could successfully develop a well-organised trading market (Chang and Wang, 2010). In March 
2011, China officially included in the 12th FYP plans to establish carbon emission trading 
systems. Seven pilots had been authorised by the NDRC in October of the same year (IETA, 
2012) (Table 1-4).  
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Table 1-4 Overview of ETS pilots in China  
 Shenzhen Shanghai Beijing Guangdong Tianjin Hubei Chongqing 
General information 
Starting date 18 Jun. 2013 26 Nov. 2013 28 Nov. 2013 19 Dec. 2013 26 Dec. 2013 2 Apr. 2014 19 Jun. 2014 
Reduction target3 21% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 19.5% 19.5% 
GHG emissions4 
(MtCO2e) 
153 297.7 188.1 610.5 215 463.1 243.1 
















Per capita GDP growth 
(2013) 


















Estimated coverage 40% 57% 45% 60% 60% 35% 40% 








Industry; Power Industry; Power; 
Buildings 
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Power 
Firm or facility-level 
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Allocation and purchase 
 
                                                          
3 Carbon intensity reduction target by 2020 (end of the 12th Five-Year Plan), based on carbon intensity level in 2015.  

























Buy or auction 
allowances in 
order to stabilise 
the market. 
Auction (3% in 
2013 and 10% in 
2015, 2016) 
Buy or sell 
allowances in 





entities must not 
sell more than 




Borrowing Not allowed 
Offsetting8 Domestic offsets 
Offset limitation9 10% 5% 5% 10% 10% 10% 8% 
Compliance 
Compliance period One year 











up to 50,000  













Penalties for failing to 
surrender enough 
allowances 
3 times the 
average market 
price  











and policies for 3 
years  






and policies for 3 
years  
(Source: ICAP, 2018b)
                                                          
5 Mainly free allocation through grand-fathering based on 2009-2012 emissions or emissions intensity; Bench-marking for specific entities.  
6 Mainly free allocation through grand-fathering based on 2009-2012 emissions or emissions intensity; Bench-marking for new entrants and entities with expanded capacity. 
7 Mainly free allocation through grand-fathering based on 2009-2012 emissions or emissions intensity; Bench-marking for electricity generators, certain cement and iron and steel industrial 
processes and new entrants. 
8 Domestic project-based carbon offset credits - China Certified Emission Reductions (CCER) are allowed. 
9 The use of CCER credits is limited to corresponding proportion of the annual compliance obligation. 
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The published literature on ETSs in China follows three main research directions: the 
mechanism and design of ETS, evaluation of ETS effectiveness, and the feasibility of regional 
pilot ETS linkage.  
First, a number of studies recognise that the mechanism design of ETSs largely determines 
their environmental and economic effectiveness, market efficiency and effect on social welfare. 
There is no universal model for carbon emission trading (Zhou et al., 2013, Li et al., 2014b); 
policy designs for sectoral (Zhang et al., 2011, Cong and Wei, 2012, Xu et al., 2015a, Jiang et 
al., 2015, Cai et al., 2015, Chen et al., 2015, Biedenkopf et al., 2017), regional (Yi et al., 2011, 
Wei et al., 2012, Qi et al., 2014a, Wu et al., 2014b, Jiang et al., 2014, Liao et al., 2015, Chang 
et al.), and national ETSs (Raufer and Li, 2009, Li et al., 2011, Hübler et al., 2014, Cheng and 
Zhang, 2011, Jiang et al., 2017) have been proposed.  
With regard to the sectoral-level ETS, most research attaches importance to the energy-
intensive industrial sectors, particularly the power sector. Through an agent-based model for 
the power sector in China, Cong and Wei (2012) indicated that electricity prices would increase 
because external environmental cost would be internalised during carbon emission trading. 
They also considered that output-based allocation would be superior to emission-based 
allocation for carbon market design in China, since output-based allocation is much more 
conducive to environmental conservation. Xu et al. (2015a) stated that power plants with lower 
carbon intensities should be allocated more allowances to achieve reduction targets effectively. 
In addition to the power sector, approaches for constructing ETSs in the transportation sector 
are discussed by Jiang et al. (2015) and Cai et al. (2015). Biedenkopf et al. (2017) and Chen et 
al. (2015) took the lead in exploring key elements and implementation paths of the ETS in 
China’s building sector. Zhang et al. (2011) addressed the importance of a reasonable cap on 
sectoral emissions, transparent MRV and strong incentives for broad participation.  
While China is currently piloting ETSs at the regional level, many researchers have focused on 
the design of ETS for specific regions. Due to regional divergences in economic development, 
industry structure and resource endowment, regional allowance allocation approaches 
considering equity, intensity reduction target fulfilment and reduction potential among regions 
in China are generally proposed (Yi et al.). Wei et al. (2012) found a large gap exists in potential 
reduction capacity and marginal abatement cost among Eastern, Middle and Western China by 
generating an abatement capacity index based on weighted equity and efficiency indexes. 
Chang et al. (2016) verified previous studies by empirical analysis and proposed the Shapley 
value-based allocation criterion as an equal and effective emissions reduction target allocation, 
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as they found that Eastern and Southern China, and the Middle Yellow River regions are the 
main emissions allowance buyers, while Western and Northern China, and the Middle Yangtze 
River regions are the main sellers of emissions permits, due to the diverse abatement costs. Qi 
et al. (2014a) and Jiang et al. (2014) provided a summary of the distinct features of the Hubei 
and Shenzhen pilot ETSs in China, and described the policy designs including coverage, cap, 
allowance allocation and compliance rules. Liao et al. (2015) and Wu et al. (2014b) elucidated 
the evolution of Shanghai’s ETS. The former study suggested the Shanghai’s ETS should adopt 
different modes at different periods and should introduce a tiered price mechanism and subsidy 
mechanism while the latter proposed improving the current ETS design in terms of allocation 
principles, information disclosure and risk management.  
Compared with the sectoral or regional research, a larger part of the literature is focused on 
establishing a nationwide ETS in China, from the perspectives of either specific mechanism 
design or general framework and institutional arrangements. As more sectors and enterprises 
participating in the ETS could provide greater economic benefits (Li et al., 2011), a nationwide 
ETS is expected after piloting ETSs. Jiang et al. (2017) identified heavy industry sectors that 
should be included in a national ETS’s coverage, and proposed that the design of a cap on 
emissions should allow for a proper increment and establish a new entrant reserve to coordinate 
economic development. The setting of emission caps directly affects the ETS’s emission 
mitigation effect; it is argued that the benefits of absolute and relative caps are mainly 
determined by uncertainties surrounding China’s economic growth and business-as-usual 
(BAU) emissions (Tian and Whalley, 2009). An intensity-based cap is widely recognised as 
more suitable for China’s ETS at the current stage (Cheng and Zhang, 2011, Hübler et al., 
2014).    
China is a large country that consists of 23 provinces and four municipalities. Many studies 
have considered how to reasonably distribute China’s national cap to the provinces and 
municipalities (Wang et al., 2013, Yu et al., 2014, Zhang, 2014). Policy makers are required to 
allocate allowances based on principles of equity, development and economic and technical 
efficiency. The auction would gradually replace free allocation with the evolution of the ETS 
(Cong and Wei, 2012), since a full auction might be difficult to implement currently because 
of its potential for larger output losses (Hübler et al., 2014).  
Only a few studies have attempted to provide a proposed carbon price level for China’s national 
ETS, even though this plays a key role in optimising the effectiveness of the trading system’s 
emission reduction. Li and Lu (2015) employed a combination of dynamic computable general 
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equilibrium (CGE) simulation and econometric analyses, by which 30–50 CNY/t CO2 was 
recommended as an ideal price benchmark for China’s ETS for the period 2016–2020. Flexible 
mechanisms, such as carbon offsetting schemes and carbon floor price, serve as market 
stabilisers to reduce carbon price fluctuations. Wang and Wang (2015) perceived carbon 
offsetting scheme as a double-edged sword, thereby suggested the regulator should carefully 
formulate a reasonable offset limit. Apart from these, some studies have proposed adopting 
diversified market stability mechanisms. Mo et al. (2013) devised an integrated price stabiliser 
constituting a price smoothing mechanism across compliance years and a ceiling-floor price 
mechanism throughout the compliance period.  
In Raufer and Li (2009) on ETS design, they propose a carbon market design based on a three-
component air quality management approach, which is more suitable for China’s conditions 
rather than imitating approaches from the US or Europe. The three-component air quality 
management approach contains a real-time trading market, a real-time intermittent control 
system and a software-oriented predictive emission monitoring system.  
Second, many researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of emission reduction and 
economic efficiency of ETSs in China. It is noted that implementing ETSs in China would 
contribute to carbon abatement cost reduction and low-carbon economic transition (Ping and 
Zhennan, 2011, Zhou et al., 2013). However, it might lead to differential impacts across 
provinces (Zhang et al., 2013a, Cui et al., 2014) and cause obvious output and export losses in 
energy-intensive sectors (Li et al., 2014a).   
Whether Chinese ETSs could stimulate low-carbon economic transition is an important 
measurement for assessing their effectiveness, as the low-carbon economic transition is 
expected to play a fundamental role in long-term emission reductions. Zhang and Xu (2013) 
revealed that implementing an ETS might favour low-carbon production over high-carbon 
production. However, empirical research by Mo et al. (2016) found that the Chinese ETSs 
cannot support its own investments in low-carbon energy currently, and carbon price 
uncertainty would restrain investment in low-carbon energy, therefore policy mix and 
stabilisation mechanisms are needed. Xu et al. (2017) concluded that the production of low-
carbon products would increase with a rising carbon price based on analysis of the made-to-
order supply chain.  On the whole, implementing ETSs in China will affect enterprises’ 
production and emission reduction decisions as well as the related expected profits, and has the 
potential to promote low-carbon production in China (Du et al., 2013, Du et al., 2015). 
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Finally, as China is moving from pilot ETSs to a nation-wide ETS, several studies have 
investigated linking regional pilot ETSs in China. Zhou et al. (2013) claimed that the link 
between provincial ETSs could significantly cut China’s total carbon abatement costs. Liu et 
al. (2013a) also confirmed the potential benefits of interregional linkage, but they further noted 
that the linkage might lead to more uneven welfare distribution and social inequity.  
Since China currently has connections with the international carbon market only via the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), some studies have turned their attention to linking China’s 
ETSs with those in other countries. Bernard et al. (2008) proposed a linkage between Russia, 
China and Annex B countries; it appears that competition between Russia and China on the 
international market for carbon emissions would significantly lower the permit prices. 
Nevertheless, the linkage between China and other developing countries in Asia showed that 
China would play a major role and would be a net buyer in the Asia ETS, with the highest level 
of per capita emissions and levels of income per capita (Massetti and Tavoni, 2012). Linking 
China’s ETS with the EU ETS demonstrated that the welfare effect of such a linkage would be 
closely related to transferring allowances, and China would always benefit from it even with a 
restricted transferring volume (Hübler et al., 2014).  Böhringer et al. (2014) further confirmed 
these results using a marginal abatement cost curve showing that the substantial revenues from 
permit exports would turn the carbon abatement costs of China into net gains. Generally, 
researchers believe that China should join a global ETS by 2030 or 2050 the latest, in order to 
compensate for its welfare losses by selling surplus allowances (Hübler, 2011, Heindl and 
Voigt, 2012), but the linkage might have an adverse impact on China’s energy-intensive 
industries (Xu et al., 2015b). 
Through reviewing the important controversies in the current literature, it appears that only a 
handful of studies have discussed the issue of carbon pricing under China’s ETS; there is an 
urgent need to investigate the major influencing factors and their function mechanisms on 
carbon allowance prices. In addition, the overwhelming majority of current studies are based 
on ex-ante model simulation (Babiker et al., 2001, Hübler, 2011, Xu et al., 2015b, Springer et 
al., 2019), therefore ex-post empirical studies on current pilot ETSs are of great value to guide 





Stakeholder views on the carbon market and 
interactions between low-carbon policies in China: 
Lessons from the Guangdong ETS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
China’s economy has been growing at a sustained average annual rate of over 9% for three 
decades and energy use has therefore increased fivefold since 1980 (to nearly 3 billion tons of 
oil equivalent in 2011) (IEA, 2017). In 2010, China’s energy consumption exceeded that of the 
United States (Lee and Zhang, 2012). As coal continues to dominate the primary energy 
structure and occupy a majority of incremental electricity demand in China, rising energy 
consumption driven by a rapidly growing economy has caused China to become the world’s 
leading emitter of GHGs (Guan et al., 2009). The Paris Agreement agreed in December 2015 
sets out a global action plan to put the world on track to avoid dangerous climate change, by 
limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels in the long term, and to 
pursue best efforts to limit increased warming to 1.5°C (United Nations, 2015). China also 
formally submitted its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) to the new global 
climate agreement by lowering carbon dioxide intensity by 60%-65% from 2005 levels and 
peaking its GHG emissions by around 2030 (NDRC, 2015). 
Although China has not adopted mandatory national emission abatement targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998), initial steps towards a national carbon market have been 
taken through piloting regional carbon emission trading systems, with an eye to establishing a 
carbon pricing system in the country. In March 2011, China officially included pilot ETSs in 
the 12th FYP with a view to meeting its 2020 carbon intensity target (Cui et al., 2014). In 
October 2011, seven pilot cities and provinces (Figure 2-1) were authorised to proceed by the 
NDRC, the central policy-making body (NDRC, 2011). Since the final pilot ETS commenced 
trading in Chongqing on 19 June 2014, all seven pilots in China have been in operation. Carbon 
dioxide emissions are being monitored in China’s pilot schemes so far (Chongqing pilot ETS 
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also covers non-CO2 GHGs including CH4 and N2O), and the trading period of the seven pilot 
ETSs ran from 2013 to 2016, after which a national ETS was launched on 19 December 2017 
(NDRC, 2016b, NDRC, 2017b).  
Initially, the seven Chinese pilot ETSs were scheduled to end after three compliance years and 
were to be replaced by the national ETS in 2016. However, as the launch of the national ETS 
was postponed to the end of 2017 and trading will begin three year later after 2020, the pilots 
are continuing to operate until then and probably also beyond. The initial phase of the national 
ETS will give regulators the opportunity to improve the system design as well as allow market 
participants time to familiarise themselves with the ETS based on experiences in the pilots.  
The design and implementation of a carbon market are influenced by different stakeholders: 
government and industry who are directly involved in the markets; academics and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) who have relevant expertise or experience will also 
contribute to market design and functioning. Consequently, it is critically important to 
investigate stakeholder views on the Chinese carbon market because policy construction would 
benefit from greater participant confidence, which would contribute to wider public 
acceptance. 
Each province or city participating in a pilot ETS has a different economic growth outlook and 
GHG emissions profile, which implies each pilot ETS will have different effective reduction 
targets and design characteristics in order to achieve its target. For instance, Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen are commercial centres along the coast, with relatively high GDP per 
capita, and large commercial and residential buildings are covered in these ETSs. Conversely, 
Hubei and Chongqing are located in central China with a lower GDP per capita but higher GDP 
growth rates and are less commercialised. Accordingly, these pilot ETSs cover heavy industrial 
sectors only, and emissions offset credits must originate from within their own provinces, since 
the abatement cost is expected to be cheaper within these provinces (EYGM, 2014). The 
diversity of the emissions trading market design roughly corresponds to the regional income 
level, thus regional emission reduction targets can be achieved without adversely affecting 
economic growth projections.  
Guangdong Province, often referred to as the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone, has some 
characteristics of an advanced industrialised economy. Guangdong Province contributed 
11.6% of national GDP in 2013, and the Guangdong ETS pilot is the largest of the seven 
schemes, with an absolute cap of 408 MtCO2 in 2014, initially covering the power and industry 
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sectors, to be followed by the transportation sector. These sectors account for more than half 
of the province’s emissions (ICAP, 2018b). Hence, the experiences of implementing carbon 
emission trading policies in Guangdong will be important in designing and operating a larger 
national ETS.  
243.1 





























 Numbers in bubbles show the total GHG emissions (MtCO2e) in seven pilots in 2012
 
Figure 2-1 Map of seven pilot ETSs in China 
(Source: EYGM, 2014) 
In addition, although global warming is already an urgent issue, China has other priorities 
including enhancing energy supply rapidly to meet national needs, improving energy 
efficiency, and environmental protection. Generally, the Chinese central government 
prescribes climate change and energy policies, as local governments may have different 
objectives compared to the central government; these policies set by the central government 
are often self-enforced by local governments (Teng and Gu, 2008). Figure 2-2 summarises the 
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existing low-carbon policies developed by the central government and the specific 







Central Government of China Specific Policies in Guangdong Province
Main existing low carbon and energy policies in China since 2006
Renewable Energy Law
 Amendments to the PRC Renewable Energy Law 
31 Aug. 
2007
The Mid-and-long Term Development Plan for 
Renewable Energy (NDRC)
In 2020, consumption of renewable energy contribute to 
15% of total energy consumption
29 Oct. 
2011
Notice of Implementing Pilot Carbon Emissions 
Trading (NDRC)
Pilot ETS in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, 
Guangdong, Hubei, Shenzhen
2014-2015 Energy Saving and Emission Reduction 
Development Action Plan (State Council)




Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in the 12th 
Five-Year Plan (State Council)
1 Jan. 
2013








Guangdong Province Comprehensive Work 
Plan of Energy Saving and Emission 
Reduction in the 12th FYP 
In 2015, reduce energy consumption intensity 
by 18% and 31.46% compared to 2010, and 
2005; reduce total CO2 emission by 14.8% 
based on 2010. 
11 Oct. 
2014
Guangdong Province Energy Saving and 
Emission Reduction Development Action 
Plan in 2014-2015 
2014-2015, reduce energy consumption 
intensity by 3.4% and 2.32% during the two 
years; reduce CO2 intensity 3.5% annually.
1 Dec. 
2011
Notice of Control GHGs Emission Work Plan 
in the 12th FYP 
During the12th FYP, reduce CO2 intensity and 




Guangdong Pilot ETS began operations
Forthcoming energy and low carbon policies, such as Renewable Energy Obligation, Carbon Taxation, etc. 
 
Figure 2-2 Existing main national and Guangdong province climate change policies  
(Sources: www.ndrc.gov.cn; www.gov.cn) 
In spite of the high political priority given to ETS as a policy instrument, the Chinese energy 
system is primarily regulated by administrative measures rather than market-based instruments 
(Lo, 2014). Meanwhile, in recent years a range of policies including carbon taxation, renewable 
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obligations and energy efficiency quota trading mechanisms have been discussed by both 
government officials and leading academics in China (Chen, 2013, Fang, 2018). All such 
parallel mechanisms would potentially reduce the implied allowance price in the ETS and give 
investors a misleading signal about the value of carbon in longer-term investments (Hood, 
2013).  
Therefore, this study is interested in stakeholder views on the Chinese carbon market and 
interactions between energy and low-carbon policies in China. Through conducting a survey 
about the Guangdong pilot ETS, stakeholders’ perceptions and expectations of the Chinese 
carbon market, and their understanding of the interactions between the carbon market and other 
energy and low-carbon policies, were investigated. The structure of the study is as follows: 
section 2.2 reviews the literature relevant to this context while section 2.3 describes the survey 
methodology; section 2.4 presents the results and discussion and the last section provides 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
Since the launch of the EU ETS in 2005, emissions trading has become a popular instrument 
to encourage climate mitigation globally (Brousers et al., 2016, Yang et al., 2016, Wang et al., 
2015, Kachi, 2015, Cui et al., 2014). The carbon price would be key for an effective and 
successful carbon market mechanism (Tang et al., 2019); however, the collapse of EU 
allowances (EUAs) prices in 2008 following the global financial crisis significantly weakened 
incentives to continue reducing emissions. Although the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and 
overly generous national allowance allocations (IETA, 2014, Zhang and Wei, 2010, Schleich 
et al., 2009) were generally recognised as the principal causes for the price drop, further studies 
have shown that the interactions between the emissions trading market and competing energy 
and low-carbon policies also contributed to weakening the impact of the ETS.  
In theory, energy and low-carbon policies could act in a complementary manner; for instance, 
renewable energy obligations could contribute to carbon emission reduction targets while 
carbon abatement instruments should stimulate renewable energy deployment (Fischer and 
Preonas, 2010). However, a number of studies highlight that in practice there has been 
duplication and conflict between different policies that are all nominally meant to work 
together to incentivise emission reductions. 
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Sorrell (2003) explored the interaction of policy instruments among the EU ETS, the UK 
Renewables Obligation and the UK Energy Efficiency Commitment, particularly on scope, 
timing, objectives and operation. His study pointed out that the UK Renewable Obligations 
would interact with the EU ETS as emission reduction would be double-counted, and no extra 
reduction would be achieved. Based on Sorrell’s work, Sijm (2005) proposed removing these 
instruments when the EU ETS is fully applied under the perfect market assumption and the 
single objective to minimise CO2 abatement cost, as he believed once the EU ETS became 
operational, the effectiveness of all other policies to reduce CO2 emissions of the participating 
sectors would become zero. However, in practice and especially in the short term, many 
policies with the aim of managing fossil fuel use by participating sectors will still function 
when the EU ETS becomes operational.  
In contrast, Stern (2006) suggested that the carbon pricing mechanism is the first element and 
cornerstone of a climate and energy policy package; it enables least-cost emissions reduction 
and stimulates companies to invest in carbon abatement. Either through carbon taxes or 
tradable emission permits, carbon pricing needs to combine with other policy mechanisms to 
create suitable investment incentives. Kautto et al. (2012) also found that the cooperation of an 
ETS with national energy policies can stimulate fuel switching and improve electricity 
efficiency via higher electricity prices. Combined multiple climate change policies also have 
synergies on fuel switching as well as biomass utilisation. What’s more, they suggested that 
the short-term inefficiency of combined multiple policies would be replaced by long-term 
benefits. 
Nevertheless, there is an increasing number of studies showing that a renewable obligation 
would depress emission prices in an ETS and would not contribute to long-term reductions in 
emissions (Syri and Cross, 2013). Pethig and Wittlich (2009) illustrated that no incremental 
emission reduction could be achieved by the supplemental renewable energy obligation. 
Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010) added to the above findings with a theoretical analysis of 
overlapping regulations. They argued that renewable energy obligations will not only cut down 
emission prices, they will even increase the emission generated by carbon-intensive power 
plants. This is due to the carbon-intensive installation benefitting the most from low emission 
prices. Through a CGE model, Morris et al. (2010) argued that combining a renewable portfolio 
standard with a cap-and-trade policy to reduce emissions would reduce the cost-effectiveness 
of the whole system. The renewable portfolio standard would shift investment away from the 
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least-cost emission reduction options and towards these specific renewable technologies, which 
are not necessarily least-cost or even low-cost.  
Most studies investigating the interaction between renewable obligations and ETSs are based 
on prospective scenarios as both of these two incentive mechanisms are relatively novel. 
However, recent research by Bergh et al. (2013) confirmed the above results by a quantitative 
analysis. They demonstrated that the maximum decrease in the emission price caused by 
renewable energy obligation would be €15/tCO2, €46/tCO2, and more than €100/tCO2 
respectively in 2007, 2008 and 2010.  
Other than interacting with renewable energy policies, ETSs may also interact with other forms 
of carbon pricing, such as carbon taxation. Bowen and Rydge (2011) argued that the UK 
effective carbon price is even higher and more pervasive than the suggested EUA prices. 
Higher, therefore more consistent and less volatile, carbon prices are needed to transform and 
meet the ambitious 2050 target. In this case, carbon taxes are preferred more than the cap-and-
trade system because the tax rate can be regularly reviewed. However, if different methods of 
carbon pricing are applied, the subsequent interaction can lead to inefficient allocation of 
abatement activity across sectors, unnecessary costs and distortion of final prices (Bowen and 
Rydge, 2011). The expectation of future price, technological progress and other emission 
control policies could impact the carbon price since they affect the demand or supply of carbon 
emissions (Lei et al., 2011). Hone (2013b) contends that the EU ETS, in combination with 
other low-carbon policies (notably binding European commitments on renewables) has 
‘distorted emissions mitigation economics across the EU, and the recession has further 
exacerbated the situation’. 
Sorrell (2015) concluded that more cost-effective ways in many end-use sectors also improve 
energy efficiency, exemplified by the marginal abatement cost curves. These cost-effective 
ways function through organisational initiatives and policy interventions, such as labelling 
schemes, minimum efficiency standards, and targeted information programmes, and they 
become key players in demand reduction. 
In an integrated policy package, it is possible that the elements inside the package may interact 
and reinforce or undermine total reductions in emissions. If the policies in a policy package 
interact well, synergies between energy, climate and trade-offs can be reduced (Stern, 2006). 
Unfortunately, insufficient policy integration might interfere with policy objectives such as 
emission permits and energy security, and deviate from climate objectives. There can also be 
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interaction between an ETS and energy policies aimed at reducing emissions, such as energy 
efficiency and technology deployment policies.  
Figure 2-2 demonstrates the shift of the abatement curve driven by parallel low-carbon policies; 
the marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) is a set of points reflecting the options with 
marginal costs and emission reductions (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998). With increasing 
emission reductions, the option with the lower marginal abatement cost sets the price for 
emission permits. Total emission reductions will be achieved at least-cost until the equilibrium 
market price has been reached (Kesicki and Ekins, 2012) (Figure 2-2(a)). In principle, if a 
country adopts a stringent mandatory policy to promote low-carbon technologies through 
parallel energy and low-carbon policies (such as an ambitious renewable obligation target, a 
mandatory energy efficiency programme, or a high carbon tax), the MACC would shift to the 
right (as illustrated in Figure 2-2(b)) and thereby the carbon price visible in the market will fall. 
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Figure 2-3 Shift of abatement curve driven by parallel low-carbon policies  
(Source: Hone, 2013b) 
Although a number of studies on interactions have focused on Europe, there are few studies of 
potential interactions between different climate change and renewables policies in China. 
China is still at an early stage in establishing a functional and effective emission trading system 
to facilitate GHG emission reductions, so existing studies mainly describe the market features 
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and characteristics (Zhou et al., 2011, Zhang et al., 2014a, Duan et al., 2014), market design 
and relevant legal and regulatory issues (Fan and Wang, 2014, Wu et al., 2014a, Jiang et al., 
2016, Qi et al., 2014a), or model the economic performance and impact of emission trading in 
China at some point in the future (Zhou et al., 2013, Qi et al., 2014b).  
Although previous studies suggest parallel low-carbon policies could influence allowance 
prices in the ETS and send the wrong signals to industry, there has been little work on the 
potential interactions between low-carbon policies and the pilot ETSs in China and on related 
stakeholder views. Identifying stakeholders’ awareness of policy interactions is vital for the 
emerging carbon market in China, as a common understanding between stakeholders would 
help improve national climate change (and energy) policy planning and avoid some of the 
problems experienced in other countries and systems.  
A number of studies on both stakeholder and public perspectives towards climate change issues 
have been conducted addressing a range of topics including stakeholder perceptions of carbon 
capture and storage (Liang and Reiner, 2013, Reiner and Liang, 2012, Li et al., 2012), 
mandatory reporting of GHG emissions (Lai, 2014) or climate adaptation (O'Keeffe et al., 
2016). On the question of policy interactions, Fischer and Preonas (2010) provided a theoretical 
rationale for why overlapping low-carbon policies will have a depressing effect on emission 
markets, which have been confirmed in empirical studies (Koch et al., 2014) and economic 
models (Morris et al., 2010). However, there have been no studies at the intersection of 
stakeholder studies and policy interaction to determine, for example, whether analysts have 
effectively conveyed the potential impact of these interactions and whether this has been 
appreciated by stakeholders. Therefore, I adopted a survey approach to help examine 
stakeholder awareness of policy interactions. 
 
2.3 Methodology and demographic information 
A two-stage survey consisting of a questionnaire and follow-up interviews were employed. In 
June 2014 100 internet-based questionnaires were sent out to stakeholders involved in the 
Guangdong pilot ETS, followed by semi-structured telephone interviews in August 2014 with 





2.3.1 Internet-based questionnaire design 
The online survey system Wenjuan was adopted as the survey platform. The internet-based 
questionnaire was made up of 22 questions, involving a combination of multiple-choice, 
ranking and open-ended questions to obtain stakeholder views on a range of issues including 
Chinese emission reduction policies and carbon markets, understanding of the interactions 
between policies as well as views on potential challenges in the implementation of the Chinese 
carbon markets. All stakeholders were asked to respond based on their personal opinions, 
knowledge and experience.  
The pool of respondents drew upon those with significant involvement in the Guangdong pilot 
ETS with respect to market design and policy making, market participation and relevant 
research. Specifically, we adopted an expert sampling approach, selecting equal numbers of 
senior stakeholders from each of the key groups: 25 government stakeholders of at least 
director level within the relevant ministry; 25 industry stakeholders of at least deputy general 
manager level in listed companies in the energy sector; 25 academic stakeholders, with the 
grade of lecturer or above, working in energy and environment; and another 25 stakeholders 
working at managerial level in environmental NGOs. An invitation letter and a participant 
information letter were emailed to all stakeholders simultaneously describing the purpose of 
the study, and the principle of anonymity and confidentiality that would be employed. 
The questionnaire began with a set of general questions about the role and experience of 
participants before turning to their evaluation of low-carbon policies and incentives. The next 
set of questions focused on their perspectives regarding Chinese carbon emission reductions 
including emissions trading and other emission reduction instruments. Specifically, 
respondents were asked to estimate and rate the likelihood of China achieving deep cuts in 
GHGs over the next 10 years, and to select the most cost-effective policy instruments to reduce 
GHGs in China. We also asked how respondents explained the collapse of the carbon price in 
the EU ETS as well as their assessment and expectations of the pilot carbon markets in China. 
Subsequently, ‘what-if’ scenario questions were designed to explore stakeholder opinions on 
the interactions between other low-carbon policies and the Guangdong pilot ETS. They were 
asked to consider the most likely immediate impact on the carbon price in the Guangdong pilot 
ETS if either a new short-term renewable energy obligation or a carbon tax were to be enacted. 
Furthermore, stakeholders were asked for their views on potential conflicts between energy-
saving and emission reduction measures on the one hand, and between a national ETS and 
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international systems on the other. The last few questions covered issues associated with 
building markets, including potential challenges for market regulation and implementation 
barriers. 
2.3.2 Semi-structured telecom interview design 
As a follow up to the questionnaire, we conducted semi-structured interviews to obtain more 
detailed views. To be able to have a more in-depth discussion about the issues involved the 
main selection criterion was that the respondents indicated that they had spent more than 50% 
of their working time on energy-saving and emission reduction policies in China in the past 
year.  Interviewees were asked to provide: 
• A brief overview and outlook for Chinese pilot carbon markets; 
• More detailed reasons behind the options they had chosen in the ‘what-if’ scenario 
questions; 
• Opinions on the main challenges in the implementation of the Chinese carbon market. 
2.3.3 Demographic information of respondents 
We received 30 responses out of a total of 91 internet-based questionnaires delivered (nine 
questionnaires were returned due to invalid email addresses), giving a response rate of 33%. 
The sectoral distribution of respondents was: industry (27%); finance (20%); consulting (17%); 
government (10%); academia (13%); and NGOs (10%) (Figure 2-4).  
 
Figure 2-4 Demographic information of respondents 
In the previous year, one third (33.3%) of respondents had spent more than 50% of their 
working time on energy and climate policy although none of them spent 90% or more of their 















one third (36.7%) spent less than 20% of their time on relevant policy issues. The internet, 
conferences and newspapers were the main channels that a large majority of respondents used 
to obtain up-to-date information about the Chinese carbon market, followed by TV news and 
personal networks. 
2.3.4 Univariate regression analysis 
In consideration of the number of variables, a simple form of statistical analysis – univariate 
analysis (Miller and Salkind, 2002) – was adopted.  These analyses could provide with 
descriptions of single variables we are interested in and help us narrow down research 
directions. Therefore, we used univariate regression to test whether certain types of 
stakeholders had certain tendencies towards their choices. For each of the variables analysed, 
univariate descriptive statistics can provide an overall picture of the data. Specific definition 
variables and regressions are described under each subsection. 
The main purpose of the univariate regression is to examine the potential correlation between 
the dependent variable and the independent variable. A general hypothesis underlies each 
regression. For instance, from figure 2-5, a hypothesis can be put forward that government 
stakeholders tend to be more confident about deep cuts in GHGs compared with other 
stakeholders. Afterwards, the regression results show our empirical observation about our 
hypothesis. 
We tried numerous methods of categorisation and picked the ones with significant linear 
regression results in order to reveal potential correlations between the stakeholders’ sectors and 
their attitudes or expectations on certain issues. Therefore, we only reported the significant 
univariate regression results. Using univariate regression makes our results convincing 
compared to a purely qualitative discussion of our results, because it shows statistically 
significant connections. 
Critically speaking, it is generally recognised that statistically, the smaller the sample size, the 
higher the error margin is (Hsieh et al., 1998). As such, to use a sample size less than 30 (n < 
30) would imply 'a magnification of error’. However, the purpose of using univariate regression 
analysis here is to provide descriptive statistics rather than inferential statistics, therefore, the 





2.4 Results and discussion 
2.4.1 Perspectives on emissions reduction and the carbon market in China 
 Predictions about emission reductions in China 
Asked about expectations of whether current climate policies in China could achieve deep cuts 
in GHG intensity in the next 10 years, most respondents were pessimistic; half (50%) 
considered it difficult to reach a stringent target, and another 20% of stakeholders were not 
sure, although over one quarter (26.7%) of stakeholders believed such reductions were likely, 
and one stakeholder (3.3%) believed it was ‘very likely’ (Figure 2-5). The results are consistent 
with a previous survey conducted in 2009, where more than 80% of respondents believed it 
would be ‘difficult’ or ‘very difficult’ to achieve deep cuts in GHG in the next 20 years (Liang 
et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 2-5 Perceived prediction of deep cuts in GHG intensity in China 
 
By using a univariate regression, where Gov stands for dummy variables that take the value of 
1 if the respondent is from the government sector and 0 otherwise. Expect are ordinal variables 
defining respondents’ expectation levels from 1 to 5, while Expect = 1 means they consider 
deep cuts in GHG intensity in the next 10 years to be very unlikely, and Expect = 5 means deep 
cuts are perceived as very likely. To regress Expect against Gov, we find the statistically 
significant result that government stakeholders generally believed that deep cuts in GHG 
intensity are likely to be achieved (Table 2-1). It implies that rather than stakeholders from 
other sectors, government stakeholders tend to be more hopeful of success in slashing GHG 































































































































































V E R Y  U N L I K E L Y U N L I K E Y N O T  S U R E L I K E L Y V E R Y  L I K E L Y
Industry Academia Government Consulting Finance NGO None of above Total
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Table 2-1 Output of univariate regression model Expect-Gov 









Adj. R-squared 0.144 
t-statistics significance 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
To achieve deep emissions reductions, fully 60% of respondents preferred a market-based 
instrument; an emission trading scheme was viewed as the most cost-effective policy 
instrument to reduce GHG emissions in China (33.3%), followed by carbon taxation (26.7%), 
even though historically the Chinese government has used non-market based forms of 
regulation to achieve its environmental goals (Lo, 2014). Seventeen per cent of respondents 
preferred renewable energy subsidies/binding obligations or industrial emission performance 
standards. Feed-in tariffs (FITs) and preferential policies favouring natural gas and nuclear 
power were considered to be the least cost-effective measures, with only a single stakeholder 
(3.3%) voting for each one (Figure 3-5).  
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renewable energy subsidies/binding obligations
industrial emission performance standards
preferential policy favoring natural gas and nuclear power
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 Assessment of progress of Chinese pilot ETS 
Media coverage and many international observers have described the Chinese carbon markets 
as moving quickly since the pilot ETS policy was launched by the NDRC in 2010 (Zhang et 
al., 2014a). In contrast, the bell shape of the solid line in Figure 2-7 demonstrates that there are 
approximately equal proportions of respondents who consider the development speed of ETS 
in China to be fast or slow: 36.7% of respondents agree that progress has been fast (26.7%) or 
even too fast (10%); another 40% have the opposite view and take progress to be slow (26.7%) 
or too slow (13.3%).  
After further investigation of respondents’ sector segmentation, a trend can be found as 
academic stakeholders tend to consider the development progress of ETS in China to be slow. 
A univariate regression of Assess on Acad confirms this tendency (Table 3-2), where Acad are 
dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the respondent is from the academic sector and 0 
otherwise, and Assess are ordinal variables defining respondents’ assessment levels from 1 to 
5. Assess = 1 represents progress is too slow and 5 implies too fast.  
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Finance NGO None of above Total
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Table 2-2 output of univariate regression model Assess-Acad 









Adj. R-squared 0.0707 
t-statistics significance 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Accordingly, there are approximately equal proportions of respondents that are pessimistic 
(30%) or optimistic (33.3%) about the future of Chinese pilot ETSs, while another 23% 
describe progress as ‘average’. The fact that the largest single response was ‘not sure’ (36.7%) 
reveals the large uncertainties over the future of ETS in China. Using different shades to present 
assessment of progress, where lighter blue denotes slower and darker blue denotes faster, the 
correlation between stakeholder assessment and perspectives can be visually observed in 
Figure 2-8;  respondents who believed that progress was too slow felt pessimistic or even very 
pessimistic while respondent assessments of too fast led to relatively optimistic perspectives. 
In a univariate regression of Prospect on Assess, where Prospect and Assess are both ordinal 
variables where 1 means very pessimistic and too slow respectively while 5 means very 
optimistic and too fast respectively, the output confirms our observations by indicating a 
significant positive correlation between these two variables (Table 2-3). 
 












Very pessimistic Pessimistic Not sure Optimistic Very optimistic
Too slow Slow Average Fast Too fast
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Table 2-3 Output of univariate regression model Prospect-Assess 









Adj. R-squared 0.126 
t-statistics in brackets 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 Expectation of Guangdong pilot ETS market price 
A quarter of stakeholders were uncertain about the expected range of the average carbon price 
in Guangdong market. Nearly half (45.8%) expected the carbon price to be between 51-100 
CNY/t CO2 (7-14 EUR/t CO2), which is higher than the 32 CNY/t CO2 (4 EUR/t CO2) found 
in the October 2013 China Carbon Price Survey. Moreover, one-sixth (16.7%) of respondents 
proposed an even higher range of 101-200 CNY/t CO2 (14-27 EUR/t CO2), while another third 
(33.3%) expected it to be lower, at 26-50 CNY/t CO2 (3.5-7 EUR/t CO2). Only 4.2% believe 
the price range would be as low as 0-25 CNY/tCO2 (3.5 EUR/t CO2) (Figure 2-9). 
 
Figure 2-9 Perceived expectation of average carbon price in Guangdong pilot ETS 
Conversely, through a univariate regression of Price, ordinal variables representing 
respondents’ price expectations (1 = 0-25 CNY/t CO2 while 5 = above 200 CNY/t CO2), on 
Acad, whether the respondent is from academia (Acad = 1 means respondents are from 










Above 200 CNY/t CO2
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stakeholders significantly expected (at 90% confidence level) the price to be relatively high 
compared with other stakeholders (Table 2-4). 
Table 2-4 Output of univariate regression model Price-Acad 









Adj. R-squared 0.0866 
t-statistics in brackets 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 
As the world’s largest emitter, China has been developing a low-carbon economy since the 
1990s. The first White Paper regarding sustainable development was published in 1994, 
followed by the ‘Programme of action for sustainable development in China in the early 21st 
Century’ in 2003. China enacted its first ‘Renewable Energy Law’ in 2005, soon to be followed 
by the ‘Energy-saving and emission reduction’ national programme from 2006 (Wu et al., 
2012).  It was not until the energy plan proposed in the 11th and 12th FYPs in 2006 and 2011 
that specific quantitative emission reduction targets were set, specifically to reduce 40%-45% 
GHG intensity by 2020 based on 2005 levels (Hu and Monroy, 2012) (Yuan and Zuo, 2011). 
In the 13th FYP (2015-2020), China set a stronger and more ambitious reduction target of 48% 
reduction in GHG intensity from 2005 levels by 2020, in line with China’s pledge at the COP21 
conference in Paris in December 2015, where the Chinese Government promised to peak 
carbon emissions by 2030 as well as to lower GHG intensity by 60%-65% below 2005 levels 
(NDRC, 2015). 
Recent studies on emission reductions in China may offer some reasons for the somewhat 
bearish expectations found in the survey. Empirical results show obvious inefficiency in 
China’s regional energy-saving and emission reduction policies (Guo et al., 2017). China’s 
carbon emissions are still driven by significant longstanding inefficiencies in key industrial 
sectors (Zhang et al., 2016), and the impact of recent low-carbon policies suffers from a lag 
effect (Zhang et al., 2017). Nonetheless, Yi et al. indicate that the 40%-45% carbon intensity 
target is very likely to be achieved by 2020 if the Chinese Government makes more effort to 
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adjust the industrial structure and primary energy mix, as well as promoting energy efficiency 
during the 13th FYP (Yi et al., 2016). Green and Stern (2017) describe important structural 
changes in the economy that are underway, which will enable Chinese emissions to peak well 
before 2030.  
The results confirm the fact that energy and low-carbon policies in China have gradually been 
switching from command-and-control to market-based approaches (Wang and Chen, 2015). 
There is no single policy, whether command-and-control or market-based, which has all the 
characteristics needed to mitigate emissions and address the full range of energy policy 
priorities including efficiency, effectiveness, promoting innovation, and security of supply. 
However, empirical studies have shown that market-based instruments will have a significant 
impact on efficiency improvement and emission reductions (Zhao et al., 2015), although there 
may be regional differences in the effectiveness of different instruments (Ren et al., 2018). 
Despite operating for only a short time and the immature market environment, the pilot ETSs 
in China appear relatively promising with regard to carbon emissions reduction (Zhang et al., 
2017).  
Indeed, the preparatory stage for the Chinese pilot carbon markets was relatively short 
compared with other ETSs developed around the world. Seven pilot ETSs were launched in 
China within two years, whereas EU ETS took almost five years to get underway (European 
Commission, 2015). The rapid development of ETSs in China is largely the result of the 
government’s strong political will. Although all pilots have been launched, some of their design 
details have yet to be finalised, for instance, the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
guidelines and regulations until 2015 (ICAP, 2018a). Nonetheless, Chinese stakeholders tend 
to equate ‘speed of development’ with the rapid economic transition over the last few decades, 
which is overwhelmingly perceived as beneficial (Lo, 2014). 
In terms of stakeholders’ expectations of the future carbon price, at the time of the survey (mid-
2014), the Guangdong carbon market price was around 60 CNY/tCO2 (8 EUR/t CO2) with very 
low turnover (Figure 2-10). After decreasing over the latter half of 2014, the price in the 
Guangdong ETS dropped to around 15 CNY/t CO2 (2 EUR/t CO2), which is consistent with 




Figure 2-10 Price and volume in Guangdong pilot ETS  
(Source: ChinaCarbon.net.cn) 
 
During follow-up interviews, stakeholders expressed mixed views on the impact of carbon 
pricing through ETSs in China. Government officials were far more confident than industrial 
and academic stakeholders. One government official considered the carbon market pilot in the 
province would be robust in response to the economic cycle, and he believed the intensity 
allowance cap scheme would adjust automatically. An official from Guangdong (the largest 
pilot scheme with an absolute cap) suggested the carbon price in Guangdong could be 
supported through a floor price in the auctioning scheme, as a carbon floor price would create 
more certainty about the minimum price, providing a clearer signal for investors. 
Three stakeholders from carbon-intensive industries expressed concern during follow-up 
interviews about the impact of the economic cycle on carbon allowance prices, but in general, 
they preferred retaining allowances for future compliance periods. Through cross-tabulation of 
stakeholder expectations on carbon price in the Guangdong ETS with respondents’ sectors, we 
see that industrial stakeholders are more likely to expect the price to stay the same or to fall.  
Meanwhile, one academic stakeholder involved in setting up the rules for one of the pilot 
carbon markets believed there was significant over-allocation of allowances in most pilot 
markets in China, and that there would be a negative impact during the compliance stage. 
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Another academic was concerned that the quality of the initial reporting of emissions could 
damage the reputation of emissions trading more generally in China, and that this effect had 
not been widely appreciated (i.e. there was significant over-reporting of emissions at the initial 
stages). 
 
2.4.2 Perceptions of interactions between incentives 
Even though earlier literature indicates that Chinese stakeholders preferred market-based 
instruments such as emissions trading over-regulation (Lo, 2014, Liang et al., 2011), and in 
spite of the current moves towards a national emissions trading scheme building on the seven 
pilots, a carbon tax is still being actively considered as a major policy option by the Ministry 
of Finance in China. There have also been longstanding discussions on how best to encourage 
renewable energy in China and having a binding national renewable target is one of the options 
that have been discussed. Consequently, in the case of the Guangdong ETS Pilot, we have 
sought to explore opinions regarding the interactions between the ETS and parallel carbon and 
energy policies. 
 Perceptions of price collapse in the EU ETS 
Before moving to the Chinese situation in detail, we asked how stakeholders viewed the price 
collapse in the EU ETS. Poor awareness of how overlapping low-carbon policies would 
influence the carbon price is reflected in the survey; the global economic downturn was blamed 
by the majority (60%), followed by excess emission allowance allocations (40%) and failure 
to reach binding international targets in international negotiations (30%). Only a relatively 
small number blamed alternative emission reduction mechanisms or increased volumes of 




Figure 2-11 Main reasons for the collapse of the carbon price in the EU ETS 
 
 Attitudes toward possible conflicts between multiple incentives 
Accordingly, we designed two ‘what-if’ scenario questions and two statement acceptance 
questions to explore reactions to hypothetical major policy announcements that we would 
expect to adversely affect the carbon price by reducing demand for allowances. 
Firstly, stakeholders were asked to consider what would the most likely impact be on carbon 
price in the pilot carbon market if a higher than expected short-term renewable energy target 
were enacted in the pilot cities (e.g. renewable energy target increases from 10% to 15%).  
Nearly half (48.3%) of respondents expected the carbon price in these pilot carbon markets to 
decrease by a small amount, and a further 3.5% expected a large decrease in the carbon price. 
However, almost a quarter (24.1%) of respondents believed there would be a small increase in 
the carbon price, and 3.5% thought it would be a large increase. Over one fifth (20.7%) 
anticipated that the price would remain the same and a renewable energy target would not have 
any impact on the carbon price in the pilot carbon market (blue bar in Figure 2-12).  
In contrast, when stakeholders were asked if an unexpected national carbon tax were suddenly 
announced for immediate implementation across all major industry sectors, surprisingly, a 
large majority (59.3%) of respondents believed the carbon price in the ETS would increase and 
almost one fifth of the total sample (18.5%) thought it would be a large increase. Only 25.9% 
of stakeholders believed that the carbon price would decrease if a carbon tax were introduced 
(orange bar in Figure 2-12). Three respondents ignored the question. 
18 12 9 5 5
Global economic downturn
Excess allocation of carbon emission permits by individual countries
Failure of United Nations negotiations to set binding international targets
Large volume of Certification Emission Reduction (CER) due to the increase in CDM projects




Figure 2-12 Stakeholder-expected market responses to ambitious renewable obligation and 
carbon tax policies 
We then tested further whether stakeholders would recognise possible conflicts that might 
emerge when there are multiple incentives. Specifically, we asked about the extent to which 
they agreed that ‘incentives, such as ‘cap and trade’ systems, carbon taxation, renewable energy 
obligations, and emission performance standards etc., may conflict, and generate different costs 
and benefits in different situations.’ Forty-three per cent of respondents agreed with the 
statement, while 23.3% disagreed (Figure 2-13). 
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None of above, please specify: Emission Trading Exchange
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As Figure 2-13 reveals, there is a slight tendency for stakeholders to recognise the possible 
conflicts between carbon markets and overlapping climate change policies; and it is especially 
noticeable among academic stakeholders. Take Attit as ordinal variables representing the extent 
of agreement or disagreement with the statement, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree, a statistically significant result is observed from a univariate regression of Attit on Acad 
(Table 2-5).  The idea is generally more widely accepted among academics than by 
stakeholders in other sectors. 
Table 2-5 Output of univariate regression model Attit-Acad 









Adj. R-squared 0.0833 
t-statistics in brackets 





 Attitudes to linkage between the Chinese and international carbon markets 
There have been many studies on the potential to link national and subnational emission trading 
schemes, as in the case of Quebec and California, and as was explored for Australia and the 
European Union (Ranson and Stavins, 2016, Mehling and Haites, 2011). With regard to the 
statement ‘integrating the Chinese carbon trading market into the international trading system 
could help reduce the adverse impact on carbon price from the interactions of other national 
carbon reduction incentive mechanisms’, 36.7% of stakeholders agreed, whereas only 13.3% 
did not. Nevertheless, for both statements (statement of policy interactions and carbon market 
linkage), a relatively large proportion (33.3% and 50% respectively) could not decide and no 
stakeholder expressed a strongly-held attitude (i.e. strongly agreed or strongly disagreed). 
To sum up, it is striking that the majority of stakeholders believed that the impact of introducing 
a renewable target would be to depress carbon prices, while a new carbon tax was seen as lifting 
the carbon allowance price. The reactions to introducing a tougher renewable energy target and 
an unexpected national carbon tax provide contrasting results. In theory at least, all else being 
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equal, introducing either measure in addition to the carbon market would reduce the allowance 
price in the ETS scheme. 
The majority of stakeholders in follow-up interviews appreciated that introducing low-carbon 
policies in parallel (such as a carbon tax or renewable obligations) would affect the carbon 
allowance price in the ETS but their attitudes differed with regard to the likely magnitude and 
direction. Two industry and two academic stakeholders during follow-up questioning 
suggested that renewable energy targets might increase carbon reductions and in turn increase 
the carbon allowance price, but that carbon taxation policies could provide a ‘carbon price 
floor’ to support the allowance prices. Another academic stakeholder believed raising the 
renewable energy target by 5% could reduce total carbon emissions, while a carbon tax could 
shift the ETS abatement cost curve to the right, and both measures could significantly reduce 
the demand and price of carbon allowances in the Chinese ETS.  
In the follow-up interviews, two government stakeholders and one stakeholder from the 
financial sector still did not believe the impact of other mechanisms on carbon price in ETSs 
would be substantial. The two government officials, though recognising the potential impact 
of parallel low-carbon incentives on carbon allowance pricing, believed that it is important to 
introduce more market-based instruments for emission reductions and environmental 
protection in China, such as energy efficiency quota trading and water rights trading.  
Furthermore, it is interesting too that there is a relationship between their attitudes regarding 
the statement and how much time they claimed have been spent on energy-saving and emission 
reduction policies in the past year. Using different shades to represent time spent on climate 
change-related policies, the positive correlation between time spent and respondents’ attitudes 
to the statement is apparent in Figure 2-14. Again, according to the regression of Attit on Time, 
which is a set of ordinal variables representing time spent working on climate change-related 






Figure 2-14 Cross-analysis of stakeholders’ attitude towards possible conflicts between 
multiple incentives and time spent on energy-saving and emission reduction policies. 
 
Table 2-6 output of univariate regression model Attit-Time 









Adj. R-squared 0.101 
T-statistics in brackets 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
The follow-up interviews also demonstrated divergent views on the compatibility of multiple 
low-carbon incentive policies. Two government stakeholders considered multiple policy 
instruments to be better than a single mechanism. However, all academics surveyed were 
concerned that multiple mechanisms could distort the price signal for environmental goods and 
provide incorrect signals. Although 33.3% selected the carbon market as their preferred 
mechanism in an earlier question, no stakeholder in the follow-up interviews believed that the 











strongly disagree disagree not sure agree strongly agree
less than 20% 20%-50% 50%-70% 70%-90% more than 90%
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The situation in Europe is very similar. Most stakeholders perceive the trading scheme as the 
main instrument to cut down GHGs, but there is a growing view that the ETS is not the only 
instrument required and will need to be combined with other instruments (Fujiwara, 2016). 
Many stakeholders expressed concern at the negative impact that policies had on carbon prices, 
especially stakeholders from the power and energy trading sectors (Gaast et al., 2016), and 
most welcomed the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) as a means of addressing the surplus of 
allowances. Others still believe, though, that policies supporting renewables have only limited 
negative effects on the EU ETS (Marcantonini et al., 2017).  
In follow-up interviews, one government official and two academic stakeholders emphasised 
the importance of linking the Chinese carbon market with international carbon markets, arguing 
that such links could help improve the design and operation of the domestic carbon market in 
the long-term. Another government official was unsure about the need for international 
linkages but believed that such linkage could boost the liquidity of the pilot schemes. Industry 
stakeholders were also unsure about linkage but two were very interested in the impact linkage 
would have on allowance prices in the long-term. One academic strongly opposed linkage on 
the grounds that international linkages might reduce the freedom of Chinese climate policy and 
constrain the Chinese position in future international climate policy negotiations.  
 
2.4.3 Challenges for Chinese carbon markets 
 The MRV system in Chinese carbon markets 
We asked stakeholders to rank potential problems with the monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) system that they believed could negatively affect the carbon market. 
Technical issues raised the greatest concern. Incorrect and incomplete historical databases were 
viewed as the top challenge, followed by incorrect carbon auditing methodologies. The lack of 
third-party verification and auditing organisations ranked third. A lack of skilled workers for 








Table 2-7 Ranking of potential challenges with regard to MRV system 
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
ranking 
Incorrect and incomplete historical database 62% 15% 12% 4% 8% 1.81 
Incorrect carbon auditing methodology 19% 38% 19% 12% 12% 2.58 
Lack of third-party verification and auditing 
organisations 
19% 22% 22% 30% 7% 2.85 
Lack of skilled workers in carbon auditing 4% 15% 23% 19% 38% 3.73 
Corruption during auditing process 0% 8% 23% 35% 35% 3.96 
 
 Implementation of Chinese carbon trading market 
In terms of potential implementation, the top-ranked challenge was the pervasive lack of 
accurate and relevant information and knowledge on the subject, as most respondents agreed 
that ‘enterprises were still confused about carbon emission trading and worried it might 
increase costs’. Concerns about a potential negative impact on GDP growth (i.e. that the ‘cap’ 
implied reduced energy consumption) came second. Stakeholders ranked the challenge of 
limited financial instruments and the absence of derivatives in carbon credit in third place, 
followed by the impact of other energy and low-carbon policies (e.g. emission performance 
standards and renewable energy obligations may reduce demand for emission reductions in 
carbon markets). Finally, limited financial instruments and institutions were viewed as the least 
significant challenge of the five listed. 
Table 2-8 Ranking potential challenges with regard to implementation 
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
ranking 
Enterprises still confused about carbon emission trading, 
and worried it may increase costs 
44% 44% 7% 4% 0% 1.7 
The ‘cap’ implies decreased energy consumption, may 
negatively influence GDP growth 
42% 19% 23% 0% 15% 2.27 
Limited financial instruments; Lack of carbon credit 
derivatives 
8% 15% 31% 23% 23% 3.38 
Limited relevant financial institutions 0% 12% 35% 27% 27% 3.69 
Other energy and low-carbon policies such as Emission 
Performance Standard and Renewable Energy 
Obligation may decrease demand for emission reduction 
in carbon trading market 




Stakeholders also suggested other challenges for the Chinese carbon market including: (a) the 
absence of strong regulatory support from the central government; (b) the need to develop 
novel carbon emission reduction technologies; (c) increased production costs for businesses; 
(d) the difficulty of setting a ‘cap’ in any emission trading system; and (e) the need for a 
comprehensive Chinese carbon market, which they felt would inevitably prove costly. 
During follow-up interviews, both government and industry stakeholders considered the major 
challenge for the Chinese ETS to be how it might evolve towards a comprehensive national 
scheme. Government officials considered the lack of trading activities to be a short-term 
constraint on the carbon market. Two academic stakeholders were concerned about the quality 
of data based on initial auditing, and cited the limitations of budget, time and capacity to 
address these problems, noting there was sometimes less than CNY 100,000 (approximately 
EUR 13,500) available for an initial survey and audit at a large conglomerate or energy 
company. One academic claimed the poor quality of initial data could pose serious challenges 
and lead to a crisis of confidence affecting future development. An industry stakeholder 
suggested that a professional standards institute should be established to better regulate the 
quality of MRV. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This is the first survey with a focus on the interaction of low-carbon and energy policies in 
China, which we hope can open the discussion and provide policymakers with a better 
understanding of some of the built-in biases and perceptions of key actors.  
Given expectations of continued high levels of economic and energy demand growth in China, 
half of the stakeholders surveyed considered a deep cut in emissions in the next decade to be 
unlikely. Government stakeholders generally were more hopeful of success in cutting GHG 
emissions in China and were far more confident than industrial and academic stakeholders in 
the potential benefits from carbon pricing in China.  
Academic stakeholders tended to consider the progress of ETS development in China to be 
slow, and generally felt pessimistic about the potential of Chinese carbon markets to reduce 
emissions due to over-allocation of permits and imperfect auditing regulations, even though 
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their expectations on the future market price in the Guangdong pilot were relatively high 
compared with other stakeholders.  
Similarly, industrial stakeholders also expressed concern over the impact of the economic cycle 
on carbon allowance prices. Although there was a wide range of views on the future carbon 
price, overall more respondents expected the price to drop, led by industrial sector stakeholders. 
Possible reasons for the bearish attitudes include concerns over an incomplete MRV system, 
lack of awareness among many enterprises of the benefits of carbon markets, and the perception 
that participation in the market merely fulfils the need for government social responsibility or 
corporate strategy (Yang et al., 2016). By contrast, academic stakeholders were more optimistic 
in their expectations. 
There is a relatively limited understanding of how other mechanisms might affect the price of 
carbon allowances, even though more than one-third of respondents considered the interaction 
to be a significant challenge. In theory, both a new additional carbon tax and a more stringent 
renewable target would shift the abatement curve to the right thereby reducing the allowance 
price. In our survey, however, many stakeholders believed that renewable targets would lower 
the carbon price, but a majority expected a carbon tax to boost the carbon price seen in the 
market. Most academic respondents recognised that interactions between the carbon market 
and other energy and low-carbon policies may decrease ‘demand’ in emission trading markets. 
It is noteworthy that the degree of understanding of interactions between instruments was 
positively associated with the self-reported amount of time spent working on energy-saving 
and emission reduction policies.  
Energy and low-carbon policies in China have been shifting from command-and-control 
policies to more market-based approaches. Past studies have indicated that a large majority of 
Chinese stakeholders would prefer market-based instruments to control GHGs (Liu et al., 
2013b, Lo, 2014). This enthusiasm for markets is consistent with our results, as an emission 
trading mechanism was deemed the most cost-effective instrument to achieve deep cuts in 
emissions in China. Therefore, disagreements over the perceived interaction between 
overlapping energy and low-carbon policies may undermine the ETS carbon price, despite 
committing to launching a unified national carbon market by 2017, while support for an ETS 
was unequivocally and repeatedly confirmed at the highest political level.  
Objectively, the preparatory stage for the Chinese pilot carbon markets has been relatively short 
compared with the systems in Korea, Quebec, and California (The World Bank, 2014), but 
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very few stakeholders considered the pace to be ‘too fast’. The development of a national ETS 
has taken place in parallel with the pilot schemes and momentum has been growing in China 
towards a national ETS with the government originally committing to a multi-sector ETS being 
up and running in 2017. While discussion of whether a Chinese national ETS should ultimately 
employ a top-down or bottom-up approach10 is still ongoing, and the road map has not yet been 
formally announced beyond the initial announcement in December 2017, the NDRC has at 
least initially adopted a top-down approach towards developing a national system.  Moreover, 
the effort to get a national system up and running so quickly may explain some of the problems 
and delays encountered by the national ETS driven primarily by the lack of baseline data and 
the need for an operational data collection system (Feng, 2017).  
Our findings suggest there are still some important unresolved issues confronting the new 
national system. It would have been more desirable if in the process of implementing the 
national ETS, the Chinese authorities were able to learn lessons from the pilot systems. The 
lack of transparency in disclosing market information, a lack of knowledge among market 
participants, and an immature MRV system pose uncertainties for carbon price setting. Fuss et 
al. (Fuss et al., 2008) claimed that climate change policy uncertainties would induce industries 
to wait and see whether strong interests in effective and efficient investment response to its 
policy signals will be brought out by the government. This implies the degree of market 
information obtained would influence industries’ investment decisions on carbon-saving 
technologies. In addition, the diversity of stakeholders’ predictions of the carbon price reflects 
a lack of consensus. 
 
  
                                                          
10 Top-down approach is through the UNFCCC framework; bottom-up approach is through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements between jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 3  
An empirical study of carbon price determinants 
and the impact of other low-carbon policies on 
Chinese pilot ETSs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Climate change is an issue of wide concern in the world and requires both developed and 
developing countries to make efforts for adaptation and mitigation. Carbon pricing, including 
carbon taxation, ETSs and other measures, essentially aims to put a price on carbon emissions 
and is perceived as an effective way to stimulate a low-carbon transition and to combat climate 
change. During the past few decades, the growing number of carbon pricing schemes and the 
coverage of GHG emissions have increased fourfold (The World Bank, 2014). Especially 
following the implementation of the EU ETS in 2005, more ETSs were proposed and launched, 
such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (USA), New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Schemes, Tokyo Metropolitan Trading Schemes, and the South Korean ETS. 
China is the largest GHG emitter in the world; the coal-based power sector in China alone 
produces more than 7% of global carbon emission and approximately one-third of China’s 
domestic emissions (Pollitt et al., 2017). Thus, China has set domestically binding FYPs, which 
act as a pathway to achieve its official Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) target 
under the Paris Agreement framework, submitted in 2015.  
China launched its own ETSs in late 2011, with seven pilots on track in 2014 and Fujian as the 
eighth ETS pilot in 2016, complementing the national target of a reduction of 60%-65% in 
carbon emission intensity by 2020 based on the 2005 level. Figure 3-1 shows the timeline of 
ETS policy development in China; establishing an ETS was officially included in the 12th FYP 
announced in March 2011, followed by an announcement by the NDRC in the following 
October to launch seven ETS pilots, to accumulate relevant experience before forming a 
national carbon market. These seven regions were chosen based on their different economic 
characteristics. For example, Beijing and Shanghai are business hubs, Guangdong province is 
more based on manufacturing sectors, Hubei province relies more heavily on energy-intensive 
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industries (e.g. iron and steel), Tianjin and Chongqing both to some extent focus on industrial 
and service sectors (Zhang, 2015b). The short-term goal and the starting point of piloting ETS 
is to accumulate experience for the transition to an integrated national carbon market, which 
was launched in late 2017.  
 
Figure 3-1 Timeline of ETS development in China 
 
In addition to the ETS pilots for stimulating GHGs reduction, there are other incentives to 
support renewables in China including feed-in tariffs (FITs) and renewable energy quota 
systems and direct subsidies such as the building-integrated photovoltaics (BIPV) subsidy 
programme and the Golden Sun Programme in 2009. The FIT is a government scheme designed 
to encourage uptake of a range of small-scale renewable and low-carbon electricity generation 
technologies (Ye et al., 2017). For example, the latest FIT policy for distributed generation 
photovoltaic (DGPV) issued by NDRC (2017a) stipulates that self-consumed generation will 
be reimbursed at the local retail electricity rate, in addition to the 0.37 RMB/kWh subsidy. 
Additionally, generation in excess of domestic demand will be taken by the power grid and 
purchased by local power enterprises at the electricity price for coal-fired generation without 
sulphur (Zhang et al., 2015). The renewable energy quota system means the electricity retailers 
need to purchase a certain quantity of renewable energy either on a voluntary basis, which 
could take the form of tradable renewable energy certificate schemes, or on a mandatory basis 
with non-compliance punishment (Xiong et al., 2014).  
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Benefiting from the renewable energy policy framework, the installed capacity of renewable 
energy in China has increased dramatically since 2006. For example, the capacity of 
hydropower in China has been growing at an average annual rate of 11% (CNREC, 2013).  
China now has the largest wind power market in both manufacturing and capacity installation 
(Zhang et al., 2013b).  
Based on previous studies on the EU ETS, this combined low-carbon regime carries a risk of: 
carbon mispricing arising from ETS system design features and from policy interactions with 
other low-carbon policies. First, institutional decisions for ETS operation are usually not 
accurate due to the complexity of ETS design and the imbalanced developing abatement 
technologies across sectors (Advani et al., 2013). For example, overall cap stringency, carbon 
offset projects, or incomplete MRV will impose certain mispricing risks in ETSs. As shown in 
Figure 2-2, after a price collapse in April 2006 following the announcement of the verified 
emissions in the year 2005, the allowance price dropped toward zero due to the prohibition on 
banking allowances during December 2007. As a result, it failed to convey valuable 
information to regulated entities and further depressed market confidence, raising policy 
concerns.  
 
Figure 3-2 EUA price collapses 2006 - 2007 
 
Second, the effect of policy interaction on emission reductions has been widely discussed. One 
of the key threats identified by scholars is the overlapping effect that weakens incentives for 
adopting low-carbon technologies thus increasing total emissions (Böhringer and Rosendahl, 
2010, European Commission, 2017). Unlike in the EU ETS, the current literature on carbon 
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pricing in China and interaction between parallel low-carbon policies is scarce, even though 
China has just launched the world’s largest ETS. Instead, most of them focus on the assessment 
of carbon market performance or the policy debate on the carbon tax and ETS policy (Liu et 
al., 2015, Zhang, 2015b, Zhao et al., 2016). Hence, there is a gap in the literature in empirical 
research on allowance pricing behaviour and the quantitative effect of policy interactions in 
Chinese ETS pilots. Thus, to understand the potential risk of carbon mispricing for Chinese 
ETS, an investigation on price deterministic drivers and policy interaction is crucial. 
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, it extends the current empirical analysis of 
pricing behaviour in the Chinese ETSs by further incorporating renewable energy factors and 
extreme weather as additional explanatory variables. Second, it conducts the first quantitative 
analysis in assessing the impact of parallel low-carbon policy on allowance prices in China. 
Lastly, this study provides an insight into the dynamic relation between macro-level financial 
risks and carbon price series.  
The remainder of this chapter is presented as follows: Section 3.2 discusses prior research and 
literature on pricing behaviours and policy interaction in carbon markets; Section 3.3 
demonstrates the dataset and methodology used in the analysis; Section 3.4 presents the 
empirical results and interpretation; and Section 3.5 concludes the research findings along with 
limitations and implications for policy frameworks and future studies.  
 
3.2 Literature review 
Overall, carbon prices are mainly driven by the balance between the supply and demand of 
allowance units (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007, Alberola et al., 2008, Tan and Wang, 2017). 
The demand for allowances is expected to be related to energy prices, extreme weather 
conditions, macro-economic factors, renewable energy production and issued CERs 
(Chevallier, 2011). The supply of allowances is primarily determined by policy decisions or 
regulatory events, such as the level of the emissions cap, the announcement of or information 
disclosure on a surrender date or the rules of using carbon offsets (Hintermann et al., 2016). 
 Energy market 
Fossil fuel prices, including crude oil, coal, and natural gas, are empirically proven to be 
significant factors in determining EUA prices in the EU ETS. Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) 
and Alberola et al. (2008) produced pioneering literature to reveal that energy markets act as 
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decisive factors in explaining allowance price fluctuation. Based on Phase I spot and futures 
data, the former study established that carbon prices in the EU ETS are linked to fossil fuel use 
(e.g. oil, gas, coal). By using an extended dataset, the latter study emphasised that the nature 
of this relationship between energy and carbon prices varies depending on the period under 
consideration. Bunn and Fezzi (2007) further quantified the mutual interactions of electricity, 
gas and carbon prices in the UK.  
Natural gas is more integrated and believed to have a significantly positive effect on allowance 
prices (Aatola et al., 2013, Kim and Lee, 2015). When the gas price goes up, carbon emissions 
go up because entities are reluctant to continually use this relatively clean fuel, thereby carbon 
price increases. Coal prices are found to be negatively related to allowance prices while gas 
prices are positively related (Benz and Trück, 2009, Creti et al., 2012, Aatola et al., 2013, Kim 
and Lee, 2015). The rationale behind this is that coal is comparatively more carbon-intensive 
than gas. Thus, the increasing price of coal results in less related output and therefore, lower 
carbon emissions, with a decrease in the carbon price. However, Rickels et al. (2014) found an 
unexpected positive relationship between coal and allowance prices in phase II of the EU ETS 
while Koch et al. (2014) could not find coal prices to be a statistically significant factor in 
explaining EUA prices (Koch et al., 2014).  
As for the Brent oil price, previous studies yielded conflicting results due to differences in 
sample periods, data series and econometric methods. For example, some papers identified the 
Brent oil price as a significant positive driver of the carbon price as it affects the price of natural 
gas (Alberola et al., 2008, Reboredo and Ugando, 2015). However, Hammoudeh et al. (2015) 
argued that the crude oil market and allowance market are negatively correlated while others 
found that these two markets are not correlated (Alberola et al., 2008, Berdin and Muckley, 
2011). Yu et al. (2015) further conducted a multi-scale analysis and indicated that the linear 
relationship between crude oil price and allowance price is stronger over a larger time scale.  
Given that the power sector is the most affected sector under the EU ETS, the fluctuating 
electricity price is found to be a key indicator of allowance prices (Bunn and Fezzi, 2007, 
Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller, 2010, Kim and Lee, 2015). However, in the context of China, 
it has been well recognised that the current power market is a state-managed system rather than 
market-based, despite the ongoing reform of the electricity supply sector (Pollitt et al., 2017). 
Thus, the electricity price in China cannot serve as a benchmark for the carbon price as it does 
in the EU ETS (Chen et al., 2016). Alternatively, another electricity-related variable that may 
be examined is the renewable energy production level, because GHG emissions would be lower 
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when there are enlarged shares of renewable resources such as hydro, wind and solar power in 
electricity generation. Koch et al. (2014) found the growth of wind and solar electricity 
production is a second important determinant of EUA price drops (the first is economic 
conditions) as the policy interaction effects between ETS and renewable outputs are 
empirically moderate. In contrast, many scholars found a significant negative correlation 
between allowance price and the supply level of renewable energy (Aatola et al., 2013, 
Hintermann et al., 2016). Rickels et al. (2014) further suggested that the short-term variation 
in wind power supply has no observable effect on allowance prices.  
 Extreme weather  
Apart from energy market factors, extreme weather and seasonal changes are expected to have 
an impact on the price path of carbon insofar as they influence energy demand (Mansanet-
Bataller et al., 2007, Zeitlberger and Brauneis, 2014).  For example, cold winters could increase 
the level of heating while hot days will yield extra demand for air conditioning, which will 
increase fuel use for electricity generation, and consequently the level of carbon emissions. 
Alberola et al. (2008) indicated that unanticipated cold temperatures would have a greater 
impact on allowance price than regular temperature changes. Chevallier (2012) further 
highlighted these nonlinear relationships by proving a statistically significant effect can only 
be found when the weather deviates above or below a certain threshold. The main insight 
behind this point is that only unanticipated temperature events can have an effect on carbon 
prices, as market participants can properly anticipate temperatures that conform to seasonal 
averages.  
 Macroeconomic indicator 
Chevallier (2009) was the first to find a transmission effect from the stock market to the carbon 
market, based on previous studies on futures price of agricultural and energy market. 
Oberndorfer (2009) suggested that stock returns of those affected companies under the ETS 
scheme positively contribute to carbon prices. This argument is further supported by Lutz et 
al. (2013) assertion that a stock indicator may serve as a macroeconomic proxy and is positively 
correlated to the allowance price. The rationale behind the relationship is that the allowance 
price is expected to fall when the economy slows down because the reduced business activities 
or lower production levels would reduce allowance demand.  
 Policy interaction 
73 
 
It is believed that renewable energy policies will affect aggregate demand of fossil fuels thus 
having an indirect influence on the demand for emissions allowance. Böhringer and Rosendahl 
(2010) provided a theoretical model suggesting that mandatorily increased renewable energy 
will reduce the demand for emission allowances in the trading market, and therefore the 
undervalued price of emission allowances will fail to trigger low-carbon and clean 
technologies. Following this, Abrell et al. (2011) extended the theoretical model by further 
analysing the effect on suppressing allowance demand due to the introduction of financial 
subsidies for renewable energy. In addition to this, many scholars have examined the actual 
effect on emission reduction levels brought about by policy interaction (Tu and Mo, 2017) 
(Fujiwara, 2016) (Kim and Lee, 2015) (Zhang et al., 2013b). This phenomenon has been 
explained by Hone (2013a), who argues that the mandatory policies such as ambitious 
renewables target or high carbon taxation would distort the marginal abatement cost curve 
thereby lowering the visible prices in the emission trading market.  
However, Shahnazari et al. (2017) generated an integrated real options and portfolio 
optimisation model of electricity generation investment behaviour under political uncertainty 
where carbon pricing interacts with renewable portfolio standard (RPS) instruments. They 
suggested that overlapping a politically contested carbon pricing policy with a renewable 
portfolio standard may result in a lower risk in renewable energy investment environment, as 
the overlap allows investors to hedge their portfolio against political uncertainty through 
renewable energy additions. Consequently, GHG abatement objectives may be achieved at 
lower cost than would be the case without the policy interaction. Furthermore, Weigt et al. 
(2013) found a promising interaction between renewable energy promotion and climate policy 
by showing that renewable energy led to a reduction of emissions in Germany and it contributes 
more to abatement activities if it is covered by an ETS scheme. Considering the long-term 
effect, ETS policy and renewable promoting policy might be implemented jointly to ensure the 
generation of renewable energy (Moselle, 2011).  
Among the rest of the extensive literature on policy interactions within climate and energy 
policies, most of it follows an ex-ante simulation approach and focuses on the interaction 
between carbon prices and renewable energy policies. They can be divided into two groups: 
the first is studies using theoretical models to understand the dynamics of policy interactions 
(Sorrell, 2003) (Pethig and Wittlich, 2009, Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010); the second group 
of studies use computable general equilibrium models to study the dynamics of policy 
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interactions in heterogeneous sectors (Boeters and Koornneef, 2011) (Flues et al., 2014) (Kim 
and Lee, 2015).  
Results from this ex-ante literature strongly depend on model assumptions and the data used, 
and the results from ex-ante simulation and ex-post empirical analyses can be different. For 
instance, Koch et al. (2014) found that ex-post sensitivity of EUA price changes to wind/solar 
growth is much smaller than predicted ex-ante by simulation-based studies. The important 
implication of this finding is that policy interaction effects between ETS and renewable energy 
standards are potentially exaggerated in simulation-based analyses. There is now a large 
empirical literature on ETS; however, only a handful of studies have a specific focus on ex-
post empirical analyses of interactions of ETS with other energy and climate policies.  
Furthermore, as market participants may react sensitively to news of regulatory changes, 
regulatory announcements may have effects on carbon prices (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2009, Conrad et al., 2012). Most studies assessed the impact of 
ETS policy (e.g. the complementary use of carbon offsets, adjustments on the total cap) that 
can influence the supply of allowances using dummy variables or an event-study model. 
Alberola et al. (2008) found the price collapse of the EU ETS during 2006 was associated with 
the verified emissions announcement in 2015. The prohibition of banking from EU ETS phase 
I to phase II is proven to have had a significant negative impact on the carbon price, as unused 
permits were worthless after the year in which they were issued, and there was a considerable 
allowance surplus at the end of Phase I (Chevallier, 2010). Daskalakis et al. (2009) further 
suggested that inter-phase banking can smooth out fluctuations. Based on previous papers, Fan 
et al. (2017) conducted complementary research by employing an event-study model and 
clustering ETS regulatory policy announcements into six categories, and they indicated that 
while aggregate impacts of the total events studied are low, impacts of events having 
underlying negative impacts are higher than those having underlying positive impact. Nearly 
half of the regulatory policy announcements have significant impacts on EUA returns and are 
coherent to their theoretical impacts.  
The literature on quantitative analysis of carbon pricing in Chinese ETS is currently limited;  
Zhang (2015a) stated carbon prices tend to be associated with energy prices rather than 
regulatory events on the supply side. Based on previous work, Chen et al. (2016) conducted 
VAR models with daily data series and surmised that oil price has a negative influence on 
carbon price. Moreover, they found an unexpected negative relation with stock prices. They 
further explained that the stock price in China is dominated by interest rate policy rather than 
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real economic conditions, especially during 2013-2015. However, drawing conclusions based 
on daily data in the Chinese ETSs needs to be done cautiously. Given that there are a large 
number of non-trading days in carbon markets during the trading period, daily data tend to be 
less informative, an issue which Chen et al. (2016) failed to consider.  
Wang and Lu (2015) proposed that price determinants for the seven pilots present regional 
variations due to differences in the degree of development of carbon-intensive and service 
industries. Macroeconomic factors, energy prices and temperatures have a significant impact 
on emission allowance prices in China, and price fluctuations are mainly driven by the demand 
side. This assumption is supported by Fan and Todorova (2017), using volume-weighted 
weekly carbon prices and other explanatory variables at a weekly frequency. Additionally, they 
found that carbon markets in China are positively correlated to macroeconomic indicators, such 
as the stock indices of Shenzhen and Shanghai, and the crude oil price was statistically 




3.3.1.1 Carbon prices 
Given that the Chinese ETS pilots have not yet launched a futures market, only spot prices are 
considered here. Emission trading, data including daily price and trading volume, were 
obtained from the official website (www.chinacarbon.net.cn). The sample period for all ETS 
pilots was from 19th June 2014 to 21st June 2017. Table 3-1 presents an overview of carbon 
prices data at a daily frequency.  
As trading was relatively inactive (see % days with trading activities in Table 3-1), too many 
zero returns would weaken the reliability of the regression models, therefore, we followed the 
example of Fan and Todorova (2017) and transformed daily data to weekly data, which does 
not omit as many noteworthy fluctuations as monthly data would, and also helps to avoid noisy 
daily data entries. Moreover, volume-weighted weekly prices are used in the regression model 





Table 3-1 Overview of carbon prices raw data 
ETS Pilots Sample period Total number of daily 
observations 
Number of days with 
trading activities 
% days with 
trading activities 
Shenzhen 19/06/2014 – 
21/06/2017 
785 509 64% 
Shanghai 19/06/2014 – 
21/06/2017 
785 391 49% 
Beijing 19/06/2014 – 
21/06/2017 
785 473 60% 
Guangdong 19/06/2014 – 
21/06/2017 
785 526 67% 
Tianjin 19/06/2014 – 
21/06/2017 
785 330 42% 
Hubei 19/06/2014 – 
21/06/2017 
785 691 88% 
Chongqing 19/06/2014 – 
21/06/2017 
785 115 14% 
 
3.3.1.2 Explanatory variables        
Note that all explanatory variables are expressed in the currency of CNY if associated with 
price. All monthly data were merged into the weekly dataset using Stata. Detailed information 
on all explanatory variables is summarised in Table 3-2.  
 Energy market factors 
Conventional energy sources, such as crude oil and natural gas, are perceived to be the price 
determinants in carbon markets. With respect to crude oil (“oil_ara’), the Arabian Dubai Fateh 
Crude Oil Spot Index was used in the model, and served as the main pricing benchmark for 
Asian crude oil (Giaever-Enger and Booth, 2008). Gas (‘gas’) is an increasingly important 
factor in the Chinese energy mix, represented by China Market Price of Commodities Liquid 
Natural Gas. The price of coal (‘coal’) is the average weekly spot price of China Qinhuangdao 
5500 kcal/kg.  
The monthly renewable energy data (‘re_prdct’) is represented by the aggregate national 
electricity production level of different renewable energy sources, including hydropower, 
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nuclear and wind power (onshore and offshore wind). Meanwhile, because daily and weekly 
series of renewable energy data are not accessible, monthly data series were chosen instead. 
 Macroeconomic indicators 
To investigate the explanatory power of macro-level indicators, we first employed the CSI 300 
stock (‘s_300’) index to capture possible economic fluctuations. Given that the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange is mainly composed of private companies while Shanghai hosts the biggest state-
owned companies from financial services and energy sectors, the broad-based stock index CSI 
300 is perceived as a representative indicator for the economy, which is a capitalisation-
weighted index tracking the financial performance of 300 actively traded stocks from Shenzhen 
and Shanghai exchanges.  
 Extreme Temperature  
Daily temperatures were collected for each pilot first, then the deviation of temperatures, 
expressed in the form of absolute value, were measured by the differences from their weekly 
average temperatures and 10-year rolling average temperatures for every week, which 
alleviates noise from seasonal changes. As the differences were transformed to absolute values, 
these can be interpreted as the extreme level of temperature on a weekly basis for each pilot.   
 Low-carbon policy events 
Policy released as an announcement, notice and legal document by either central or local 
government is defined as ‘regulatory event’ in this study. Two main targeted categories are 
policies concerning renewable energy development and usage, and ETS policies. Initially 54 
events about renewable energy at the national level and 166 events about ETS at the local level 
were collected as the data pool. Next, the events related to renewable energy on the national 
level were kept without further adjustment, because they are consistent in their nature of 
promoting renewable energy installation and usage, and thus are expected to have the same 
effect on carbon markets. The renewable energy events mainly include tariff settlement, 
announcements of financial subsidy, and guidelines for increasing the use and output of 
renewable energy, for example, the announcement of issuing the 13th FYP for wind power 
generation.  
 ETS regulatory events 
ETS policy events need to be further classified as follows: surrender dates, i.e. the dates on 
which covered entities must surrender enough allowances to cover its emissions, otherwise 
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heavy penalties are imposed; CCERs (Chinese Certified Emission Reductions) offset limit 
announcements, i.e. the events related to the rules of using or verifying carbon offsets. The 
policy event data are listed in Appendix C.    
Table 3-2 Dataset summary 
Series Specification Frequency Unit Database 
Gas Market price of commodities liquid natural 
Gas (LNG) in China 
Weekly CNY/Tonne 
Bloomberg 
Crude Oil Arabian Dubai Fateh Crude Oil spot index Weekly CNY/Barrel 






Shenzhen Shanghai CSI300 Weekly CNY 






China Energy Production Electricity Hydro 
Electric Power 
Monthly Billion KWh 
China Energy Production Electricity 
Nuclear Electric Power 
Monthly Billion KWh 
China Energy Production Electricity Wind 
Electric Power 
Monthly Billion KWh 
 
3.3.2 Empirical method 
3.3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares 
OLS regression was employed in this study. All ETS pilots are expressed in the general 
regression form as follows: 
 𝛥𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(∆)𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡      (3-1)                               
Where 𝛥𝑦𝑡 refers to weekly returns of carbon prices, 𝑋𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables. 
𝛽 stands for the estimated coefficient for each explanatory variable and 𝑢𝑡 refers to the residual 
term of the model.  
The use of non-stationary variables can lead to spurious results in regressions (Brooks, 2008). 
Therefore, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test needs to be conducted. After 
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taking ADF tests, all variables other than weekly returns and extreme weather were found to 
be non-stationary, therefore those non-stationary data entries were converted to stationary by 
taking the firstdifferenced form. In order to alleviate possible heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation issues in the error term, all estimation models adopted Newey-West HAC 
standard errors with maximum 10 lags. Our basic carbon allowance pricing model is as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑆𝐼300𝑡 +
  𝛽5𝑅𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡    (3-2) 
All raw data and cross-correlation of all the variables are presented in Appendix B. The 
correlation table suggests that each carbon market is segmented and driven by different price 
determinants.  
3.3.2.2 Event-based study 
It is widely recognised that fundamental-based econometric models do not have sufficient 
explanatory power regarding observed carbon price variations, as the adjusted R2  or R are 
generally low (Alberola et al., 2008, Koch et al., 2014, Hintermann et al., 2016). To deal with 
this issue, many studies assess the impact of given policy events using dummy variables to 
represent certain event dates. Through this method, the influence of some ‘distorted’ factors 
can be examined, and additional explanatory variables through time will be spotted. Following 
previous works, three dummy variables representing the policy events of renewable energy 
development and usage, limiting the use of CCERs, and surrender date notification were added. 
Thus, for each pilot, we considered renewable energy policy events on the national level, 
denoted as ‘Renewable Energy,’ and ETS policy events including announcements dates of 
CCERs and surrender date. The regression model for each pilot is shown as below: 
𝛥𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑖(∆)𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝛾2𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑅 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒     (3-3)     
Where 𝛥𝑦𝑡 refers to weekly returns of carbon prices, 𝑋𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables 
as in Equation 4-2. 𝛽 and 𝛾 stand for the estimated coefficient for each explanatory variable, 
𝐷 refers to the type of policy events inserted as dummy variables, and 𝑢𝑡 refers to the residual 
term of the model.  
Thus, the more detailed regression model is presented below: 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑆𝐼300𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 +  𝛾2𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑅 +




3.4 Results and findings 
3.4.1 Empirical results  
The brief summary of regression results for each pilot is presented in Appendix B. Overall, it 
seems that no statistically significant price determinant can be found in the Chongqing market, 
which is reasonable given its extremely inactive trading. However, several valuable price 
drivers were identified across all other markets. In the Beijing market, carbon prices appear to 
be positively associated with the Arabian crude oil price, which is significant at the 5% level, 
while other factors are not significant. A similar effect can also be found in the Shanghai 
market, in which the Arabian crude oil price positively affects the carbon price with a 5% 
significance level. As for the Guangdong market, the Chinese market price of LNG is 
significant at the 1% level and positively correlated with carbon prices, while other factors are 
not significant. However, in the Shenzhen market none of the aforementioned energy factors 
is found to influence carbon prices, except extreme weather (at the 10% significance level). 
Finally, carbon prices in the Tianjin market show a weak positive correlation with the 
renewable energy production level, while all other factors found to be insignificant.  
The Beijing and Shanghai markets seem to have no reaction to policy events with a noteworthy 
significance level. Renewable energy policy announcements are found to be significant in 
Guangdong and Hubei markets at the significance levels of 5% and 10% respectively. 
Moreover, regulatory announcements that are associated with a surrender date are negatively 
linked with carbon allowance prices in the Shenzhen market at the 5% significance level. 
Finally, a dummy variable for CCER announcements only had a statistically significant effect 
in the Tianjin market, at the 10% significance level. The relations between macroeconomic 









Table 3-3 Summary of impacts on carbon prices from explanatory factors 
Factors 
Previous literature on the EU 
ETS 
Previous literature on 
China’s carbon market 
Results in this 
study 
Theory-based price driven factors 
Gas prices Positive  Insignificant  
Positive 
(Guangdong) 




Coal prices Positive/Negative/Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Macroeconomic 
indicator 
Positive Positive/Negative Insignificant 






















Surrender dates - - 
Negative 
(Shenzhen) 





3.4.2 Discussion  
 Explanatory power of energy market and macroeconomic factors 
Coal price is a not significant price driver in any of the pilot carbon markets. The rationale 
behind this is as follows: first, coal is a globally traded commodity with a stable price over a 
fairly long period, except during 2016 when its price rose because of the Chinese Government’s 
attempt to decarbonise its economic structure and thus reduce the amount of coal mining; 
second, even though the use of coal is expected to be reduced gradually, coal still dominates 
the current energy consumption mix in China partly due to the insufficient natural gas resource 
and rich coal reserves (See Figure 3-3) (Xie et al., 2010, BP, 2017). As energy demand in an 
emerging economy imposes a relatively inelastic demand on coal use, coal consumption in 
China does not depend on coal prices, and thus coal prices do not have a significant impact on 
emission prices in carbon markets in China. 
 
Figure 3-3 China primary energy consumption by fuel type 2010-2016 
 
Even though coal price is not significant, a positively significant dynamic relationship exists 
between other energy prices (i.e. Arabian crude oil and natural gas) and carbon prices in the 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong markets. This supports the mainstream studies such as 
Chevallier (2011) and Conrad et al. (2012), in that an increase in the international oil price 
sends a signal of an increase in energy demand, which is translated as an increase in the carbon 
emissions level. Moreover, the rising natural gas price in China reinforces dependence on coal 
consumption. Thus, the level of carbon emissions will also increase. 
 
















 Dynamic relations with renewable energy supply and extreme weather   
Table 3-3 summarises the empirical results of this study by comparing them with previous 
research. As the very first study to probe the dynamic relation between the renewable energy 
supply level and carbon allowance price, a positive correlation is found in the Tianjin market. 
In contrast, mainstream studies on the EU ETS report negative correlations or no significant 
relationship, because a reduced demand for emissions allowance results from the substitution 
effect between carbon-intensive power generation and renewable energy plants. However, in 
this case, the coefficient of renewable energy production level is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. In fact, this result may be consistent with the context in China.  
First, this could be interpreted as the signalling effect from the increasing level of renewable 
energy supply on the emerging demand for overall electricity generation, which indicates an 
increasing demand for carbon allowances. Second, unlike Europe which has rich reserves of 
natural gas in the North Sea, China has large coal reserves and insufficient gas resources. Under 
such an energy reserve mix, exporting more intermittent renewable energy to the power grid 
means more hot back-up power from coal-fired power plants with high flexibility resilience to 
rapid load change (Agora Energiewende, 2017, The World Bank, 2014). Thus, some market 
participants will expect a potentially higher demand for carbon allowances and drive up the 
price.   
Regarding the relation between extreme weather and carbon prices, the result demonstrates a 
statistically significant relationship within the Shenzhen market. Aligned with the findings of 
Zeitlberger and Brauneis (2014), the result in the Shenzhen market indicates that additional 
carbon emissions, resulting from increasing energy demand due to the unexpected heating and 
cooling activities beyond seasonal change, are priced in the Shenzhen carbon market. 
Compared with the other studies focusing on Chinese ETSs, this appears to be inconsistent 
with the findings of Chen et al. (2016), which suggested that extreme weather level has no 
significance in terms of carbon prices. However, their data series were collected at daily 
frequency rather than weekly level.  
 Policy interactions  
Regarding policy event dummies, three categories of announcements were considered: policies 
promoting renewable energy, notifications on compliance dates and policies with respect to the 
use of carbon offsets (i.e. CCER). First, the coefficient for renewable energy policy dummies 
in the Guangdong and Hubei’s markets were proven to be positive at the 5% and 10% 
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significance levels, respectively. This seems to be inconsistent with the studies that suggest 
that renewable energy development will lower the carbon price by reducing the demand for 
allowances. However, the result of this study to some extent supports the findings of Jiang et 
al. (2018), as stakeholders consider that it is possible for the carbon market to translate the 
debut of a renewable energy policy into a signal for rising carbon prices. However, this point 
of view is contrary to the fundamental economic theory that reduced demand for emission 
allowances caused by increasing renewables would cause the allowance price to slump. It 
indicates a market failure within the pilot that the allowance price reacts abnormally to changes 
in demand and supply.  
Another possible rationale is that a constant emphasis on promoting renewable energy reveals 
China’s ambitions and determination in addressing climate change. The results in Chapter 2 on 
stakeholder views indicate that market participants may not be fully aware of the operating 
principles of ETSs, and the main motivation for participating is to fulfil government obligations 
or social responsibilities. Therefore, the government’s ambitions and determination will send 
a signal of a more stringent emission trading scheme in the future, hence participants would 
expect the price of emission permit to rise, thus lifting the market price.    
Second, notifications of compliance dates were found to influence price variations in the 
Shenzhen market at the 5% significance level. This further supports the observations of Ren 
and Lo (2017) that transactions fluctuate with the approach of the compliance date, and the 
participation of most covered entities is to serve a regulatory purpose instead of exploring the 
benefit of carbon trading. Finally, the dummy of the CCERs policy in Tianjin accounts for the 
increase in carbon price at the 10% significance level. This may be explained by the fact that 
on 14 March 2017 the release of the notice suspending verification of voluntary carbon offsets 
(i.e. CCERs) removed the possibility of the increasing use of CCERs for compliance and thus 
decreased the alternative supply of carbon allowances. 
 Market characteristics  
Similar to previous research, this study recognises the immature nature of the seven carbon 
markets in China, and that secondary markets are somewhat poorly developed. First, the seven 
carbon markets are highly segmented, and price determinants and market performance in each 
market are largely heterogeneous. For example, among the considered factors, extreme weather 
is the only priced factor that has a statistically significant effect on the Shenzhen market while 
the gas price is significant in the Guangdong market only. Second, fundamental-based 
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econometric models tend to have limited effectiveness over total variance, as illustrated by the 
low R-squared across models. Therefore, ETS pilots in China are less efficient markets in terms 
of informational structure. Third, more advanced financial instruments, such as futures and 
options, have not currently been introduced. Thus, market participants are exposed to higher 
risks due to the lack of hedging choices and an incomplete hybrid structure. Meanwhile, the 
immature nature makes it difficult to divert potential investment capital to carbon trading. 
Therefore, most of the capped entities, especially large state-owned enterprises, participate in 
emission trading activities in order to control their total emissions and meet compliance 
obligations instead of achieving cost-efficient abatement or the embedded investment purpose. 
In other words, few participants recognise the benefits of carbon trading and may have limited 
knowledge about ETS policy; thus, essentially, they are driven by responsibility rather than a 
market-based solution to reduce marginal abatement cost.   
 Regional heterogeneity 
Regional disparity across China is a prominent source of uncertainty because the more than 30 
provinces have distinct economic structures, resource endowments and market conditions (Yi 
et al., 2011, Zhang et al., 2013a). Any unified low-carbon policy scheme at the national level 
would mean different abatement costs in each province (Wei et al., 2012).  
All of the regional ETS pilots include heat and electricity production, iron and steel, nonferrous 
metals, petrochemical and chemical, pulp and paper, and cement. However, each of the ETS 
pilots have certain striking divergences in the sectoral coverage. The Beijing pilot covers 
education, medical, and public utilities; the Shanghai pilot covers financial companies, airports 
and harbours; the Shenzhen pilot covers road transportation; and the Tianjin and Chongqing 
pilots include coal, oil and gas exploration (Duan et al., 2014, Qi et al., 2014a). Different 
coverage may imply varying sensitivity to exogenous price drivers.  
Moreover, the shadow price is positively correlated with regional economic development levels 
in China. That is, the shadow prices of carbon emissions in high-income provinces, such as 
Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, are significantly higher than those of the other 
provinces, while the shadow prices of carbon emissions in low-income provinces are very low 
(Zhang et al., 2014b). Higher shadow prices in Shanghai and Beijing imply higher abatement 
costs compared to other regions, therefore the ETS pilots in these two regions would prefer 
offsets from other regions with lower abatement costs, and tend to be less sensitive to other 





This paper examines the effect of price fundamentals that have been shown to be relevant to 
the EU ETS and it presents an empirical analysis of the impact of parallel low-carbon policy. 
To begin with, econometric analysis of market fundamentals was conducted, based on sample 
data drawn from September 2014 to June 2017. The regression results, to some extent, align 
with similar studies of the EU ETS; for example, the energy price factors are positively linked 
to allowance prices in the Chinese ETS pilots (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong) to 
varying degrees.  
Second, this paper demonstrates the influence of extreme weather and renewable energy supply 
levels in some of China’s carbon markets. Empirical results suggest that a significant positive 
correlation exists between the renewable energy supply level and carbon prices in the Tianjin 
market, which appears to diverge from the findings of mainstream studies in the EU ETS. 
However, to some extent, the result aligns with the context in China. First, due to the fast-
growing economy, the higher production level of renewable energy may signal an increase in 
demand for electricity. Further, since China has plentiful coal reserves but insufficient gas 
resources, more renewable energy being introduced to the power grid suggests a higher demand 
for coal-fired plants with higher flexibility and excellent resilience to load changes to serve as 
an alternative power source.  
As the first empirical research investigating price interactions between renewable energy policy 
and ETS policy for Chinese ETS pilots, this paper also sheds light on two points. First, the 
announcement of a renewable energy policy positively contributes to an increase in carbon 
price in the Guangdong and Hubei markets; second, the announcements of ETS policy, such 
as surrender date notice and the use of CCERs, influence carbon price variations in Shenzhen 
and Tianjin to varying degrees. However, the findings overall are in line with previous research 
suggesting the ETS pilots in China are segmented and remain relatively inefficient. On the 
other hand, given the fact that carbon spot prices do reflect some underlying conditions for 
micro- and macro-level factors, market participants may not be as rational as some scholars 
suggest. 
The main limitation of the study is that, due to the lack of comprehensive literature on price 
behaviour discovery in China’s ETS market, it is difficult to generate sufficient analysis of the 
results, therefore no cogent conclusions could be drawn. The scarcity of literature  provides an 
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opportunity to fill the evidence gap, however, the large heterogeneities in the results of seven 
pilot ETSs mean that there are huge difficulties in explaining the results.  
Meanwhile, the event-based study could be further improved, as announcements of ETS 
institutional policy and CCERs offset regulation could be divided into two groups: 
hypothetically, one has a positive influence on carbon prices (such as tightening caps, stringent 
allowances allocation, auction rather than free allocation and reducing offsets limitation), while 
hypothetically the other group has a negative influence on carbon prices (such as loosening 





Impact of emission trading market linkage on the 
carbon price 
4.1 Introduction 
Although China is currently piloting ETS designs at the provincial level, a trading market at 
the national level was set up at the end of 2017. Additionally, China has indicated that it would 
consider participating in an international carbon market. Given the scale of China’s economy 
and energy system, its energy trends and climate policies will have a significant impact on 
global climate change mitigation (Qi et al., 2013).  
Moreover, all of the existing emission trading markets are at a regional or national level or at 
the level of a single economic group. The potential benefits of linking emissions markets across 
countries and regions are well recognised (Carbon Trust, 2009, Haita, 2013, Borghesi et al., 
2016). A global market provides more flexibility for parties to achieve emissions reductions at 
the lowest marginal cost across all covered sectors.  
In addition, as the largest emission trading scheme in the world, the EU ETS continues to 
negotiate with ETSs in other regions, attempting to establish an international emission trading 
market. The prospects for linking carbon markets between developed and developing countries 
have been widely discussed and are seen as a way to encourage the participation of developing 
countries in tackling global climate change. However, carbon market linkage may not only 
impact the emission permit price, but also impact total emissions and welfare, and such effects 
may depend on the regions’ own situation, for instance, the emission level and policy strength 
of emission reduction in the two regions (Babiker et al., 2004).  
Therefore, quantifying the impact of emission trading linkage between China and the world 
through a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model would generate insights for forming a 
global emission trading market. Driven by the above motivations, this chapter simulates the 
case of linking the Chinese ETS with global emission trading by employing the GTAP-Energy 
(GTAP-E) model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002), and demonstrates the impact on the carbon 
market in China. 
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This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 summarises the current literature on analysing 
climate change policy interactions using general equilibrium models; Section 4.3 illustrates the 
methodology including general features, conditions for model equilibrium and policy 
constraints in the CGE model; subsequently, the model description is demonstrated in section 
4.4 followed by results and findings in section 4.5. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
Parallel to the growing number of ETS, governments are starting to link or consider linking 
their respective ETSs (Mehling and Görlach, 2016). Emissions trading schemes therefore have 
the potential to play an important role in international climate change cooperation. Linkage 
offers several advantages; economic efficiency gains, a broader and more liquid carbon market, 
potentially lower risks of carbon leakage and lock-in of the climate policy (Hawkins and Jegou, 
2014). However, linkage also comes with disadvantages, including distributional issues and a 
loss of regulatory control (Flachsland et al., 2009). 
In terms of the impact of linkages on those participating in cap-and-trade systems, numerous 
studies have tried to probe the benefits and challenges of linkage from environmental, 
macroeconomic and political aspects respectively.  
First, studies assessed the emissions reduction effect by simulating linkage among ETSs, and 
carbon leakage was found to be the main concern. Blyth and Bosi (2004) doubted the real 
emission reduction effect of linkage, as they found overall emissions would be larger if linking 
parties have looser caps and over-allocate emission permits. Carbone et al. (2009) added further 
weight to their result by suggesting an international collaborative trading system would not be 
helpful to the environment within large trading systems; however, collaboration between the 
Chinese and the EU ETSs would improve cost-effectiveness because China has a relatively 
low abatement cost. Therefore the EU ETS, with a higher abatement cost, could benefit from 
purchasing emission allowances from the Chinese market. Marschinski et al. (2012) 
supplemented Carbone et al. (2009) argument that linking ETSs with an intensity target rather 
than an absolute cap may lead to rising emissions because of leakage risk. Further, Liu and Wei 
(2016) proposed that linkage between the EU ETS and Chinese ETS without an absolute cap 
may cause an increase in overall carbon emission from fossil fuels.  
On the other hand, one of the most obvious benefits of linking ETSs is economic efficiency 
gain in reducing emissions. Theoretical analyses show that linking ETSs would improve the 
90 
 
reduction efficiency within the cap-and-trade system (Ranson and Stavins, 2016, Dellink et al., 
2013). Simulations based on general equilibrium models provided evidence for this theoretical 
finding. It is demonstrated that uneven carbon prices resulting from fragmented carbon markets 
would reduce economic welfare, while linking carbon markets would make it possible to 
prevent economic loss from emission constraints for all participating parties (Lanzi et al., 
2012). Qi and Weng (2016) simulated the equilibrium carbon price in a global ETS and 
concluded that the reduced cost for Annex I countries would be significantly reduced in this 
global ETS (Qi and Weng, 2016). Another research based on a CGE model also showed that 
the linked carbon market comprising Russia, China and Annex B countries had a lower carbon 
price compared to the price in the Russian domestic carbon market (Bernard et al., 2008). 
Hübler et al. (2014) analysed the best design for linking the Chinese and EU ETSs and 
suggested that the optimal volume of tradable allowances should be limited to 300 Mt/year. 
However, different linkage conditions may affect economic welfare (Alexeeva and Anger, 
2016). For example, allowance allocation plans would impact economic benefits and overall 
compliance costs when linking the EU ETS to emerging emission trading systems such as the 
Chinese ETS (Anger et al., 2009).  
Moreover, ETS linkage can smooth distributional effects among sectors. Regulated sectors may 
lose competitiveness internationally compared to the sectors excluded from the emission cap 
and therefore generate competitiveness distortions (Kachi et al., 2015). By linking emission 
trading systems, these market distortions are supposed to be adjusted. For example, a unilateral 
link with CDM is beneficial for the regulated energy-intensive and export-oriented industries 
under the EU ETS to strengthen their competitiveness in global trade, since obtaining offsets 
from CDM are usually more cost-effective than purchasing EUAs (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 
2010). Choosing the linking parties is of great importance in linking ETSs as abatement costs 
vary between countries. Alexeeva-Talebi and Anger (2007) found that sectoral competitiveness 
faces challenges after integrating emerging schemes in Japan and Canada, but it can be 
controlled by including the Russian ETS as it supplies permits with a much lower price. Finally, 
linkage has a positive effect on carbon market liquidity, (Ranson and Stavins, 2013), but 
appears to have the risk of importing price volatility (Mundaca and Richter, 2013).  
Besides, linkage not only serves as a catalyst for lower emission reduction costs but also a 
political cornerstone for international collaboration for climate change mitigation (Flachsland 
et al., 2009). However, Jiang et al. (2016) considered that linking the Chinese ETS with other 
trading systems would facilitate Chinese climate action but might have adverse effects on 
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China’s energy-intensive industries (Jiang et al., 2016). What’s more, linkage appears to dilute 
the control of a national government over the carbon market (Tuerk et al., 2009). 
Existing research focuses on the evaluation of linking ETS among a small scope of regions, 
mainly the EU or US, although there is a handful of papers examining a global ETS covering 
a wider scope of regions from developed economies to emerging countries (Ellis and Tirpak, 
2006, Dellink et al., 2013, Borghesi et al., 2016). As the effects of linkage mainly rely on the 
relative emission mitigation costs across regions, a broader market provides more flexibility 
for parties to achieve emission reductions at the lowest marginal cost across all covered sectors 
(Qi and Weng, 2016), the difference of research region scope would result in significant 
different evaluation results. Therefore, a multi-regional CGE model (specifically the GTAP-
Energy or GTAP-E model) is employed to capture the impact on emission reductions, 
abatement costs as well as economic growth from ETS linkage among a global scope of regions.  
The CGE model was developed from input-output modelling and can primarily be used to 
analyse the impact of policies on the economy (Wing, 2004). It has been widely used in 
analysing the efficiency of low-carbon policies in the last decade (Bernard et al., 2008, Wang 
et al., 2009, Morris et al., 2010, Hübler, 2011, Jin, 2012, Li et al., 2014a) due to its ability to 
simulate the impact of prospective policies, taking into account inter-sectoral and international 
interactions (Beckman et al., 2011). The extension to the GTAP-E model adds a module for 
substitution effects towards more energy-efficient capital and a module of CO2 emissions 
resulting from the use of emission-generating commodities in the production process (Burniaux 
and Truong, 2002).  
Nijkamp et al. (2005b) tried to extend the basic GTAP-E framework by introducing tradable 
emission permits, joint implementation (JI), and clean development mechanisms (CDM). 
Later, the basic GTAP-E model was modified and improved by incorporating CO2 emissions 
from the combustion of fossil fuels as well as a mechanism to trade emission internationally 
(McDougall and Golub, 2007).  
Uses of the GTAP-E model have ranged from policy options for reducing carbon leakage 
(Antimiani et al., 2013), to the costs of climate mitigation policies (Nijkamp et al., 2005a), to 
the environmental and economic effects of European emissions trading (Kemfert et al., 2006), 






The GTAP-E model is an extension of a base model constructed by the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) team, which offers a general equilibrium model with a detailed treatment of 
international trade flows (Burniaux and Truong, 2002, McDougall and Golub, 2007). The 
GTAP-E model modifies the production structure of the standard GTAP model in order to 
mimic more closely the ability of firms to substitute among alternative fuels as well as between 
labour, capital and energy. 
As a CGE model, it can capture policy impacts across interlinked sectors of the economy, 
including commodity and factor market interactions and bilateral trade relationships, and is a 
well-established tool used to undertake a quantitative analysis of the economic impact of 
energy and environmental policies (Wing, 2004). The basic structure of the model is derived 
from the Walrasian general equilibrium model (Avinash and Norman, 1980). In this study the 
GTAP-E model uses version 5 of the GTAP database, which consists of 66 regions and 57 
sectors. 
 
4.3.1 General features of the CGE Model 
The CGE model is widely used to analyse the aggregate welfare and distributional impacts of 
policies whose effects may be transmitted through multiple markets. The fundamental 
conception for a CGE model is the circular flow of commodities in a closed economy (Figure 
4-1). Households own the factors of production (e.g. labour and capital) and are the final 
consumers of produced commodities. Industries produce goods and services by employing the 
factors of production from households. There is also government, which collects taxes and 
disburses these revenues to industries and households as subsidies and lump-sum transfers.  
A fundamental feature of the CGE model is its representation of the ability of individuals to 
make trade-offs among the inputs to both production and consumption to achieve Walrasian 
general equilibrium. This kind of equilibrium has three important assumptions: zero profit, 




































































































Figure 4-1 Circular flow of goods and services in the model 
 
 Market clearance 
For a given commodity the quantity produced must equal the sum of the quantities that are 
demanded by other industries and households in the economy. Analogously, for a given factor 
the quantities demanded by industries must equal the aggregate supply endowed to the 
households.  
 Zero profit 
In a fully competitive market, producers cannot have any excess profits. The value of 
commodities in the economy must be equal to the total value of all the inputs used to produce 
the commodity. The profits made from production much be allocated either to households for 
factor rentals, other industries for intermediate inputs, or to the government as taxes.  
 Income balance 
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Income balance defines the equilibrium from the household utility side, which means 
households’ factors are fully employed for producing, and households spend all their income 
on commodity purchases or for the purpose of saving.   
In the model, households are modelled as representative agents that are assumed to have Cobb-
Douglas preferences, while industry sectors are modelled as representative agents that are 
assumed to have Cobb-Douglas production technologies. Specifically, the equilibrium prices 
will be estimated by allowing substitution between goods and primary factors, such as capital 
and labour. Substitution allows an assessment of the indirect effect of policies across different 
economic sectors. 
Therefore, households maximise utility 𝑈 by choosing the levels of consumption of the 𝑁 
commodities (𝑐) in the economy, subject to the constraints of income  𝑚, ruling commodity 
prices 𝑝 and saving  𝑠: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑈(𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑛), Subject to 𝑚 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑐𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖)     (4-1) 
Meanwhile, producers maximise profits π by choosing the level of intermediate inputs 𝑥 and 
primary factors 𝑣 to produce output, subject to the constraint of its production technology ∅: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝑖𝑗𝜋𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗𝑦𝑗 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑤𝑓𝑣𝑓𝑗
𝐹
𝑓=1 , Subject to 𝑦𝑗 = ∅𝑗(𝑋1𝑗,, … , 𝑋𝑁𝑗; 𝑣1𝑗 , … , 𝑣𝐹𝑗)    
(4-2) 
International trade links the various regions; products from one region can be exported to the 
rest of the world, and imported goods can enter domestic product markets following the 
Armington assumption (Armington, 1969). 
4.3.2 Model equilibrium 
China is a hypothetical closed free-market economy that is composed of N industries, each of 
which produces its own type of commodity and an unspecified number of households that own 
𝐹  different types of factors, and households can spend their income to purchase the 𝑁 
commodities for the purpose of satisfying 𝐷 types of demands. All production sectors and final 
consumption are modelled using nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
functions, or Cobb-Douglas and Leontief forms, which are special cases of the CES. The model 
is solved using the Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium (MPSGE) 
modelling language.  
Thus, we can have the indices: 
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𝑖 = {1, … , 𝑁} denotes the set of commodities; 
𝑗 = {1, … , 𝑁} denotes the set of sectors; 
𝑓 = {1, … , 𝐹} denotes the set of primary factors; 
𝑑 = {1, … , 𝐷} denotes the set of final demands. 
Therefore, the circular flow in this economy can be completely characterised by three data 
matrices: 𝑁 × 𝑁 input-output matrix of industries’ use of commodities as intermediate inputs, 
denoted by 𝑋; 𝐹 × 𝑁 matrix of primary factor inputs to industries, denoted by 𝑉; and 𝑁 × 𝐷 
matrix of commodity uses by final demand activities, denoted by 𝐺. 
Under the above three conditions, market clearance, zero profit and income balance, the three 
matrixes 𝑋,𝑉 and 𝐺 should be arranged according to a social accounting matrix (SAM), which 
is a snapshot of inter-industry and inter-activity flows of value within an economy that is in 
equilibrium in a particular benchmark period (Wing, 2004).  
  ← j →  ← d →  Total 
  1 … N  1 … D  
↑ 1            𝑦1̅̅ ̅ 
i ⋮  ?̅?    ?̅?    ⋮ 
↓ N          𝑦𝑁̅̅̅̅  
          
↑ 1         𝑉1̅ 
f ⋮  ?̅?       ⋮ 
↓ F         𝑉𝐹̅̅ ̅ 
           
Total 𝑦1̅̅ ̅ … 𝑦𝑁̅̅̅̅   𝐺1̅̅ ̅ … 𝐺𝐷̅̅̅̅    
 




4.4 Model description 
4.4.1 Regions 
Regions in the GTAP-E model are aggregated based on the basis of economic structural 
similarities, membership in trade blocks, and geographical relationships. The model 
disaggregates the world into nine regions, as shown in Table 4-1. 
96 
 
Table 4-1 Regions covered in the model 
Regions Description 
USA United States 
EU27 European Union 
EEFSU Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union 
JPN Japan 
RoA1 Other Annex 1 Countries 
EEx Net Energy Exporters 
CHN China 
IND India 
RoW Rest of the World 
4.4.2 Sectors 
Production within each region is comprised of eight industry sectors, as shown in Table 4-2. 
The aggregation includes a variety of non-energy sectors and energy sectors.  
Table 4-2 Sectors covered in the model 
Type Sector Description 
Non-Energy Agriculture Aggregation of all agriculture products, plus managed 
forest land and logging activities. 
 Energy-intensive industry  Iron and steel, non-metallic minerals products, non-
ferrous metals products, chemical rubber products and 
fabricated metal products. 
 Other industries and services All other industries not included elsewhere, e.g. food, 
tobacco, construction, mining, equipment and others; 
all other services not included elsewhere, e.g. 
communication, finance, public services, dwellings 
and others. 
Energy  Oil Extraction of petroleum. 
 Coal Mining and agglomeration of hard coal, lignite and 
peat. 
 Nature Gas Extraction of natural gas. 
 Petroleum Refined oil and petrochemical products. 
 Electricity Electricity and heat generation, transmission and 
distribution. Electric generation technologies include  






GTAP-E has been specifically designed to simulate policies in the context of GHG mitigation 
(McDougall and Golub, 2007). The scenarios discussed in this section, as shown in Table 4-3, 
are primarily illustrative.  
The first scenario refers to the initial version of the Kyoto Protocol, including the US and China, 
however multilateral trading of emission is not allowed among these countries. The second 
scenario allows multilateral trading between these countries; China is not included in these 
countries. The third scenario includes China in the above global emission trading system in 
scenario 2, in order to compare the impacts of the linkage of a Chinese ETS and the global 
market.  
Table 4-3 Scenarios in the model 
Scenario 1 2 3 
ETS in the model USA    
EU27    
JPN    
RoA1    
CHN    
EEFSU    
EEx    
IND    
RoW    
Multilateral trading    
Description ETS adopted 
separately in 
these countries 
Chinese ETS is 
not included in 
the global carbon 
market 
Chinese ETS is 




Beckman et al. (2011) examined the ability of the GTAP model to reproduce historical price 
volatility in a specific commodity market (wheat). Results of the stochastic simulations 
indicated that the existing GTAP-E model does not perform well against the historical record, 
leading to the conclusion that the energy parameters in the original GTAP-E specification are 
mis-specified. The CGE model may have its drawbacks in an accurate representation of the 
real economy, but it is suitable for climate change policy analysis because forecasting from 
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model simulations is a better solution for assessing emission trading market linkage compared 
to empirical analysis when there is a lack of empirical data.    
In the original and standard GTAP-E, where emission mitigation actions are not defined in the 
model, the only way to reduce emissions is by substitution, while the abatement cost is 
modelled implicitly. Specifically, industries (sectors in the model) are allowed to change fuels 
and factors for production and consumption behaviours of private households and the 
government.  
The model with the standard GTAP database 5 contains data of millions of tonnes of carbon, 
fossil fuel-derived CO2 emissions, including commodities and vehicles. CO2 emissions for 
electricity are equal to zero and equal for all other energy consuming products. Sets, 
parameters, variables and basic functions and initial values are already defined and assigned. 
Simulations need to be carried out by setting the scenarios.  
First of all, in order to assess how emission mitigation shifts the burden from carbon-efficient 
countries to less efficient countries, sectors and regions aggregation have been defined using 
RunGTAP software, which could help generate SAMs for model calibration. 
Second, it is assumed that CO2 emissions in the model are produced by energy consumption of 
industries, government and private households. CO2 emissions can be treated as one of the 
commodities and are proportional to usage, and modelled exogenously by assigning emission 
factor parameters. In the model, an economy-wide cap can be independently set for each region 
as the total CO2 emissions, and the model can be solved to find an equilibrium carbon price in 
each region or, allowing for international trade, a global price.  
The EU and China already have existing emission trading systems, therefore, CO2 emission 
allowances allocated in each regional market are based on their national reduction targets in 
2020. For the EU, the 2020 target is a 21% reduction in GHG emissions from 2010 levels, 
while China’s target is to reduce CO2 intensity by 40%-45% by 2020 based on 2005 levels. 
Since China’s GDP growth maintains a rising trend, we simply set an absolute cap of 40% 
reduction target for China in the model. 
Since CO2 emissions represent, after an ETS is effectively implemented, a cost to the 
production sectors, these sectors will demand cost-minimising amounts of tradable emissions 




4.5 Results and findings 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5 report the emission changes and the corresponding marginal abatement 
costs of meeting the emission limitations. In the first scenario, where the Annex 1 countries, 
the USA and China have their own emission reduction targets and no multilateral trading of 
emission is allowed, the marginal abatement costs corresponding to these reductions range 
from $24.10 in the US and $121.91 in Japan. Marginal costs are lower in the US than in other 
regions because the US uses relatively more coal and taxes energy less heavily. In more carbon-
efficient countries, such as Annex 1 countries, the marginal abatement costs are higher. The 
abatement cost is $29.97 in China to meet the 40% reduction target.   
In terms of the second scenario, where the Chinese carbon market is not included in the global 
carbon trading market and only the Annex 1 countries and the USA need to achieve their 
reduction targets, the marginal cost among those trading countries is $27.62 per tonne of 
carbon. Allowing multilateral trading of emissions among these countries shifts the burden of 
reduction away from oil products in the relatively carbon-efficient economies (EU, Japan and 
the rest of the Annex 1 countries) towards coal in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. 
This induces a substantial reduction of the marginal abatement costs in the above economies. 
The abatement costs in Japan decrease from $121.91 to $27.62 per tonne of carbon while the 
costs in the rest of the Annex I countries (RoA1) drops from $126.19 to $27.62. 
However, in scenario 3 the marginal cost significantly increases to $40.08 if the Chinese carbon 
market is included in the global trading market.  
In terms of economic considerations, the most important reason for linking is the increase in 
cost-effectiveness that results from the reallocation of abatement effort between systems with 
different marginal abatement costs. The system with the higher marginal cost benefits from 
purchasing relatively inexpensive allowances from the other system, allowing it to achieve its 
emission reduction goals at a lower cost. Conversely, the system with the lower marginal cost 
benefits from selling its allowances at higher prices, resulting in an inflow of revenue. 
Practically, in the system with the higher pre-linkage allowance price, firms with high 
abatement costs will benefit from the linkage, and firms with low abatement costs will be hurt 
by linkage, since linking will lower allowance price in the high-price system. Nevertheless, 
although the abatement costs increase in the international ETS scenario, a strong carbon price 
could give investors a right price signal on the value of carbon emissions and incentivise the 
carbon market activity and improve the liquidity in a long-term. 
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Table 4-4 Marginal costs of achieving the reduction target  
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
 1997 USD per ton of carbon 1997 USD per ton of carbon 1997 USD per ton of carbon 
USA 24.1 27.62 40.08 
EU27 40.37 27.62 40.08 
EEFSU 0 27.62 40.08 
JPN 121.91 27.62 40.08 
RoA1 126.19 27.62 40.08 
EEx 0 0 0 
CHN 29.97 0 40.08 
IND 0 0 0 
RoW 0 0 0 
 
It is interesting to find that while emissions are reduced in some countries that are subject to 
binding constraints, they increase in other countries; this suggests the presence of the ‘carbon 
leakage’ phenomenon, which implies that additional emissions will be emitted in those 
countries with no binding constraint relative to the emission reduction in countries with binding 
constraints. For instance, in scenario 1, the emissions in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union increases by 1.91% while emissions in net energy exporting countries increases by 
1.47%. The causes of carbon leakage are multiple and involve competitiveness effects as well 
as the reactions of the world energy markets (Burniaux and Truong, 2002).  
Table 4-5 Emission reduction under different scenarios  
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
 % reduction of emissions % reduction of emissions % reduction of emissions 
USA -17 -17 -17 
EU27 -17 -17 -17 
EEFSU 1.91 0 -28.79 
JPN -30 -30 -30 
RoA1 -40 -40 -40 
EEx 1.47 0.96 1.36 
CHN -40 0.32 -40 
IND -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 




Finally, Chinese stakeholders’ concern about implementing emission trading in China would 
have a negative impact on national GDP. In the scenario of enforcing an emission trading 
mechanism separately, GDP in China decreases by 0.88% (Table 5-6). However, linkage 
between the Chinese carbon market and the international carbon market leads to a considerably 
lower decrease in the GDP in China (0.04%). 
Table 4- 6 GDP changes under different scenarios  
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
 % GDP change % GDP change % GDP change 
USA -0.14 -0.17 -0.26 
EU27 -0.22 -0.14 -0.21 
EEFSU -0.2 -0.46 -0.8 
JPN -0.87 -0.15 -0.22 
RoA1 -1.1 -0.22 -0.32 
EEx -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
CHN -0.88 -0.03 -0.04 
IND 0.11 0.08 0.11 
RoW 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Price convergence and potential efficiency gains are the main drivers for linking carbon 
markets, as the linked schemes create a larger pool of compliance instruments and widen the 
options for carbon mitigation (Ranson and Stavins, 2016). In addition, a larger carbon market 
tends to be more liquid and resilient. The decision to link carbon markets entails political 
compromise and a trade-off between advantages and disadvantages (Haita, 2013) 
Just like international trade in general, trade in emissions allowances has positive effects on 
some participants and negative effects on others. Linkage between emissions trading schemes 
has now been discussed for several years, and and there is an extensive body of literature on 
the merits, demerits, and requirements for linkage. Building on this largely theoretical literature, 
this paper contributes to the analysis and discussion of linking emerging carbon markets with 
international markets by using the GTAP-E model. The study provides an analysis of current 
linkage cases between the major economies, including the European Union, USA, China and 
India.  This insight is then applied to assess the impact on marginal abatement cost, emission 
reduction and GDP from a linked international carbon market. 
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The results show that in China the abatement cost is $29.97 to meet its 40% reduction target, 
and it significantly increases to $40.08 if the Chinese carbon market is included in the global 
trading market. However, allowing multilateral trading of emissions among these countries 
shifts the burden of the reduction away from oil products in the relatively carbon-efficient 
economies. The change in a system’s allowance price, together with the role of participants as 
net buyers or sellers of allowances, determines whether participants win or lose as a result of 
linkage. Buyers in the pre-linkage higher-price scheme and sellers in the pre-linkage lower 
price scheme will benefit from linkage as the former will be able to purchase allowances at a 
lower price while the latter will receive a higher price for the allowances they sell. The results 
imply a win-win situation for both carbon-intensive and carbon-efficient economies.   
Moreover, results from Chapter 2 suggest that stakeholders are concerned that linking the 
Chinese carbon market with the international carbon market might reduce the freedom of 
Chinese climate policy and constrain the Chinese position in future international climate policy 
negotiations. Industry stakeholders also showed concern about the negative impacts on the 
economy as a result of a stringent emissions trading scheme. However, the simulation results 
suggest negative impacts on GDP would be mitigated by the linkage between China and the 
world, as the decrease in GDP would be reduced from 0.88% to 0.04%.  
The top-down GTAP-E model is a suitable method for assessing changes in emission 
reductions and regional economic growth driven by linking regional ETSs, given that empirical 
data are lacking for ex-post empirical studies on international ETS linkage. Meanwhile, a 
bottom-up linkage is an unlikely outcome in the near future due to the difficulties in achieving 
international agreement (Bosetti et al., 2013, Carraro and Sgobbi, 2008). 
However, the model employed has several limitations. First, the CGE model can only work 
under a series of assumptions of the perfect market, which might lead to inaccurate simulation 
results compared to the real world. Second, due to funding constraints, the database used in the 
GTAP-E model is out of date (the benchmark year is 1997). However, the results can still 
generate references for policy consideration and future research directions. Third, the CGE 
model is inaccessible to non-economists, and it is expensive and difficult to operate. 
Additionally, many of the indirect economic relationships that CGE analyses seek to represent 
can be captured in simpler, more transparent models. 
Finally, absolute caps are set in the used model rather than carbon-intensity caps, which might 
cause bias in the results. In addition, some regions covered in the model have renewed their 
103 
 
emission reduction targets, such as the EU and China, which would weaken the indicative value 







Conclusion and policy recommendations 
Policies to reduce GHG emissions and curb global warming are expanding around the world, 
and policy making takes place within increasingly complex systems. When policymakers are 
implementing their policy packages to deliver countries’ own ambitions to move towards 
international climate change commitments, important issues that need to be taken into account 
are the interactions between carbon pricing and other climate change and energy policies, as 
well as uncertainties in integrating domestic carbon pricing systems with the international low-
carbon policy environment.  
ETS, as the main instrument of carbon pricing, is generally considered indispensable for 
enabling cost-effective emission reductions (Ranson and Stavins, 2016). However, it is also 
generally recognised that an ETS alone is not usually sufficient for short-term and long-term 
decarbonisation (Stavins, 2001). Where there is a case for integrated policy packages to tackle 
climate change, carbon pricing systems would interact with other low-carbon and energy 
policies to reduce emissions in the same sector over the same timeframe (Marcantonini et al., 
2017). On the other hand, a global response to climate change is the general trend (Kachi et al., 
2015). The last ten years have seen the growth of linkages between many of the ETSs around 
the world (Ranson and Stavins, 2016). Balancing the expected benefits of integrating domestic 
ETSs with a worldwide system with the expected costs is a priority for policymakers.  
Poor policy integration will undermine energy security and affordability, leading to higher 
costs, investment uncertainty and increased risk of missing emission reduction targets; the 
performance of renewable energy policies and energy markets could also be affected (Schmidt 
and Fleig, 2018).   
This thesis draws on the past few years of experience with carbon markets to examine whether 
other climate change and energy policies will interact with carbon markets, and either reinforce 
or undermine the emission trading systems. Furthermore, potential impacts on achieving 
emission reduction goals and regional economies within a global ETS have been modelled. 
The next section is the summary of the main findings of the thesis, which have implications for 
designing a package of policies that include emission trading systems, and implications for the 
future role that ETS linkage may play in international climate policy architecture. 
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5.1 Summary of findings 
First of all, we conducted a survey with a focus on the interaction of low-carbon and energy 
policies in China, by which we hope to open the discussion and provide policymakers with a 
better understanding of some of the built-in biases and perceptions of key actors as they 
formulate new energy and low-carbon incentive mechanisms.  
The results imply that there is a relatively limited understanding of how other mechanisms 
might affect the price of carbon allowances. Stakeholders believed that renewable targets 
would dampen the carbon price, but a majority expected a carbon tax to actually boost the 
carbon price seen in the market. The interactions between the carbon market and other energy 
and low-carbon policies are generally recognised by academic stakeholders as other policies 
may decrease ‘demand’ in emission trading markets, and such interactions will be a significant 
challenge for implementing a policy package to achieve emission reduction targets.  
We also found that stakeholder understanding of mechanism interactions is associated with the 
time (reported by stakeholders themselves) spent working on energy-saving and emission 
reduction policies. The more working time spent on climate change-related policies, the more 
recognition of potential problems associated with the policy interactions was found among 
stakeholders.  
Moreover, the survey results suggest the economic and energy consumption growth momentum 
was still expected to be strong. However, opinions varied from stakeholders in different sectors. 
Stakeholders from the government sector generally were more hopeful of success in 
significantly reducing GHG emissions in China in the future, and they were far more confident 
than industrial and academic stakeholders about the potential of carbon pricing in China. 
Academic stakeholders tended to consider the progress of ETS development in China to be 
slow, and generally felt pessimistic about Chinese carbon markets due to over-allocation in the 
market and imperfect auditing regulations, even though their expectations of the future market 
price in the Guangdong pilot were relatively higher compared with the expectations of other 
stakeholders. Similarly, industrial stakeholders also showed negative perceptions with regard 
to the impact of the economic cycle on carbon allowance prices.  
The survey findings suggest there are still some important unresolved issues confronting the 
new national system. It would have been more desirable if in the process of implementing the 
national ETS, the Chinese authorities had been able to learn lessons from the pilot systems. 
The lack of transparency in disclosing market information, a lack of awareness among market 
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participants, and an immature MRV system pose uncertainties for carbon markets. The inability 
of many stakeholders to understand that other low-carbon and renewable policies would reduce 
the price in the carbon market reflects the need for greater capacity development among 
industry participants. 
The second study empirically examines the impact of low-carbon parallel policy in seven pilot 
ETSs in China, and looks into the explanatory power of price fundamentals. Based on an event-
based regression, this paper finds contrary results to our hypothesis: the announcements of 
renewable energy policy positively contribute to an increase in carbon price in the Guangdong 
and Hubei markets; second, the empirical results suggest a positive correlation exists between 
the renewable energy supply level and carbon prices in Tianjin market.  
This appears to be divergent from mainstream studies in the EU ETS. However, to some extent, 
the result aligns with the context in China. First, due to the fast-growing economy, the higher 
production level of renewable energy may signal an incremental aggregated demand for 
electricity. Further, given that China has plentiful coal reserves but insufficient gas resources, 
the introduction of more renewable energy to the power grid suggests an increasing demand 
for coal-fired plants as they have higher flexibility and excellent resilience to load changes to 
serve as an alternative power source.  
Moreover, announcements of the use of CCERs and surrender dates influenced the carbon price 
in Shenzhen and Tianjin to varying degrees. The findings suggest that ETS pilots in China are 
segmented and remain relatively inefficient, that many enterprises are not fully aware of the 
benefits of carbon markets; they consider participation in the market as merely fulfilling the 
need for government, social responsibility or corporate strategy. On the other hand, given the 
fact that carbon spot prices do reflect some underlying conditions on micro- and macro-level 
factors, market participants may not be as irrational as some scholars suggest. 
Linkage between ETSs offers several benefits that make it an attractive policy option. Linking 
domestic ETSs with an international one can also be considered as a form of policy integration. 
One key question about the decision to develop links between ETS systems is whether it can 
generate a sufficient quantity of GHG emission reductions at a reasonable cost.  
Building on a substantial amount of theoretical literature, the third study contributes to the 
analysis and discussion of linking emerging carbon markets with the international market by 
using the GTAP-E model. The study provides an analysis of current linkage cases among the 
major economies, including the European Union, the USA, China, and India. This insight is 
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then applied to assess the impact on marginal abatement cost, emission reduction and GDP 
from a linked international carbon market. 
The results show that the abatement cost in China significantly increases when the Chinese 
carbon market is included in the global trading market. Allowing multilateral trading of 
emission among these countries shifts the burden of the reduction away from oil products in 
the relatively carbon-efficient economies. Buyers in the pre-linkage higher-price scheme and 
sellers in the pre-linkage lower price scheme will benefit from linkage as the former will be 
able to purchase allowances at a lower price while the latter will receive a higher price for the 
allowances they sell. The results imply a win-win situation for both carbon-intensive and 
carbon-efficient economies.   
Moreover, results from the survey suggest that stakeholders are concerned that linking the 
Chinese carbon market with the international carbon market might reduce the freedom of 
Chinese climate policy and constrain the Chinese position in future international climate policy 
negotiations. Industry stakeholders also have concerns about the negative impact on the 
economy brought about by a stringent emission trading scheme. However, the simulation 
results suggest negative effects on GDP would be largely offset by the linkage between China 
and the world as the decrease in GDP is reduced. 
 
5.2 Policy implications 
There is no doubt that the costs of decarbonisation over the short term and long term can be 
reduced by implementing a package of policies including carbon pricing, energy efficiency, 
technology development and deployment, and support to overcome underlying infrastructure 
or financing barriers. A key question to ask in developing the policy package is what the 
objectives for each policy are. Policy makers need to uncover relevant policy overlaps which 
need to be taken into consideration. Additionally, policymakers need to have a better 
understanding of the degree of overlaps and interactions, and how to manage these interactions. 
As national circumstances will make the optimal policy mix unique to each country, there is 
no single set of solutions to integrating the carbon market with other low-carbon and energy 
policies. Most of the research in this thesis has been conducted within the Chinese context. 
With such a short preparation period, the development of the seven pilot carbon markets in 
China has been an experiment for designing a nationwide ETS based on diverse economic 
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structures through a learning-by-doing approach, which will provide valuable experience for 
building a robust national and integrated carbon market.  
Drawing on the above findings, we offer the following policy recommendations: 
 Government and other key stakeholders have focused too much on the price and volume 
of carbon allowances in China’s pilot ETS schemes; stakeholders and policymakers should 
seek to continuously assess and improve the quality of regulation, market integrity and 
information disclosure. Therefore, stakeholders should reconsider ‘what does a well-
functioning carbon market look like?’  
 The inability of many stakeholders to understand that other low-carbon and renewable 
policies would reduce the price in the carbon market reflects the need for greater capacity 
development among industry participants. 
 As the carbon market is not likely to be the only major low-carbon policy instrument in 
China, a correct interpretation of the carbon pricing signal is needed as part of capacity 
development among industry participants.  
 Given the fact that the current carbon price in China’s ETSs is not market-efficient, 
alternative carbon pricing signals, such as a carbon floor price, should be proposed along 
with a carbon market allowance price to signal to industry the short-term and long-term 
cost of carbon emissions. Industry is also encouraged to develop an internal carbon price 
for investment valuation or project appraisal.  
 Regulators and carbon exchanges should provide more transparent, real-time information 
for market participants to facilitate price setting.  
 The Chinese Government should seek an efficient way to improve the MRV systems and 
establish a set of best practices to provide greater confidence for market participants.  
 More effort should be placed on improving the compatibility of carbon markets. China has 
the relatively rare advantage of having conducted seven pilots with varying specifications, 
so it is important that time is taken to learn from the different pilots.  
 As carbon market linkages could provide a more cost-effective way for achieving emission 
reduction targets, the Chinese government should ensure comprehensive analysis is 
conducted on the feasibility of carbon market linkage as well as sector or regional linkage 





5.3 Limitations and scope for future work 
This section concludes with the limitations and self-reflections of my PhD study, with a 
discussion of potential future work for improving and expanding on the current research. 
5.3.1 Comprehensive review on stakeholder views on carbon market 
The sample size and the relatively low response rate are limitations of the current survey. 
However, from the literature there is no set-in-stone minimum sample size or response rate; 
suitable analytical methods and statistical options could help to control for limited coverage. 
Therefore, for future survey studies, the literature should be reviewed extensively to find 
optimal methodologies for studies according to the sample size; for instance, t-test could be an 
appropriate alternative statistical analysis technique for relatively small samples. Second, the 
main topic of the study is not prominent enough as many themes are covered in the survey, 
which weakens the valid lessons drawn from the study. Future studies will need to be more 
focused on specific research questions. 
Since I conducted an in-depth assessment of the perspectives of different key stakeholders of 
the Guangdong pilot only, which was before launching the national system, a comprehensive 
review across all seven pilots or the newly released national ETS would be beneficial. In 
addition, there might be potential to identify shifting patterns in stakeholder perspectives. 
The experience of carrying out the survey as my first PhD study was very meaningful for me. 
Qualitative research is not my expertise; the research idea was originally generated from the 
Research Design course during the first year of my PhD. The course provided a systematic 
introduction to qualitative research methods, from which I benefited a lot. The survey in 
Chapter 2 was originally generated as an assignment of the course, I did not lay it up after the 
course but to start to conduct the survey by polishing the questionnaire again and again. I still 
feel that the survey could have included many other questions of importance; however, once 
the questionnaires were sent, they could not be revised anymore. I spent a lot of time revising 
the questions and waiting for responses. However, such a low response rate became an obstacle 
for conducting in-depth statistical analysis.  I finished the paper eventually, although there were 
lots of difficulties. This is the first qualitative research in my PhD study; it taught me a lot 
about doing qualitative research.  
5.3.2 Quantitative assessment of policy interactions 
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As there are hardly any studies that have looked into price behaviour discovery in China’s ETS 
market, it is difficult to find sufficient proof and examples to support the arguments in Chapter 
3. Moreover, there are huge heterogeneities across the seven pilot ETSs; it is difficult to find 
evidence to explain the disparate results in different regions. 
In addition, to further improve the study, the events (such as announcements of ETS 
institutional policy and CCERs offset regulations) adopted in the event-based study could be 
divided according to their potential effects (hypothetically positive or negative) on the market 
prices, in order to generate more accurate results.  
Meanwhile, the insignificant results in the current regression could possibly be caused by 
inactive trading or trading driven by other external factors such as government commitment or 
media effects. Along with the establishment of a national ETS in China, public acceptance, 
market perception, and the design and operation of ETSs in China will be improved with larger 
size of dataset. Market trading would be more active, and the patterns and determinants of 
carbon prices for a longer trading period would be more easily identified. Therefore, a more 
comprehensive dataset could be employed in the future with updated market data to further 
investigate the dynamic relationship between energy and low-carbon policy. Additionally, an 
extended and revised CGE model could also be employed to quantitatively assess the impact 
from interactions between renewable energy obligations and carbon market mechanisms.  
The idea of investigating price drivers in China’s carbon market was my PhD application 
proposal. When I started my PhD, China started piloting ETSs. I worked on this study during 
the last year of my PhD, as I had to wait for empirical Chinese carbon market trading data after 
a certain trading period. The data collection was a difficult process, as information on China’s 
pilot ETSs is incomplete and not transparent. Not only are the data in the carbon markets 
difficult to access, but also the energy markets. I have conducted on investigations into all 
seven pilots but most of the literature focuses on one or two pilots. However, doing more work 
does not mean better; the heterogeneous results among the seven pilots are very interesting but 
difficult to interpret.  
5.3.3 Validating energy-oriented CGE models 
In terms of the third study, which assessed the impact of carbon market linkage via a CGE 
model, learning to construct a CGE model was a difficult and long process for me. The original 
idea was to construct a multi-regional CGE model based on the General Algebraic Modelling 
System (GAMS), but it was too expensive to purchase a GAMS licence. Therefore, I chose 
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GTAP based on the General Equilibrium Modelling PACKage (GEMPACK) instead. The 
majority of CGE modelling work uses the GTAP database (in GAMS or GEMPACK), as it 
provides a user-friendly software, RunGTAP, for generating Social Accounting Metrics 
(SAMs) for the CGE model. However, the newly released GTAP database is very expensive, 
therefore the database used in this study is old. The main limitation of employing the CGE 
model for climate change policy assessment is that the models are inaccessible to non-
economists, and expensive and difficult to operate.  
Secondly, many of the indirect economic relationships that CGE analyses seek to represent can 
be captured in simpler, more transparent models; for instance, partial equilibrium techniques. 
Additionally, input-output relationships among industries have been analysed without the 
added layer of CGE techniques. Therefore, future studies could seek alternative techniques 
such as partial equilibrium for simulating policy interactions between ETSs and renewable 
energy in China by implementing renewable obligation or standard policy in the economy.  
5.3.4 Bottom-up approach for ETS linking 
As the top-down international linkage of ETSs is rather difficult due to political negotiation, 
future research could seek to develop a simple bottom-up approach for linking ETSs based on 
actual mitigation efforts. The benefits of linking are clear; a broader market provides more 
flexibility for parties to achieve emission reductions at the lowest marginal cost across all 
covered sectors. The following example explores efficiency gains from a two-way direct 
linkage.  
The two oblique lines 𝑀𝐴𝐶 𝐴 and 𝑀𝐴𝐶 𝐵 (Figure 5-1) show the marginal abatement costs of 
reducing emissions in jurisdictions 𝐴 and 𝐵 respectively, and 𝑄𝑎𝑢𝑡 is the quantity of emissions 
that a system would emit during a certain period. Before linking, the domestic allowance prices 
are 𝑃𝑎𝑢𝑡𝐴 and 𝑃𝑎𝑢𝑡𝐵  respectively. After linking, the system with the higher marginal cost 
(𝑀𝐴𝐶 𝐵) benefits from purchasing relatively inexpensive allowances from the other system, 
which is shown as area 𝑋, allowing it to achieve its emission reduction goals at a lower cost. 
Conversely, the system with the lower marginal cost ( 𝑀𝐴𝐶 𝐴 ) benefits from selling its 
allowances at higher prices, resulting in an inflow of revenue, which is shown as area 𝑌. The 
free flow of allowances between systems results in an equalisation of prices 𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 and leads to 
the cost-effective allocation of abatement efforts across the linked systems. Therefore, the 
efficiency gain from linkage in a compliance period is equal to the total difference between the 
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sum of the mitigation costs of the two ETS jurisdictions before and after linkage, which is the 












Figure 5-1 Simplified illustration of the distribution of efficiency gains when linking two 
ETSs (assuming carbon prices of two systems converge after linkage) 
 
Given the combined reduction target of two jurisdictions is constant  𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 = 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑡 , the 
efficiency gains from linkage in a compliance period 𝑤 is (𝐺𝑙,𝑤), which is equal to the total 
difference between the sum of mitigation costs of the two ETS jurisdictions before and after 



































)  (5-1) 
Benefits are determined by the price before linkage 𝑃𝑎𝑢𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡, the price after linkage  𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
and the quantity of emission reductions, which implies that the extent to which linked systems 
yield efficiency gains depends on the heterogeneity of the linked systems. A larger, more 
diverse system will likely have more options with different associated abatement costs. In 
contrast, linking systems with similar abatement costs will likely have limited potential for 
efficiency gains (Ranson and Stavins, 2016, Burtraw et al., 2013, Blyth and Bosi, 2004) 
113 
 
This work may involve an in-depth evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
risks of measuring baseline and over-allocation of emissions at the individual entity level. 
Secondly, the practical challenges of measuring over-allocation should be addressed. This may 
involve exploring and comparing both top-down and bottom-up methodologies and identifying 
key indicators for estimating the amount of ‘leftover allowances’ that have resulted from the 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire results 
         
Q1. Which of the following options best describe your sector? 





% of respondents to Q1 (%)  26.67 13.33 10.00 25.00 20.00 10.00 3.33  
Number of respondents to 
Q1 
8 4 3 5 6 3 1  
         
Q2 Which of the following options best describe your role within your organisation? 
 Economics 
or finance           
Engineering Managerial   Research None of above, 
please specify 
   
% of respondents to Q2 26.67 23.33 16.67 30.00 3.33    
Number of respondents to 
Q2 
8 7 5 9 1, low-carbon 
certification and 
verification 
   
         
Q3 How much of your working time have you spent on energy saving and emission reduction policies in China in the past year? 
 Less than 
20% 
20% to 50%               >50% to 70%             >70% to 90%             More than 90%           
% of respondents to Q3 36.67 30.00 23.33 10.00 0.0    
Number of respondents to 
Q3 
11 9 7 3 0    
         
Q4 How much of your working time on Chinese carbon trading system occupied in your total working time on energy saving and emission 
reduction policies in China according to question 3? 
 Less than 
20% 
20% to 50%               >50% to 70%             >70% to 90%             More than 90%           
% of respondents to Q4 76.67 13.33 6.67 0.0 3.33    
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Number of respondents to 
Q4 
23 4 2 0 1    
         
Q5  Which channels do you use to obtain up-to-date information about Chinese carbon market?  
 Books Newspapers TV news                                    Internet Conference Government 







         
Votes 7 17 10 24 20 6 8 0 
         
Q6  To what extent do you consider yourself be familiar with the portfolio of carbon reduction incentive mechanisms?  e.g.  Emission 
Trading Scheme, carbon taxation, etc. 






Very familiar    
% of respondents to Q6 10.00 23.33 20.00 36.37 10.00    
Number of respondents to 
Q6 
3 7 6 11 3    
         




Unlikely  Not sure Likely  Very likely    
% of respondents to Q7 23.33 26.67 20.00 26.67 3.33    
Number of respondents to 
Q7 
7 8 6 8 1    
         
Q8 Which of the following do you think would be the most cost-effective policy instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in China? 
(If not sure, you can skip the question) 
 Emission 
Trading 
Scheme                                             
Carbon Taxation                                                             Feed-in Tariffs




obligation     
Preferential policy 
for natural gas and 
encouragement 










% of respondents to Q8 33.33 26.67 3.33 16.67 16.67 3.33 0.0  
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Number of respondents to 
Q8 
10 8 1 5 5 1 0  
         
Q9  Which of the following do you think would be the second most cost-effective policy instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
China? (If not sure, you can skip the question) 
 Emission 
Trading 
Scheme                                             
Carbon Taxation                                                             Feed-in Tariffs




obligation     
Preferential policy 
for natural gas and 
encouragement 










% of respondents to Q9 33.33 33.33 3.33 10.00 16.67 3.33 0.0  
Number of respondents to 
Q9 
10 10 1 3 5 1 0  
         
Q10 The EU ETS is the largest carbon market in the world, but the price of carbon emission is volatile and has been at a low level in the last 
two years. Which of the following factors do you think would be the main reasons that explain the collapse of the carbon price in the 













due to the 






such as carbon 
tax, renewable 
target or FITs 
Failure of United 
Nations 







         
Votes  18 12 5 5 9 0   
         





Not sure Relatively 
optimistic 
very optimistic    
% of respondents to Q11 6.67 23.33 36.67 33.33 0.0    
Number of respondents to 
Q11 
2 7 11 10 0    
         
Q12 How you would assess progress in the seven cities pilot carbon trading system project in China? 
 Too slow Relatively slow Average Relatively fast Too fast    
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% of respondents to Q12 13.33 26.67 23.33 26.67 10.00    
Number of respondents to 
Q12 
4 8 7 8 3    
         
Q13  Taking Guangdong pilot carbon market as example, which range of average carbon price in the seven cities pilot carbon market do you 
think would be expected by the end of 2014? (If not sure, you can skip the question) 
 0-25CNY/t 
CO2                        
26-50 CNY/t CO2                    51-100 CNY/t 
CO2                    
101-200 CNY/t 
CO2                    
Above 200 CNY/t 
CO2               
   
% of respondents to Q13 3.33 26.67 36.37 13.33 0.0    
Number of respondents to 
Q13 
1 8 11 4 0    
         
Q14  If a higher than expected short-term renewable energy target is enacted in the pilot cities (e.g. renewable energy target increases 




Small decrease unchanged Small increase Large increase    
% of respondents to Q14 3.33 46.67 20.00 23.33 3.33    
Number of respondents to 
Q14 
1 14 6 7 1    
         
Q15 If an unexpected national carbon tax is suddenly announced for immediate implementation across all major industry sectors (power, 
cement, refinery, etc.), what do you think will be the most likely immediate impact on the carbon price in these pilot carbon markets? 
(If not sure, you can skip the question) 
 Large 
decrease 
Small decrease unchanged Small increase Large increase    
% of respondents to Q15 13.33 10.00 13.33 36.67 16.67    
Number of respondents to 
Q15 
4 3 4 11 5    
         
Q16  To what extend do you agree with the following statement: Multiple Energy Saving and Emission Reducing incentives, such as ‘cap and 
trade’ system, carbon taxation, renewable energy obligation, emission performance standard etc., may be conflicting, and generate 
different cost and benefit under different situations. 
 Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Not sure agree Strongly agree    
% of respondents to Q16 0.0 23.33 33.33 43.33 0.0    
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Number of respondents to 
Q16 
0 7 10 13 0    
         
Q17 To what extend do you agree with the following statement: Integrating the Chinese carbon trading market into the international 




disagree Not sure agree Strongly agree    
% of respondents to Q17 0.0 13.33 50.00 36.67 0.0    
Number of respondents to 
Q17 
0 4 15 11 0    
         
Q18  In regard to the monitoring, report and verification (MRV) system, please give rank from 1 t0 6 the following potential challenges that 
you think would negatively affect the carbon market from the most important to the least important. You can also tick ‘Not sure’ if 




















   
Average ranking 1.81 2.58 2.85 3.96 3.73    
         
Q19 In regard to the implementation of Chinese carbon trading market, please give rank from 1 t0 5 the following potential challenges that 
you think would negatively affect the carbon market from the most important to the least important. You can also tick ‘I do not know’ 



























Other energy and 
low-carbon policies 





decrease demand of 
emission reduction 
in carbon trading 
market; 





Average ranking 1.70 2.27 3.38 3.92 3.69    
         
Q20 Can you indicate any other challenges you think are relevant that an ETS in China might confront? 
 Yes, please 
specify     
No, I think the 
challenges listed 
above already 
covered them all 
      
% of respondents to Q20 36.67 73.33       
Number of respondents to 
Q20 
8 22       
         
Q21 Would you like to be invited in the future to take part in further research? 
 Yes, I’m 
glad to 
Sorry, I don’t 
want to be 
invited 
      
% of respondents to Q21 63.33 36.67       
Number of respondents to 
Q21 
19 11       
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Appendix B: Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Chongqing Beijing Shanghai Guangdong Shenzhen Tianjin Hubei 
        
Gas 0.154 0.276 0.408 1.878*** -0.111 -0.290 -0.0763 
 (0.395) (0.276) (0.331) (0.632) (0.433) (0.581) (0.168) 
        
Coal 0.498 0.0937 -0.680 -0.155 -0.214 -0.163 -0.162 
 (1.187) (0.193) (0.726) (0.408) (0.321) (0.310) (0.162) 
        
Crude Oil 0.108 0.462** 0.444** 0.113 -0.0132 -0.452 -0.181 
 (0.417) (0.216) (0.182) (0.208) (0.163) (0.371) (0.165) 
        
CSI_300 0.619 -0.0749 -0.479 0.0687 0.0258 -0.205 0.0455 
 (0.398) (0.143) (0.339) (0.140) (0.124) (0.167) (0.125) 
        
Extreme weather 0.0250 -0.00384 0.00453 0.000880 0.00921* -0.00217 0.00199 
 (0.0203) (0.00336) (0.00572) (0.00739) (0.00482) (0.00367) (0.00259) 
        
Re_prdct 0.00197 -0.000319 0.000807 -0.000560 0.000136 0.00129* 0.000290 
 (0.00130) (0.000306) (0.000598) (0.000525) (0.000309) (0.000756) (0.000250) 
        
Renewable policy 0.0164 -0.0204 0.0248 0.0649** -0.0169 0.00480 0.0169* 
 (0.0246) (0.0287) (0.0345) (0.0256) (0.0277) (0.0182) (0.00901) 
        
Surrender Date -0.0368 0.00760 0.00778 0.0454 -0.0663** -0.115 0.00303 
 (0.0444) (0.0199) (0.0702) (0.0536) (0.0261) (0.158) (0.0266) 
        
CCER 0.0268 0.00247 0.0390 (0.0256) (0.0277) 0.0344* 0.0260 
 (0.0597) (0.0132) (0.0468) 0.0247 0.00492 (0.0205) (0.0197) 
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R-squared 0.061 0.060 0.063 0.144 0.037 0.080 0.032 
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
        
 
Energy 0.115 0.112 0.115 0.0159 0.0126 -0.360 -0.291 
 (0.410) (0.436) (0.410) (0.423) (0.309) (0.370) (0.256) 
Material -0.213 0.0603 -0.213 0.455 0.0599 -0.452 -0.266 
 (0.355) (0.394) (0.355) (0.737) (0.331) (0.453) (0.223) 
Consumption -0.262 -0.167 -0.262 -0.180 -0.107 -0.0205 0.228 
 (0.395) (0.373) (0.395) (0.641) (0.314) (0.494) (0.184) 
State-owned -0.120 -0.0695 -0.120 -0.253 0.0925 0.567* 0.376* 
 (0.339) (0.212) (0.339) (0.392) (0.227) (0.303) (0.193) 
R-squared 0.018 0.002 0.018 0.006 0.001 0.027 0.029 
HAC standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C: Policy events data 
DATE RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY EVENTS  
2014/6/7 国务院办公厅关于印发能源发展战略行动计划（2014-2020）的通知 
 (General Office of the State Council) Notice on Issuing the Strategic Action Plan for Energy 
Development (2014-2020) 
2014/5/15 国务院办公厅关于印发 2014-2015 节能减排低碳发展行动方案的通知 
 (General Office of the State Council) Notice on Issuing the 2014-2015/Action Plan for 
energy conservation Emission-reduction and Low-carbon Development 
2015/10/29 中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的建议 
 (Central Committee of Communist Party of China) Suggestion for Formulating the 13th 
Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development 
2015/5/12 关于印发《节能减排补助资金管理暂行办法》的通知 
 Notice on issuing the Interim Measures for Management of Energy-conversation Emission-
reduction subsidiaries   
2015/3/20 国家发展改革委 国家能源局关于改善电力运行调节促进清洁能源多发满发的指导意
见 
 (National Development Reform Commission, National Energy Administration) Guiding 
opinion on improving the electrical operation and regulation, promoting the full power 
generation of the clean energy 
2016/12/29 国家能源局 国家海洋局关于印发《海上风电开发建设管理办法》的通知 
 (National Energy Administration, State Oceanic Administration) Notice on issuing the 
Administrative Measures for Offshore Wind Power Development and Construction 
2016/12/26 国家发展改革委 国家能源局关于印发能源发展“十三五”规划的通知 
 (National Development Reform Commission, National Energy Administration) Notice on 
issuing the “13th Five-Year” Plan for Energy Development 
2016/12/8 《太阳能发展“十三五”规划》的通知 
 Notice on the “13th Five-Year” Plan for Solar Energy Development 
2016/11/29 水电发展“十三五”规划 
 The “13th Five-Year” Plan for Water Power Development  
2016/11/16 国家能源局关于印发《风电发展“十三五”规划》的通知 
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on issuing the “13th Five-Year” Plan for Wind 
Power Development 
2016/11/7 电力发展“十三五”规划 
 The  “13th Five-Year” Plan for Wind Power Development 
2016/10/28 国家能源局关于印发《生物质能发展“十三五”规划》的通知 
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on issuing the “13th Five-Year” Plan for the 
Biomass Energy Development 
2016/10/17 下达第一批光伏扶贫项目的通知 
 Notice on issuing the first group of PV poverty alleviation projects 
2016/7/22 《可再生能源调峰机组优先发电试行办法》 
 Trial Measures for Preferential Power Generation of the Renewable Energy Cycling Unit    
2016/7/11 关于做好 2016 年度煤炭消费减量替代有关工作的通知 
 Notice on performing the work relevant to reduction and substitution of coal consumption 
in 2016  
2016/6/3 国家能源局关于下达 2016 光伏发电建设实施方案的通知 
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on issuing the implementation schemes for 2016/ 
PV power generation construction 
2016/5/27 国家发展改革委 国家能源局关于做好风电、光伏发电全额保障性收购管理工作的通
知 
 (National Development Reform Commission, National Energy Administration) Notice on 
performing the full indemnificatory  acquisition management of the wind power and PV 
power generation 
2016/4/5 关于实施光伏发电扶贫工作的意见 




 (National Development Reform Commission) Notice on issuing the Full Indemnificatory 
Acquisition Management Measures for the Renewable Energy Power Generation 
2016/3/22 国家能源局关于印发 2016/能源工作指导意见的通知 
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on issuing the 2016/ guiding opinions on energy 
work 
2016/3/17 国家能源局关于下达 2016 全国风电开发建设方案的通知 
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on issuing the 2016 national schemes for wind 
power development construction 
2016/3/17 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要 
 The 13th Five-Year Plan outline for the national economy and social development of the 
People’s Republic of China 
2016/3/11  国家能源局关于做好 2016 度风电消纳工作有关要求的通知 
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on performing the requirements relevant to wind 
power assimilating in 2016 
2016/2/29 国家能源局关于建立可再生能源开发利用目标引导制度的指导意见 
 (National Energy Administration) Guiding opinions on establishing the goal-directed 
system of renewable energy development and utilization  
2016/2/5 国家能源局关于做好“三北”地区可再生能源消纳工作的通知 
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on performing the renewable energy assimilating 
in the “three northern areas of China” 
2017/5/27 国家能源局关于加快推进分散式接入风电项目建设有关要求的通知  
 (National Energy Administration) Notice on promoting the requirements relevant to the 
distributed-access wind power project construction  
06/06/2017 国家能源局综合司关于开展北方地区可再生能源清洁取暖 
 Cleaning and warming of renewable energy developed in the Northern areas by the 
National Energy Administration, Comprehensive Department 
25/04/2017 国家发改委、国家能源局印发《能源生产和消费革命战略（2016-2030） 
 Energy Production and Consumption Revolution Strategies (2016-2030) issued by the 
National Development Reform Commission, National Energy Administration 
14/03/2017 暂缓受理温室气体自愿减排交易备案申请 
 Filing application for suspended accepting of greenhouse gas voluntary emission reduction 
trading  
21/02/2017 国家发展改革委 住房城乡建设部关于印发气候适应型城市建设试点工作的通知 
 (National Development Reform Commission, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development   Notice on issuing the pilot work of climate-adapted city construction  
  
 Guangdong ETS Policy Events: Surrender Date & CCER 
20/06/2017 2016 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2016 
14/04/2017 广东省发展改革委关于碳普惠制核证减排量管理的暂行办法》 
 (Guangdong Development Reform Commission) Interim Measures for the Management of 
Carbon GSP and Certification Emission Reduction  
09/01/2017 广东省发展改革委关于印发《广东省控排企业使用国家核证自愿减排量（CCER）抵
消 2016 年度实际碳排放工作指引》的通知 
 (Guangdong Development Reform Commission) Notice on issuing the Working Instruction 
for the Emission-control Enterprises in Guangdong Province Adopting the National 
Certification for Voluntary Emission Reduction and Set-off in 2016 
20/06/2016 2015 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2015 
23/06/2015 2014 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2014 
15/07/2014 2013 年度配额履约截止日期 




 Shenzhen ETS Policy Events: Surrender Date & CCER  
30/06/2017 Allowance surrender for the year of 2016 
12/06/2017 深圳市发展和改革委员会关于按时足额提交配额完成 2016 年度碳排放履约义务有关
事宜的公告 
 (Shenzhen Development Reform Commission) Announcement about submitting the quota 
on time in full and completing the matters relevant to the obligations of 2016 Carbon 
emission fulfilment  
30/06/2016 2015 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2015 
30/06/2015 2014 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2014 
10/06/2015 深圳排放权交易所核证自愿减排量(CCER)项目挂牌上市细则（暂行） 
 Detailed rules and regulations for public listing of voluntary emission reduction projects 
certified by Shenzhen emission right exchange (Interim) 
08/06/2015 深圳市发展改革委关于印发《深圳市碳排放权交易市场抵消信用管理规定（暂
行）》的通知 
 (Shenzhen Development Reform Commission) Notice on issuing the Administrative 
Regulations for Set-off Credit of Shenzhen Carbon Emission Right Trading Market (Interim) 
30/06/2014 Allowance surrender for the year of 2013 
  
   Beijing ETS Policy Events: Surrender Date & CCER 
15/06/2016 2015 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2015 
15/06/2015 2014 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2014 
01/09/2014 关于印发北京市碳排放权抵消管理办法（试行）的通知 
 Notice on issuing the management methods for CCER in Beijing (Trail)  
15/06/2014 2013 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Surrender Data for the year of 2013 
  
 Chongqing ETS Regulatory Events: Surrender Date & CCER 
10/11/2016 关于下达 2015 年度审定碳排放量和碳排放配额（调整）的通知 
 Notice on issuing the audited Carbon emission and Carbon Allowance Quota (adjustment) 
in 2015 
18/11/2016 2015 年度履约截止 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2015 
23/06/2015 2013-2014 年度履约截止 
 Allowance surrender for the year of from 2013 to 2014 
25/05/2015 关于抓紧做好 2013 -  2014 年 度碳排放配额清缴工作的通知 
 Notice on performing the clearance of Carbon emission quota from 2013 to 2014 
15/02/2015 关于开展 2014 年度碳排放报告工作的通知 
 Notice on developing the reports on the Carbon emission in 2014 
12/02/2015 关于下达重庆市 2014 年度碳排放配额的通知 
 Notice on issuing the Carbon emission quota of Chongqing in 2014 
11/12/2014 关于下达 2013 年度审定碳排放量和碳排放配额（调整）的通知 
 Notice on issuing the audited Carbon emission and Carbon emission quota (adjustment) in 
2013 
  
 Shanghai ETS Regulatory Events: Surrender Date & CCER 
30/06/2017 2016 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2016 
30/06/2016 2015 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2015 
30/06/2015 2014 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2014 
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01/06/2015 关于本市碳交易试点企业使用国家核证自愿减排量进行 2014 年度履约清缴有关工作
的通知 
 Notice on the Carbon trading pilot enterprises in this city using the national CCER for 
voluntary emission reduction and performing the work relevant to the fulfilment clearance 
in 2014 
21/04/2015 关于本市碳排放交易试点期间进一步规范使用抵消机制有关规定的通知 
 Notice on further regulating use of the rules relevant to the carbon offsets mechanism 
(CCER) 
08/01/2015 关于本市碳排放交易试点期间有关抵消机制使用规定的通知 
 Notice on rules of use for the relevant carbon offsets mechanism (CCER) 
30/06/2014 2014 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2013 
  
 Tianjin ETS Regulatory Events: Surrender Date & CCER 
30/06/2017 2016 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2016 
30/06/2016 2015 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2015 
10/07/2015 2014 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2014 
25/07/2014 2013 年度配额履约截止日期 
 Allowance surrender for the year of 2013 
  
 Hubei ETS Regulatory Events: Surrender Date & CCER 
07/06/2017 省发展改革委关于 2017 年湖北省碳排放权抵消机制有关事项的通知 
 (Provincial Development Reform Commission) Notice on CCER Mechanism of Carbon 
Emission in Hubei Province in 2017 
25/07/2016 碳排放履约截止日期 
 Surrender date for the carbon emission for the year of 2015  
10/07/2015 碳排放履约截止日期 
 Allowance Surrender for the year of 2014 
17/04/2015 关于 2015 年湖北省碳排放权 抵消机制有关事项的通知 




Appendix D: Cross-correlation of all variables11 
 
 
                                                          
11 Panel A: CQ, BJ, SH stand for Chongqing, Beijing, Shanghai ETS pilots, respectively. GD, SZ, TJ, HB refer to ETS pilot in Guangdong, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Hubei. 
Carbon prices refer to weekly returns of each pilot. 
Panel B: ew_location refers to the extreme weather level calculated at a weekly frequency for each pilot. re stands for the aggregated national production level of renewable 
energy. S_300 is weekly average closing prices from CSI 300 index which incorporates stocks in Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges. Oil_ara represents weekly average spot 
prices of the Arabian Dubai Fateh Crude Oil. Coal denotes weekly average prices of China Qinhuangdao 5500 kcal/kg. Gas refers to the weekly average prices of China 
commodities Liquid Nature Gas (LNG). 
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Appendix E: Equilibriums of CGE model  
In the CGE model, households are modelled as representative agents that are assumed to have 
Cobb-Douglas preferences, while industry sectors are modelled as representative agents that 
are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas production technologies. Specifically, the equilibrium 
prices will be estimated by allowing substitution within goods and primary factors, such as 
capital and labour. Substitution allows an assessment of the indirect effect of policies across 
different economic sectors.  
 Household Behaviour: maximize utilities 
Therefore, households maximize utility by choosing the levels of consumption of the 𝑁 
commodities in the economy, subject to the constraints of income𝑚, ruling commodity prices 
𝑝 and saving 𝑠:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑈(𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑛),  
Subject to 𝑚 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑐𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖) 
Thus, the demand function for the consumption of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ commodity is: 
c𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖





Where the parameters 𝛼𝑖 are the share of each good in expenditure on consumption, in which 
𝛼1 + ⋯ 𝛼𝑛 = 1 
 Industry Behaviour: maximize profits 
Producers maximize profits π by choosing the level of intermediate inputs 𝑥  and primary 
factors 𝑣 to produce output, subject to the constraint of its production technology∅: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝑖𝑗𝜋𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗𝑦𝑗 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑤𝑓𝑣𝑓𝑗
𝐹
𝑓=1 ,  
Subject to 𝑦𝑗 = ∅𝑗(𝑋1𝑗,, … , 𝑋𝑁𝑗; 𝑣1𝑗 , … , 𝑣𝐹𝑗) 










Where parameters 𝛽𝑖𝑗 and 𝛾𝑓𝑗are shares of each input in the cost of production, in which 𝛽1𝑗  +
⋯ 𝛽𝑁𝑗 = 1 and  𝛾1𝑗  + ⋯ 𝛾𝑁𝑗 = 1 
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 General Equilibrium 
Market clearance, zero profit and income balance are the three conditions for general 
equilibrium. Therefore, the quantity of each commodity produced must equal the sum of the 
quantities of that commodity demanded by j producers in the economy as an intermediate input, 
and by households as an input to consumption and saving activities: 
y𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝐽=1
+ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖 
In addition, the quantities of primary factor f must equal to the endowment of that factor: 




Meanwhile, the value of output must equal the value of input of intermediate and primary 
factors: 







At last, the income must equal the payment for the use of primary factors: 




Let’s substituting the equations of demand functions for consumption, intermediate input and 
primary factors input into above equations, we can obtain the divergence ∆𝑖
𝐶 between 
commodity supply and demand,  ∆𝑓
𝐹 between primary factor supply and demand, ∆𝑗
𝜋 excess 






𝑓=1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗
𝑁






















Hence, the general equilibrium can be generated by jointly minimizing the above equations.   
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Table details of variables denotations 
Variables Denotation 
𝒄 Consumption of commodity 
𝒎 Households’ income 
𝒑 Commodity price 
𝒔 Households’ saving 
𝒗 Households’ primary factors 
𝒘 Households’ wages for factors 
𝒙 Intermediate inputs 
𝒚 Outputs of industry  
𝑼 Households’ utility 
𝜶 Share of each good in expenditure on consumption 
𝜷 Share of each intermediate inputs in the cost of production  
𝜸 Share of each factor inputs in the cost of production 
𝝅 Enterprises’ profit 
∅ Constraints of production technology 
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